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ABSTRACT 
 
Bulk electric system reliability analysis is an important activity in both vertically 
integrated and unbundled electric power utilities. Competition and uncertainty in the 
new deregulated electric utility industry are serious concerns. New planning criteria with 
broader engineering consideration of transmission access and consistent risk assessment 
must be explicitly addressed. Modern developments in high speed computation facilities 
now permit the realistic utilization of sequential Monte Carlo simulation technique in 
practical bulk electric system reliability assessment resulting in a more complete 
understanding of bulk electric system risks and associated uncertainties. Two significant 
advantages when utilizing sequential simulation are the ability to obtain accurate 
frequency and duration indices, and the opportunity to synthesize reliability index 
probability distributions which describe the annual index variability.  
 
This research work introduces the concept of applying reliability index 
probability distributions to assess bulk electric system risk. Bulk electric system 
reliability performance index probability distributions are used as integral elements in a 
performance based regulation (PBR) mechanism. An appreciation of the annual 
variability of the reliability performance indices can assist power engineers and risk 
 v
managers to manage and control future potential risks under a PBR reward/penalty 
structure. There is growing interest in combining deterministic considerations with 
probabilistic assessment in order to evaluate the “system well-being” of bulk electric 
systems and to evaluate the likelihood, not only of entering a complete failure state, but 
also the likelihood of being very close to trouble. The system well-being concept 
presented in this thesis is a probabilistic framework that incorporates the accepted 
deterministic N-1 security criterion, and provides valuable information on what the 
degree of the system vulnerability might be under a particular system condition using a 
quantitative interpretation of the degree of system security and insecurity. An overall 
reliability analysis framework considering both adequacy and security perspectives is 
proposed using system well-being analysis and traditional adequacy assessment. The 
system planning process using combined adequacy and security considerations offers an 
additional reliability-based dimension. Sequential Monte Carlo simulation is also ideally 
suited to the analysis of intermittent generating resources such as wind energy 
conversion systems (WECS) as its framework can incorporate the chronological 
characteristics of wind. The reliability impacts of wind power in a bulk electric system 
are examined in this thesis. Transmission reinforcement planning associated with large-
scale WECS and the utilization of reliability cost/worth analysis in the examination of 
reinforcement alternatives are also illustrated. 
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Electric power systems throughout the world are undergoing considerable change 
in regard to structure, operation and regulation. Technological developments and 
evolving customer expectations are among the driving factors in the new electricity 
paradigm. Competition and uncertainty in the new deregulated electric utility industry 
are serious concerns. Electric power utilities also face increasing uncertainty regarding 
the political, economic, societal and environmental constraints under which they have to 
operate existing systems and plan future systems. All these conditions have created new 
electric utility environments that require extensive justification of new facilities, 
optimization of system configurations, improvements in system reliability and decreases 
in construction and operating costs. New planning criteria with broader engineering 
considerations of transmission access and consistent risk assessment must be explicitly 
addressed. The likelihood of the occurrence of worst possible scenarios must also be 
recognized in the criteria and acceptable risk levels incorporated in the decision making 
process [1].  
 
The development of modern society has significantly increased the dependency 
on electric supply availability. The basic function of an electric power system is to 
supply its customers with electrical energy as economically as possible and with a 
reasonable degree of continuity and quality [2]. It is not economical and technically 
feasible to attempt to design a power system with one hundred percent reliability. Power 
system engineers, therefore, attempt to achieve an acceptable level of system reliability 
in their planning, design and operation within the existing economic constraints. In order 
to resolve the conflict between the economic and reliability constraints, a wide range of 
techniques and criteria has been developed and used in the system design, planning and 
 2
operating phases. It is believed that the application of reliability concepts in electric 
power system planning and operation will continue to increase in the future in both 
regulated and deregulated utility environments.  
 
1.1  Restructured Electric Power Industry 
 
 Electric power systems have traditionally been organized and operated as 
vertically integrated utilities in which generation, transmission and distribution facilities 
are owned by one company. In this structure, the company controls all aspects of system 
planning, design and operation. It also manages all functions of producing, delivering 
and selling electric power to the end users. One of the advantages that this traditionally 
regulated electricity industry has is in the coordination of all the functions required to 
provide a highly reliable electrical supply. One of the important disadvantages of the 
traditionally regulated industry is the lack of competition in the created monopoly, 
which leads to losses in efficiency and economic incentives. This traditionally regulated 
electricity industry structure has existed for a long time and continues to exist in some 
locations.  
 
 In recent years, social, economic, political and technical changes have forced the 
regulated electric power industry to adapt. The power industry is now undergoing 
considerable changes due to restructuring. Competition has become the key factor 
driving the restructuring or deregulation process in the electric power industry, and 
should benefit both the customers and the participating companies. The key concept 
behind deregulation in many countries is that no one company should have a monopoly 
on either the production, the wholesale or retail sale of electricity and electricity-based 
services. The delivery function associated with transmission and distribution is still a 
regulated, monopoly business due to its natural characteristics [3]. One of the 
advantages in the newly deregulated electricity industry is the resulting competition and 
the benefits that it brings to the customers, utility companies and therefore society. One 
of the biggest problems associated with the deregulation process, however, is the 
resulting financial risk caused by the uncertainty existing in the market. Figure 1.1 
 3
illustrates some of the general differences between the traditionally regulated (vertically 
integrated) electric power structure and the new deregulated industry.     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The regulated and deregulated power industry structures. 
 
In Figure 1.1, the vertically integrated utility structure represents the traditional 
regulated power industry. In the new deregulated industry structure, generation 
companies (Gencos) are separately owned and compete to sell energy to customers, and 
are no longer controlled by the same entities that control the transmission system. 
Transmission companies (Transcos) own high voltage transmission lines and move 
power in bulk quantities from where it is produced to where it is needed. Distribution 
companies (Discos) are the monopoly-franchise owner-operators who locally deliver 
power at the retail level to end-use customers. A Power Exchange (PX) is an 
organization somewhat like a stock exchange where the buyers and sellers of wholesale 
electricity are allowed to buy and sell electric energy as a commodity. Retail energy 
services companies (Rescos) are retailers of electric power who buy power from a power 
market and sell it directly to consumers [3]. These entities must work cooperatively to 
provide cost effective and reliable electric power supply. In order to do so, independent 
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entities designated as Independent System Operators (ISO) are established to coordinate 
the activities among these energy-related entities to achieve the overall goal of serving 
the customers. 
 
The ISO is an entity entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the reliability 
and security of the bulk electric system consisting of the generation and transmission 
facilities. It is an independent authority who does not participate in the electricity market 
trades nor own generation facilities for business (except for owning some capacity for 
emergency use) [4]. In general, the ISO is a neutral operator who has the objective to 
guarantee comparable and non-discriminatory access by power suppliers and users to the 
regional electric transmission system. The ISO performs its function by controlling the 
dispatch of generation and gives orders to adjust or curtail load to ensure that loads 
match the available generating resources in the system. It has the operational control of 
the transmission grid components, administers system wide transmission tariffs, 
maintains and ensures system reliability, coordinates maintenance scheduling, and has a 
role in coordinating long-term planning. Consequently, the ISO’s activities have 
significant impacts on all the energy-related participants.  
 
In the new deregulated industry structure Gencos produce electric power, which 
Transcos and Discos deliver to the end-use customers, under the control of the ISO. In 
this process, the PX and Rescos coordinate the market information and transfer the 
knowledge to the other entities to facilitate their decision making and operating 
strategies. The new power industry is facing many problems such as how to operate the 
new power structure economically and reliably, how to minimize production costs, how 
to attract the new investment required to construct the required generation and 
transmission facilities under the uncertainty of market competition, etc. Power system 
reliability evaluation is an important activity in vertically integrated utilities, and is at 
least equally important in the unbundled electric power utility environment. As noted 
earlier, the requirements of low cost electrical energy and high levels of reliability are in 
conflict. Balancing these two aspects is a big challenge for power system managers, 
planners and operators. The research in this thesis is focused on reliability analysis of 
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bulk electric systems. This is an important activity in both the traditional and more 
recent power system structures, and is a primary responsibility of the ISO in a 
deregulated system.         
 
1.2  Power System Reliability and Related Concepts 
 
 Reliability is an inherent characteristic and a specific measure of any component, 
device or system, which describes its ability to perform its intended function. In the 
context of power systems, reliability in general terms is related to the ability of the 
system to supply electric power to its customers under both static and dynamic 
conditions, with a mutually acceptable assurance of continuity and quality [5]. The term 
“system reliability” can be subdivided into the two fundamental aspects of system 
adequacy and system security [2] shown in Figure 1.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Subdivision of system reliability. 
 
System adequacy relates to the existence of sufficient facilities within the system 
to satisfy the consumer load demand or system operational constraints. These include the 
facilities necessary to generate sufficient energy and the associated transmission and 
distribution facilities required to transport the energy to the actual consumer load points. 
Adequacy is therefore associated with static conditions, which do not include system 
disturbances. On the other hand, system security relates to the ability of the system to 
respond to disturbances arising within that system. Security is therefore associated with 
the response of the system to whatever perturbations arise. These include the conditions 
associated with both local and widespread disturbances and the loss of major generation 
and transmission facilities [2]. In system security considerations, the analysis can be 
System Reliability 
System Adequacy System Security 
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further classified into two types designated as transient (dynamic) and steady-state 
(static). Transient stability assessment consists of determining if the system oscillations 
following an outage or a fault will cause loss of synchronism between generators. The 
objective of steady-state security analysis is to determine whether, following the 
occurrence of a contingency, there exists a new steady-state secure operating point 
where the perturbed power system will settle after the dynamic oscillations have damped 
out. The focus of this thesis is on the adequacy domain and on extended adequacy 
assessment incorporating the steady-state security perspective. The research work does 
not incorporate dynamic phenomena, i.e. oscillations and system faults, in the overall 
security constraints.   
 
An overall power system can be divided into the three basic functional zones of 
generation, transmission and distribution. Power system adequacy assessment can be 
conducted in each functional zone and at each hierarchical level [2]. Figure 1.3 shows 
the three hierarchical levels.  
 
 
Generation
Facilities 
Transmission
Facilities 
Distribution
Facilities 
HL-I 
HL-II 
HL-III 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Hierarchical levels. 
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Reliability assessment at hierarchical level-I (HL-I) involves the ability of the 
generation facilities to meet the system demand. In hierarchical level-II (HL-II) 
reliability assessment, the generation and transmission facilities are considered as a 
composite system or bulk electric system that is responsible for delivering the required 
energy to the bulk supply points (delivery points). Reliability assessment at hierarchical 
level-III (HL-III) pertains to the complete system consisting of the three functional 
zones of generation, transmission and distribution. HL-III assessment is difficult to do in 
a large system because of the computational complexity and scale of the problem. 
Detailed analysis is usually conducted at HL-I, HL-II and in the distribution functional 
zone. The focus of this thesis is on reliability assessment at hierarchical level-II (HL-II). 
 
The need to evaluate system reliability has resulted in a wide range of 
deterministic and probabilistic criteria for subsystem and system assessment. 
Deterministic techniques provide a reliability analyst with information on how a system 
failure can happen or how system success can be achieved. The most common 
deterministic criterion dictates that specific credible outages will not result in system 
failure. The traditional deterministic criterion used particularly in bulk electric systems 
(BES) is known as the N-1 security criterion [6, 7] under which the loss of any BES 
component will not result in system failure. Deterministic techniques, which are also 
often referred to as engineering judgment, do not include an assessment of the actual 
system reliability as they do not incorporate the probabilistic or stochastic nature of 
system behavior and component failures. These approaches, therefore, are inconsistent 
and cannot be used for comparing alternative equipment configurations, and performing 
economic analyses. Probabilistic methods, however, can respond to the significant 
factors that affect the reliability of a system. These techniques provide quantitative 
indices, which can be used to decide if system performance is acceptable or if changes 
need to be made. Most of the published papers on reliability assessment of engineering 
systems are based on probabilistic approaches rather than deterministic concepts [8]. 
There is, however, considerable reluctance to using probabilistic techniques in many 
areas due to the difficulty in interpreting the resulting numerical indices. Although 
deterministic criteria do not consider the stochastic behavior of system components, they 
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are easier for system planners, designers and operators to understand than a numerical 
risk index determined using probabilistic techniques. This difficulty can be alleviated by 
incorporating the accepted N-1 deterministic consideration, which is a hard criterion, in 
a probabilistic assessment to provide a resulting soft criterion. This concept is designated 
as system well-being analysis [9, 10] and is one of the main research tasks illustrated in 
this thesis.   
 
1.3  Concept of Bulk Electric System Reliability Analysis 
 
The term “bulk electric system” used in this thesis is equivalent to the term 
“composite generation and transmission system” introduced in [11], which falls into 
hierarchical level-II (HL-II) noted earlier. The reliability assessment of composite 
generation and transmission systems or bulk electric systems is extremely complicated 
as it is necessary to include detailed modeling of both the generation and transmission 
facilities to consider multiple levels of component failure. Composite power system 
reliability evaluation provides an assessment of the ability of an electric power system to 
satisfy the load and energy requirements at the major load points and for the overall 
system. The most significant quantitative indices in composite power system reliability 
evaluation are those that relate to load curtailment. Reliability assessment at HL-II can 
be performed using analytical methods or Monte Carlo simulation techniques [2].  
 
Analytical methods such as contingency enumeration [12] represent the system 
by a mathematical model and evaluate the reliability indices from the model using direct 
numerical solutions. An analytical method will always give the same numerical result 
for the same system, same model and same set of input data. The methods, therefore, 
tend to give more confidence to reliability evaluation results obtained by an exact 
solution from an accepted system model. Assumptions, however, are frequently required 
in order to simplify the problem and to produce an analytical model of the system. This 
is particularly the case when complex operating procedures have to be modeled. The 
resulting analysis can therefore sometimes lose some or much of its significance. This 
difficulty can be reduced or eliminated by using a simulation approach. Monte Carlo 
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simulation methods estimate the reliability indices by simulating the actual process and 
random behavior of the system. The method therefore treats the problem as a series of 
experiments. There are merits and demerits in both methods. Generally, Monte Carlo 
simulation requires a large amount of computing time compared to analytical methods. 
Monte Carlo simulation techniques, however, can theoretically take into account 
virtually all aspects and contingencies inherent in the planning, design and operation of a 
power system [2, 13]. These include random events such as outages and repairs of 
elements represented by general probability distributions and different types of operating 
policies. On the other hand, numerous assumptions and approximations may be required 
in an analytical approach to handle complex operations and inherent characteristics. 
References 14 – 17 show 145 published papers during the last two decades on the 
subject of composite generation and transmission system reliability evaluation using 
analytical or Monte Carlo simulation techniques, or a hybrid of both methods. There has 
been a growing interest and an increasing trend in applying Monte Carlo simulation 
approaches to bulk electric system reliability analysis during the last decade due to the 
development and availability of high speed computation facilities. 
 
There are two basic techniques when applying Monte Carlo simulation methods 
to bulk power system reliability evaluation. These methods are designated as the 
sequential and non-sequential approaches. Sequential simulation can fully take into 
account the chronological behavior of the system, while the non-sequential method 
involves non-chronological system state considerations. The sequential technique, 
therefore, provides more accurate frequency and duration assessments than the non-
sequential method. The significant merit when utilizing the sequential simulation 
approach is the ability to provide information on the mean or average values and on the 
probability distributions of the indices. Both sequential and non-sequential simulation 
techniques, however, have advantages and disadvantages. These issues are addressed in 
detail in Chapter 2 in conjunction with the simulation procedures used in the different 
Monte Carlo methods.  
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1.4  Scope and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
This research work is focused on the utilization of sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation in bulk electric system reliability analysis and the application of these 
concepts in system planning and decision making. A fundamental objective of this 
research work is to take advantage of the sequential simulation technique to create 
reliability index probability distributions, which indicate the annual variability of 
reliability indices and the likelihood of specific values being exceeded from both the 
adequacy and steady-state security perspectives. An inherent benefit of the chronological 
representation used in sequential simulation is the opportunity to investigate the impact 
on bulk electric system reliability of intermittent energy resources such as wind power. 
The following list of conducted tasks indicates the specific objectives of the research 
described in this thesis. 
 
1. A detailed investigation of the possible utilization of sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation in composite system reliability evaluation including reliability worth 
considerations. 
2. An examination of the ability to develop and utilize probability distribution 
analysis in composite system evaluation. 
3. An examination of the ability to predict performance based adequacy indices 
including their probability distributions. 
4. An investigation of the ability to develop both system and load point indices in 
the steady-state security domain based on system well-being analysis including 
probability distribution considerations. 
5. The development of combined reliability indices obtained using adequacy 
assessment and steady-state security evaluation. 
6. An investigation of the impact of large-scale wind power on bulk electric system 
reliability.   
 
The basic concepts and different types of Monte Carlo simulation are described 
in Chapter 2 and the advantages and disadvantages of the different Monte Carlo 
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simulation approaches are addressed. Sequential Monte Carlo simulation is discussed in 
detail. Chapter 3 presents an overall procedure for bulk electric system reliability 
analysis using sequential Monte Carlo simulation. Network solution techniques using 
DC and Fast Decoupled AC load flow are presented. Linear programming techniques for 
corrective actions due to system operating limits such as generation, transmission 
capacity, and bus voltage constraints are presented. These corrective actions include 
overload alleviation, generation rescheduling, bus voltages adjustment, and a 
minimization model for load curtailment. Approximation techniques required due to 
network ill-condition problems and network separation problems are discussed. 
Different load curtailment philosophies used in the analyses are also addressed. The two 
test systems used throughout this thesis are also described in this chapter.    
 
 The impacts of utilizing sequential and non-sequential simulation techniques in 
bulk electric system reliability evaluation is presented in Chapter 4. Reliability indices 
obtained using both techniques are compared and discussed in terms of annualized and 
annual reliability indices. A discussion of the frequency index calculation and the 
pertinent factors affecting the frequency indices are provided. Chapter 5 presents 
reliability worth assessment methodologies for bulk electric systems. An event-based 
customer interruption cost evaluation technique is incorporated in a composite system 
reliability evaluation framework using sequential Monte Carlo simulation. This method 
provides a realistic and accurate incorporation of the temporal variations in the customer 
outage costs in a reliability worth analysis. Approximate methods for customer 
interruption cost evaluation are also presented and compared with the customer 
interruption costs obtained using the more accurate procedure.  
 
 Reliability index probability distribution analysis of bulk electric systems is 
presented in Chapter 6. Two basic types of reliability indices designated as predictive 
and performance indices are demonstrated. Delivery point and overall system reliability 
indices obtained using different system operating policies are examined. Some factors 
that influence the reliability index probability distributions such as load curtailment 
philosophies and the probability distributions of component repair times are illustrated. 
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Chapter 7 presents the utilization of reliability index probability distributions in a 
performance based regulation (PBR) framework. This provides an opportunity to extend 
the existing models for performance based regulation (PBR) used in the deregulated 
utility environment from a bulk electric system perspective. Selected performance based 
indices associated with a PBR structure for bulk electric systems are illustrated. 
Sensitivity analyses such as changing system operating policies are also demonstrated in 
order to examine these impacts on reward and penalty payments under a PBR structure. 
The potential utilization of the PBR mechanism associated with reliability index 
probability distributions for an overall bulk electric system and for a transmission 
system are also discussed.      
 
The inclusion of security constraints in adequacy evaluation can overcome some 
of the difficulties associated with the more traditional methods. Chapter 8 extends the 
adequacy assessment process described in Chapter 3 by incorporating steady-state 
security considerations. This extended adequacy assessment is designated as security 
constrained adequacy analysis and is focused on the overall operation of the power 
system. In this analysis, the system is classified into different operating states defined in 
terms of adequacy and security. The system well-being concept presented in Chapter 8 is 
a probabilistic framework that incorporates a practical simplification of the traditional 
operating states associated with the accepted deterministic N-1 security criterion. The 
procedure used to extend traditional adequacy assessment to incorporate steady-state 
security considerations in system well-being analysis is addressed. System well-being 
index probability distributions of bulk electric systems are also investigated. Chapter 9 
presents the combined reliability framework using adequacy assessment and steady-state 
security evaluation. This is achieved using a combination of reliability indices obtained 
using adequacy assessment and system well-being analysis. Selected reliability indices 
from both adequacy and security domains are proposed in order to create a compact 
combination in an overall reliability framework. An expected potential insecurity cost 
due to system security concerns is proposed. The combined reliability indices are 
utilized in a system reinforcement process using various study cases. The utilization of a 
combined reliability framework considering both adequacy and static security 
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perspectives provide complementary information insight to identify potential system 
adequacy and security problems. 
 
Wind power integration in bulk electric system reliability evaluation is presented 
in Chapter 10. One advantage of utilizing sequential Monte Carlo simulation in bulk 
electric system reliability evaluation is that the framework already exists to incorporate 
the chronological characteristics of wind (diurnal and season wind speeds), load profiles 
and chronological transition states of all the components within a system. A wind energy 
conversion system (WECS) model involving wind turbine and wind speed 
characteristics is illustrated and a technique to simulate single and multiple wind farms 
is presented. The effect of wind speed correlation between wind farms from a system 
reliability perspective is quantitatively demonstrated. The effective load carrying 
capability (ELCC) associated with a wind energy conversion system (WECS) is also 
discussed. The impact on overall system reliability due to connecting WECS to different 
locations in a bulk electric system is examined and transmission planning for large-scale 
wind farms using cost-benefit analysis is illustrated.  
 
Chapter 11 summarizes the thesis and presents the conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 2   
BASIC CONCEPTS OF SEQUENTIAL MONTE CARLO 
SIMULATION 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
 The application of quantitative reliability evaluation in electric power systems 
has now evolved to the point at which most utilities use these techniques in one or more 
areas of their planning, design, and operation [13]. As noted in Chapter 1, the two main 
procedures for power system reliability evaluation are designated as analytical and 
Monte Carlo simulation methods. Analytical methods have been in use for a long time to 
assess expected indices because of their relatively short computing times and fewer 
computing resource constraints compared to the utilization of simulation methods. 
Improvements in and increased availability of high-speed digital computer facilities 
have created opportunities to analyze many problems using stochastic simulation 
methods. Over the last decade, there has been increased interest in utilizing Monte Carlo 
simulation in quantitative power system reliability analysis. Although Monte Carlo 
simulation is not a new concept, as its application has existed for at least 50 years, the 
availability of high speed computation facilities has now made Monte Carlo simulation 
an available and sometimes preferable option for many power system reliability 
applications. Simulation can be also used to experiment with new situations where there 
is little or no available information. In addition, simulation can sometimes be valuable in 
breaking down a complicated system into subsystems, each of which can then be 
modeled and analyzed separately. 
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2.2  Monte Carlo Simulation Techniques 
 
 Monte Carlo simulation for power system reliability analysis can be classified 
into two general types designated as non-sequential and sequential methods. The basic 
principles of three simulation techniques used in power system reliability evaluation are 
described in the following sections. These three techniques are designated as the state 
sampling, state transition sampling and state duration sampling approaches [13]. The 
state sampling and state transition sampling approaches fall into the non-sequential 
simulation category and the state duration sampling approach is a sequential simulation 
procedure.   
 
2.2.1  State Sampling Approach 
 
The state sampling approach [18, 19] is a non-sequential simulation procedure. 
In this approach, the states of all components are sampled and a non-chronological 
system state is obtained by combining all the component states. The basic sampling 
procedure is conducted by generating pseudo-random numbers and assuming that the 
behavior of each component can be described by a uniform distribution between [0,1]. 
Each consecutive sample of system states is randomly selected independently from 
previous and subsequent samples. The advantage of the state sampling approach is that it 
is a relatively simple process involving the utilization of uniformly distributed random 
numbers, and has a relatively short computation time with small memory requirements. 
The major disadvantage of the state sampling approach when applied to power systems 
is that it cannot be used by itself to calculate an actual frequency index, as this approach 
cannot recognize the impact of failure state transitions and transitions associated with a 
chronological load model. These factors directly affect a frequency index calculation 
and are addressed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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2.2.2  State Transition Sampling Approach 
 
 The state transition sampling approach [20, 21] is focused on state transitions of 
the whole system rather than individual component state transitions. A long system state 
transition sequence can be obtained by a number of samples and the probability of each 
system state can be evaluated. The major advantage of this approach is that it can be 
used to calculate an actual frequency index by creating a system state transition chain. 
The state transition sampling approach in general does not involve sampling component 
state duration distribution functions nor the storage of chronological information as 
required in the sequential approach. The disadvantage of the state transition sampling 
approach is that it only applies to components with exponentially distributed state 
residence duration characteristics, which may not always be the case. 
 
2.2.3  State Duration Sampling Approach (Sequential Simulation)     
 
The state duration sampling approach [13] is a sequential simulation process, and 
is utilized in this research. The state duration sampling approach is based on sampling 
the probability distribution of the component state duration. In this approach, 
chronological component state transition processes for all components are first 
simulated. The chronological system state transition process is then created by 
combining the individual chronological component state transition processes. The term 
“sequential simulation” is often used in engineering literature [22] to designate the 
technique in which the history of a system is simulated in fixed discrete time steps. This 
thesis uses the term sequential simulation in the engineering sense [23], in which any 
event occurring within a particular time step is considered to occur at the end of the time 
step, and the system states are updated accordingly. A time step of one hour is 
considered to be adequate for power system reliability assessment since the number of 
changes within that period is generally small.  
 
In sequential simulation, each subsequent system state sample is related to the 
previous set of system states (historically dependent). A sequential time evolution of 
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system behavior is created which enables a wide range of reliability indices to be 
assessed. The random factors affecting the capacity and energy states of history 
dependent systems and the required operating scenarios can be incorporated using 
sequential Monte Carlo simulation. The sequential simulation approach is very useful 
when the system to be analyzed is past-dependent, i.e. the state of the system at any 
given time is partially determined by the historical time evolution of the system. 
Sequential simulation is particularly useful when the operating system is history-
dependent or time correlated. This often applies to hydro generation systems in which 
the reservoir storage capacity is relatively small and the use of water has to be carefully 
controlled [24]. In such situations, the available power at any moment is dependent on, 
among other factors, the past water inflows, past operating policies and the historical 
behavior of the system load. Sequential simulation can incorporate realistic and 
sophisticated load models that incorporate the chronological characteristics inherent 
within each customer sector and the customer mix at each bulk system supply point. If 
the operating life of the system is simulated over a long period of time, it is possible to 
study the behavior of the system and to obtain a clear picture of possible deficiencies 
that the system may suffer. The recorded information can be used to calculate the 
expected values of selected reliability indices together with an appreciation of the 
dispersion of these indices. There is frequently a need to know the likely range of 
reliability indices, the likelihood of certain values being exceeded, and similar 
parameters. These can be assessed from a knowledge of the probability distribution 
associated with the expected value. At the present time, sequential simulation is the only 
realistic option available to investigate the distributional aspects associated with system 
index mean values.  
 
In conclusion, the sequential simulation approach can be used to represent most 
of the contingencies and operating characteristics inherent in a bulk electric system and 
provide a comprehensive range of reliability indices. This comprehensive information 
provides a detailed description, and hence understanding, of the system reliability. The 
major disadvantage of the sequential simulation method is that it requires more 
computation time and storage than non-sequential methods because it is necessary to 
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generate a random variate following a given distribution for each component and store 
information on the chronological component state transition processes of all the 
components in a long time span. This disadvantage is now becoming less significant due 
to the availability of high speed computation facilities. 
   
2.3  Basic Methodology of Sequential Simulation 
 
2.3.1  Sequential Simulation Procedure 
 
 The sequential simulation approach is based on sampling the probability 
distributions of the system component state durations. This approach uses the 
component state duration distribution functions. In a two state component 
representation, these are the operating and repair state duration distribution functions 
and are usually assumed to be exponential. Other distributions can also be easily utilized 
and this is discussed in Chapter 6. The sequential simulation method can be summarized 
in the following steps: 
 
Step 1: The initial state of each component is specified. Generally, it is assumed that 
all components are initially in the success or up state (operating state). 
 
Step 2: The duration of each component residing in its present state is sampled from its 
probability distribution. For example, an exponentially distributed random 
variate T has the probability distribution function [22],  
λt
T λe      (t)f
−=       (2.1) 
where λ is the mean value of the distribution. Its cumulative probability 
distribution function is:  
λte-1      F(t) −=       (2.2) 
Using the inverse transform method the random variate T is given by [22]: 
  U)ln(11-      T −= λ       (2.3) 
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where U is a uniformly distributed random number obtained from a 
multiplicative congruential pseudo-random number generator [22]. The 
procedure used to generate the pseudo-random number is described in 
Appendix A. Since the term 1-U distributes uniformly in the same way as U in 
the interval [0,1], 
  ln(U)1-      T λ=       (2.4) 
If the present state is the up state (success state), λ is the failure rate of the 
component. If the present state is the down state (failure state), λ is the repair 
rate of the component. 
 
Step 3: Step 2 is repeated in the given time span, i.e. normally a year, and sampling 
values of each state duration for all components are recorded. The 
chronological component state transition processes in the given time span of all 
components are then combined to create the chronological system state 
transition process.   
 
Step 4: System analysis is conducted for each different system state to obtain the 
reliability index function Φ(S). The expected value of the index Φ(S) is 
designated as E(Φ). The mathematical expectation of the index or test function 
E(Φ) of all system states is given by: 
∑
∈
=
GS
Φ(S)P(S)      )E(Φ      (2.5) 
where S is the system state and G is the set of system states. Assuming that 
each system state has the probability P(S).  
Substituting the sampling frequency of the system state S for its probability 
P(S) results in: 
  ∑
∈
=
GS N
n(S)Φ(S)      )E(Φ      (2.6) 
where N is the total number of samples and n(S) is the number of occurrences 
of system state S. Φ(S) can be obtained by appropriate system analysis. For 
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example, to determine the system probability of load curtailment, the index 
Φ(S) is given as [25]: 
        Φ(S)  =     
tcurtailmen load no is there if   
 S state system withassociated tcurtailmen load a is there if    
0
1
 (2.7) 
Equations 2.5 and 2.6 are associated with the random state sampling approach 
(non-sequential simulation). When the sequential simulation technique is used, 
the concept used to estimate the expected value of the index can be extended as 
follows: 
NS
)Φ(S
      )E(Φ
NS
1i
)S(n
1j
i j,
i∑ ∑
= = ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=      (2.8) 
where:   ni(S)    =   Number of occurrences of system state S in year i, 
              Φ(Sj,i)  =   Index function corresponding to jth occurrence in year i, 
              NS       =   Number of simulation years. 
 
Sequential Simulation Illustration: 
 
 The sequential simulation process described above is briefly illustrated using the 
simple system composed of two parallel redundant components shown in Figure 2.1. 
This system is in the failed state when both components are in the failed state at the 
same time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A simple parallel system. 
 
The chronological component state transition processes of the two components 
obtained using Steps 1-3 for the first three simulation years are illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
The chronological system state transition process is obtained by combining the 
1 
2 
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chronological component state transition processes as shown in the bottom of Figure 2.2. 
There is no system failure in the first simulation year and there are one and two failures 
in the second and third simulation years respectively. If the desired reliability index Φ(S) 
is the system failure frequency index, the expected value E(Φ) based on the three 
simulation years can be calculated as follows using Equation 2.8. 
 
E(Φ)  
3
)Φ(S    )Φ(S    )Φ(S
   3  fail,2  fail,1  fail,
++=  
E(Φ)  
3
1)(1    (1)    (0)   +++=   =   1.0  occurrence/year 
 
 It is important to note that a large number of simulation years is required in order 
to obtain a reasonable result when utilizing Monte Carlo simulation. The following 
section addresses the stopping criterion used to terminate the simulation process. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Chronological component and system state transition process of a simple 
                      parallel redundant system during the first three simulation years. 
 
Year 1 Year 2
8760 hours 
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Up 
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2.3.2  Simulation Convergence and Stopping Criterion 
 
 Monte Carlo simulation creates a fluctuating convergence process and there is no 
guarantee that a few more samples will definitely lead to a smaller error. It is true, 
however, that the error bound or the confidence range decreases as the number of 
samples increase. It is, however, not practical to run the simulation for an extremely 
large number of samples requiring an extensive computation time. A compromise, 
therefore, must be made between the required accuracy and the computing time. The 
purpose of a stopping rule is to allow the simulation to run until the reliability index 
achieves a specified degree of accuracy. The basic parameter used in the stopping 
criterion is the coefficient of variation and is derived as follows:  
 
A fundamental parameter in reliability evaluation is the mathematical 
expectation of a given reliability index. Salient features of Monte Carlo simulation for 
reliability analysis therefore can be discussed from an expectation point of view [13]. 
Let X be the reliability index to be estimated. In sequential simulation, the number of 
samples is the number of simulation years. The expect value of the reliability index (X) 
is given by 
 ∑
=
=
N
i
ixN
1      (X)E
1
       (2.9) 
where:   xi   =   The observed value of X in year i, 
  N   =   The total number of simulation years. 
 
The unbiased variance of the reliability index (X) is 
  ∑
=
−=
N
i
i ))X(Ex(1-N
1      )X(V
1
2      (2.10) 
 It is important to note that Equation (2.9) provides only the expected value of the 
reliability index (X). The uncertainty around the estimate can be measured by the 
variance of the expectation estimate:  
  
N
V(X)      ))X(E(V =        (2.11) 
 The standard deviation of the expectation estimate is given by 
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N
V(X)      V(E(X))      ))X(E( ==σ      (2.12) 
 The accuracy level of a sequential Monte Carlo simulation can be expressed by 
the coefficient of variation (β) which is defined as follows: 
   
)X(E
))X(E(      σβ =        (2.13) 
The coefficient of variation (β) shown in Equation (2.13) can be rewritten using 
Equation (2.12) as: 
   
NE(X)
(X)      
N
V(X)
)X(E
      ×==
σβ 1      (2.14) 
where )X(V)X( =σ . The simulation can be terminated when a specified coefficient of 
variation has been achieved. The selected stopping criterion is designated as the 
acceptable tolerance error (ε) in the simulation as shown in Equation (2.15). 
         
NE(X)
(X) εσ <×           (2.15) 
where ε is the maximum (tolerance) error allowed, i.e. 5% or 0.05. 
 
 As shown in Equations (2.14) and (2.15), the value of β will decrease as the 
number of simulation years increase and the simulation process can be terminated when 
β is less than ε. It is important to note that the specified accuracy level of a Monte Carlo 
simulation is directly related to the number of simulation samples and is not dependent 
on the size of the system. Monte Carlo simulation techniques are therefore quite suitable 
for handling large systems with complex features. It is also important to note that the 
computation effort is affected by the value being estimated, i.e. the more reliable the 
system is, the harder it is to estimate the value.  In power system reliability analysis, 
different reliability indices have different convergence speeds. It has been found that the 
coefficient of variation of the expected energy not supplied (EENS) index has the lowest 
rate of convergence. This coefficient of variation is therefore utilized as the convergence 
criterion in order to guarantee reasonable accuracy in a multi-index study [13].  
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The sequential simulation approach briefly described in this chapter is utilized to 
conduct bulk electric system reliability analysis in the research work described in this 
thesis. The advantages and disadvantages of this approach are summarized in the 
following.  
 
Advantages: 
• Accurate frequency-related indices in reliability assessment can be obtained when 
utilizing the sequential simulation approach. 
• Any state duration distribution function related to component reliability 
characteristics can be easily incorporated in the sequential simulation approach. 
• The probability distributions of the reliability indices can be obtained in addition to 
the expected values.  
• Detailed system operating conditions and historical system behavior can be 
incorporated in the simulation process.  
 
Disadvantages: 
• The sequential simulation approach requires considerably more computation time 
and memory storage than non-sequential simulation methods because it is necessary 
to generate a random variate following a given distribution function for each 
component and to store information on the chronological component state transition 
processes of all the components in a long time span. This technique can now, 
however, be realistically used in bulk electric system reliability evaluation due to the 
developments in high speed computation facilities. 
• The sequential simulation approach requires detailed input data such as 
chronological load curves, which some utilities may not have. Such detailed data, 
however, are becoming more important especially in the competitive electricity 
environment. It is expected that such detailed data will become more routinely 
available in the future. 
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2.4  Conclusions 
 
 Non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation techniques are briefly introduced in this 
chapter. The basic concept and methodology of the sequential Monte Carlo simulation 
approach are discussed and illustrated. The advantages and disadvantages when applying 
sequential simulation to bulk electric system reliability analysis are briefly addressed.  
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CHAPTER 3   
BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
USING SEQUENTIAL SIMULATION 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
A bulk electric system contains both generation and transmission facilities and is 
sometimes designated as a composite generation and transmission system (or composite 
system) [11]. Bulk electric system reliability analysis is concerned with the total 
problem of assessing the ability of the generation and transmission system to supply 
reliable electrical energy to the major system load points. These load points are known 
as bulk supply points, points of delivery or delivery points. This form of study can also 
be designated as hierarchical level II (HL-II) reliability analysis [2]. In a bulk electric 
system, the transmission configuration which links the generating units to the major load 
buses is usually relatively complicated and it is rarely possible to model the transmission 
configuration using simple series/parallel reduction techniques. The reliability analysis 
of a bulk electric system, therefore, normally involves the solution of the network 
configuration under random outage situations. Network solution and related techniques 
for bulk electric system reliability evaluation are described in this chapter. As noted 
earlier, system reliability can be divided into the two domains designated as system 
adequacy and system security. This chapter deals with reliability modeling from a 
system adequacy perspective. Extended adequacy assessment incorporating system 
security considerations is addressed in Chapter 8.  
 
There is a wide range of adequacy indices which can be calculated at the 
individual delivery points and for the overall bulk electric system. Individual delivery 
point indices are useful in identifying weak points in the system and in establishing 
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appropriate system reinforcements. They are also useful as input indices in the reliability 
analysis of electric distribution systems fed from the relevant bulk supply points. The 
overall system indices provide an appreciation of the global system adequacy in regard 
to the ability of the system to satisfy its overall load and energy requirements. These 
indices are useful for overall system adequacy management. They can also be used in a 
comparison of one system with another. The delivery point and system indices, 
therefore, do not replace each other, but complement each other [2]. 
 
3.2  Adequacy Indices 
 
 Adequacy indices are computed using the fundamental parameters of frequency, 
duration and magnitude of power outage events. The magnitude of an outage event 
depends on the components on outage (contingencies), their relative importance and 
their location in the network. An outage event may affect a wide area of the system or it 
may affect only a small group of buses or perhaps a single bus. Different outage events 
(contingencies) can affect different sets of delivery points, and create different 
individual delivery point indices. Overall system indices cannot, however, offer this 
information. It is therefore not reasonable to draw conclusions regarding the adequacy of 
a particular delivery point from the overall system indices.   
 
3.2.1  Delivery Point Indices 
 
Expected Duration of Load Curtailment (EDLC) at Bus k: 
NS
d
      EDLC
NS
1i
N
1j
ki,j,
k
ki,∑ ∑
= = ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=   (hours/year)    (3.1) 
where:   Ni,k   =   Number of interruptions occurring in year i, at Bus k, 
  dj,i,k  =   Duration of the jth interruption (hours) in year i at Bus k,  
  NS    =   Number of simulation years. 
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Probability of Load Curtailment (PLC) at Bus k: 
 
8760
EDLC
      PLC kk =   (/year)      (3.2) 
 
Expected Frequency of Load Curtailment (EFLC) at Bus k: 
 
NS
N
      EFLC
NS
1i
ki,
k
∑
==   (occurrences/year)    (3.3) 
 
Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS) at Bus k: 
 
NS
BusENS
      EENS
NS
1i
N
1j
ki,j,
k
ki,∑ ∑
= = ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=   (MWh/year)   (3.4) 
where:   BusENSj,i,k   =   Energy not supplied in MWh for the jth interruption, in year i 
                                        at Bus k. 
 
3.2.2  System Indices 
 
Expected Duration of Load Curtailment (EDLC) of the overall system: 
NS
d
      EDLC
NS
1i
N
1j
ij,
i∑ ∑
= = ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=   (hours/year)    (3.5) 
Where:   Ni    =   Number of system interruptions in year i, 
    dj,i  =   Duration of the jth system interruption (hours), in year i.   
 
Probability of Load Curtailment (PLC) of the overall system: 
8760
EDLC      PLC =   (/year)      (3.6) 
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Expected Frequency of Load Curtailments (EFLC) of the overall system:
 
NS
N
      EFLC
NS
1i
i∑
==   (occurrences/year)    (3.7) 
 
Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS) of the overall system: 
NS
SysENS
      EENS
NS
1i
N
1j
ij,
i∑ ∑
= = ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=   (MWh/year)   (3.8) 
where: SysENSj,i  =  System energy not supplied in MWh for the jth interruption, in year i.   
 
 These adequacy indices when calculated for a single load level (constant load) 
over a period of one year are referred to as “annualized indices”. In practical systems, 
the load demand does not remain constant throughout the period and the chronological 
load model (time varying load) can be used to produce more representative “annual 
indices”. The basic annual indices are different from the annualized indices obtained 
using peak load levels. All the adequacy indices described by Equations (3.1) – (3.8) are 
utilized in the research described in this thesis and are obtained using the sequential 
Monte Carlo simulation technique. 
 
3.3  Network Solution Techniques 
 
 Adequacy assessment of a bulk electric system generally involves the solution of 
the network configuration under random outage situations (contingencies). Various 
techniques, depending upon the adequacy criteria used and the intent behind these 
studies, are used in analyzing the adequacy of a power system. The three basic 
techniques used in network solutions are as follows [12, 26]: 
 
• A network flow method [27, 28] 
• DC load flow method [29, 30] 
• AC load flow method [30, 31, 32] 
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The selection of an appropriate technique is of prime importance and is an 
engineering decision. The key point is that the selected technique should be capable of 
satisfying the intent behind the studies from a management, planning and design 
perspective. One of the simplest techniques is to treat the system as a transportation 
model (network flow model) [27]. This method is based on the movement of a particular 
commodity from a number of sources to a number of demand centers. The network flow 
model preserves the power balance at each node of the network and does not satisfy 
Kirchhoff’s law which may not be appropriate for practical power system operation. 
Approximate load flow techniques such as DC load flow are quite simple and fast but 
only provide estimates of the line power flows, without including any estimate of the bus 
voltages and the generating unit reactive power limits. When both continuity and quality 
of the power supply are of concern, then it is necessary to examine the voltage levels at 
each major load center and the reactive power (MVAr) limit of each generating unit 
while considering the effect of component outages i.e. generating units, transmission 
line and transformers [33]. Considering a power network as a transportation model or 
using DC load flow does not provide an estimate of the quality of the power supply. If 
the quality of power supply including acceptable voltage levels and appropriate 
generating unit MVAr limits is an important adequacy requirement, more accurate AC 
load flow methods [30, 32] such as Newton-Raphson, Gauss-Seidel techniques must be 
utilized to calculate the adequacy indices. These techniques however require large 
computer storage and are computational expensive. A fast AC load flow technique such 
as the “fast decoupled load flow” [31] method, which is a modification of the Newton-
Raphson load flow approach, can be employed. The following is a brief description of 
the two network solution techniques used in this research work.  
 
3.3.1  DC Load Flow Method 
 
One of the simplest network solution techniques applied in contingencies studies 
is the DC load flow method. Reference [34] presents work on composite generation and 
transmission system reliability evaluation utilizing the DC load flow technique. This 
approach uses the following linear model: 
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[P]   =   [B'][δ]        (3.9) 
 
where:   [P]   =   Vector of bus power injection, 
   [B']  =   System susceptance matrix, 
   [δ]   =   Vector of phase angle (in radian). 
 
 The dimensions of [P] and [B'] are (n-1)×1 and (n-1)×(n-1) respectively, where 
n is the total number of buses in the system, and one bus is specified as the slack or 
swing bus (reference bus). 
 
 The vector of bus phase angles [δ] can be calculated by solving Equation (3.9) 
using [B'] and [P]. The computed bus phase angles are then used to determine the 
individual branch flows (power flow on a line or transformer) as given in Equation 
(3.10). 
 
 
ij
ji
ij X
      P
δδ −=         (3.10) 
 
Where:   Pij   =   Real power flow from Bus i to Bus j, 
    δi    =   Phase angle at Bus i, 
    δj    =   Phase angle at Bus j,    
    Xij   =   Reactance of the line between Bus i and Bus j.  
 
 Voltage and reactive power constraints and transmission line losses cannot be 
evaluated using this simple method. The solution is, however, fast and free of 
convergence problems. The DC load flow method described in this section is not the 
main network solution technique used in this research work. The fast decoupled AC load 
flow method described in the following section is used as the basic network solution 
technique. The DC load flow method is, however, employed if the fast decoupled AC 
load flow cannot find a solution due to divergence when dealing with an infrequent 
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system ill-conditioned network situation. This issue is addressed later in the corrective 
actions section.     
 
3.3.2  Fast Decoupled AC Load Flow Method 
 
 The fast decoupled load flow technique [31] is a good compromise between the 
basic AC and DC load flow approaches in regard to storage requirements and solution 
speed. It can be used to check the continuity as well as the quality of a power system 
thus meeting the two important adequacy requirements involving reactive power and 
voltage constraints. Reactive power and voltage constraints are becoming serious 
concerns in current bulk electric systems in the deregulated electricity environment 
where the transmission open access paradigm has created heavy utilization of the 
transmission network. Reactive power problems were a significant factor in the August 
14/2003 outage affected the Northeastern U.S. and parts of Canada [35]. The fast 
decoupled load flow method is therefore used to conduct bulk electric system reliability 
analysis in this research. A brief description of the fast decoupled load flow technique is 
given below. 
 
The general equations for the power system mismatch at all system buses except 
the swing bus (reference bus) can be obtained using the Newton-Raphson load flow 
technique [36]. The fast decoupled load flow method neglects the weak coupling 
between the changes in real power and voltage magnitude, and the changes in reactive 
power and phase angle. The mismatches of active power and reactive power are 
expressed in Equations (3.11) and (3.12) respectively. 
 
[∆P]    =   [Jδ][∆δ]        (3.11) 
[∆Q]   =   [Jv][∆V/V]         (3.12) 
 
where:   ∆Pi   =   Active power mismatch at Bus i, 
  ∆Qi   =   Reactive power mismatch at Bus i, 
   ∆δi    =   Increment in phase angle of the voltage at Bus i, 
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   ∆Vi    =   Increment in magnitude of the voltage at Bus i, 
   Jδ, Jv =   Submatrices of the Jacobian matrix [36],  
      δi    =   Phase angle of the voltage at Bus i, 
      Vi   =   Magnitude of the voltage at Bus i. 
 
 Equations (3.11) and (3.12) can be further simplified by making the following 
assumptions, which are usually valid in a practical power system: 
 
 cos(δi – δj)   ≈   1.0 , 
 gij .sin(δi – δj)   <<   bij , 
 Qi   <<   2iij V.b  
 
where:    (gij – jbij)   =   Series admittance of the line connecting Buses i and j, 
     Qi   =   Reactive power at Bus i. 
 
The final equations used in the fast decoupled load flow technique are given by 
Equations (3.13) and (3.14) using the simplifications [31] noted above. 
 
[∆P/V]    =   [B′][∆δ]        (3.13) 
[∆Q/V]   =   [B″][∆V]         (3.14) 
 
 Both matrices [B′] and [B″] are real, sparse and contain only network 
admittances. Since [B′] and [B″] are constant, they need to be inverted or factorized only 
once at the beginning of iterative process. The voltage magnitude at each load bus and 
the phase angle at each bus except the swing bus are modified in each iteration as shown 
in Equations (3.15) and (3.16).  
 
 [δ]new   =   [δ]old  +  [∆δ]       (3.15) 
 [V]new   =   [V]old  +  [∆V]       (3.16) 
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 The power mismatches [∆P] and [∆Q] are calculated for each new value of bus 
angle and bus voltage. Equations (3.13) and (3.14) are iterated in some defined manner 
towards an exact solution, i.e. when power mismatches are less than the tolerance. In the 
case of transmission line or transformer outages, the Sherman-Morrison correction 
formula [26, 37] can be used to reflect the outages without rebuilding and refactorizing 
the system matrices [B′] and [B″]. 
 
3.4  Corrective Actions 
 
In normal operation, all the operating limits are satisfied. The operating 
constraints are described as follows [13]: 
 
1. Voltage magnitude constraints: Operating limits are imposed on the voltage 
magnitude of buses, i.e., 
     Vmin   ≤   V   ≤   Vmax     (3.17) 
where:  Vmin and Vmax represent the minimum and maximum voltage limits 
respectively. 
 
2. Branch flow constraints: These are the thermal capacity limits on transmission 
lines and transformers. In some cases, the steady state stability limits on 
transmission lines expressed by angle differences can also be transformed into 
branch flow constraints. 
    | T |   ≤   Tmax      (3.18) 
where:   T     =   Power flow on a branch, 
           Tmax =   Maximum capacity limit of a line or transformer. 
 
3. Real power (MW) generation constraints: The real power generation constraints 
at the swing bus and generator buses are 
    Pmin   ≤   P   ≤   Pmax     (3.19) 
where:  Pmin and Pmax represent the minimum and the maximum power 
generation at each generator bus respectively. 
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4. Reactive power (MVAr) generation constraints: The reactive power generation 
constraints at the swing bus and generator buses are 
    Qmin   ≤   Q   ≤   Qmax     (3.20) 
where:   Qmin and Qmax represent the minimum and the maximum reactive power 
generation at each generator bus respectively. 
 
 All the operating constraints described above must be satisfied for normal 
operation of a bulk electric system. When any operating constraint is violated, corrective 
action(s) is required in order to alleviate the operating constraint problem and to restore 
the system to normal operation. The occurrence of a system problem may by itself be 
recorded as a failure event. In many cases, however, it may be possible to eliminate a 
system problem by taking appropriate corrective action. It is, therefore, of interest to 
determine whether it is possible to eliminate a system problem by employing proper 
corrective action. There is no consensus among power utilities and related organizations 
regarding uniform failure criteria and therefore all organizations do not use the same 
fundamental solution technique to calculate the adequacy of their systems [38]. The 
broad categories of corrective action [26, 31, 39, 40] that can be employed are as 
follows: 
 
1. Generation rescheduling in the case of a capacity deficiency in the system. 
2. Alleviation of transmission line overloads. 
3. Correction of generating unit MVAr limits violations. 
4. Correction of a voltage problem at a bus and the solution of ill-conditioned 
network situations when using AC load flow techniques. 
5. Bus isolation and system splitting under transmission line or transformer outages. 
6. Load curtailment in the event of a system problem. 
 
Corrective action to alleviate operating constraint violations can be conducted 
using an optimal power flow (OPF) approach. Nonlinear OPF requires a large amount of 
CPU time and can encounter convergence problems in some multi-component failure 
situations. The ability to include a high degree of accuracy in corrective calculations will 
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never override the inherent uncertainties in the forecast data including load, failure rates, 
repair rates and in the Monte Carlo simulation. It is therefore reasonable to use a linear 
optimization model for corrective action analysis [13] in bulk electric system reliability 
assessment.  
 
3.4.1   Linear Programming Model for Load Curtailment and Generation  
           Rescheduling 
 
 In the event of constraint violation(s), the system encounters an emergency 
situation in which load may or may not be curtailed after corrective action has been 
taken to eliminate the operating constraint violations. The initial activity is normally to 
alleviate the problem by rescheduling generation without requiring load curtailments. If 
it is not possible to overcome this difficulty by rescheduling the generation, then load 
will be curtailed at different buses while minimizing the total load curtailment. A linear 
programming method designated as a dual simplex algorithm [41, 42], which is 
described in detail in Appendix B, is used for generation rescheduling and load 
curtailment minimization. The objective of the minimization model is to minimize the 
total load curtailed at each bus while simultaneously satisfying the power balance. This 
minimization model is as follows [13]: 
 
 Objective function:  ∑
∈NDi
ii C.Wmin        (3.21) 
 Subject to:  T(Sk)   =   A(Sk)(PG + C – PD)   (3.22) 
   ∑∑∑
∈∈∈
=+
NDi
i
NDi
i
NGi
i PD      CPG     (3.23) 
   PGmin   ≤   PG   ≤   PGmax    (3.24) 
   0   ≤   C   ≤   PD     (3.25) 
   | T(Sk) |   ≤   Tmax     (3.26) 
 
where:  T(Sk)  =  Line flow vector under system state Sk, 
  Tmax   =  Maximum capacity limit vector for the line flows T(Sk), 
  A(Sk)  =  Relation matrix between line flows and power injections under state Sk, 
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  PG     =  Generation vector with minimum (PGmin) and maximum (PGmax) limits, 
  PD     =  Load vector, 
  NG    =  Set of generator buses, 
  ND    =  Set of load buses, 
  C       =  Load curtailment vector, 
  W      =  Weighting factor vector related to a specified load shedding policy 
 
 Equation (3.21) incorporates the system load curtailment philosophy using the 
variable Wi which is designated as the bus weighting factor. Different load shedding 
policies can be incorporated by assigning a different Wi value at each load bus (delivery 
point). There is a wide range of possible load curtailment philosophies. Three possible 
policies are used in this research. These three possible schemes are implemented by 
assigning different sets of weighting factors (Wi). Load curtailment philosophy 
considerations are addressed later in this chapter.  
 
3.4.2  Linear Programming Model for Voltage Adjustment and Reactive Load 
          (MVAr) Curtailment 
 
 Bus voltage violations can be alleviated by adjusting the generator bus voltages 
and/or by reactive power injections from reactive sources. If it is not possible to 
eliminate all the bus voltage violations by these adjustments, then reactive load 
curtailments at some buses are unavoidable. Reactive load curtailments should be 
minimized in this case. The linear programming model designated as a primal simplex 
algorithm [41, 43] and described in detail in Appendix B is used for this purpose [13, 
44]. 
 
 Objective function: ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∆+∆∑ ∑
∈ ∈NGi NDj
jjii Q     |V|min βα 0    (3.27) 
 Subject to:      [B][∆V]   +   [B0][∆V0]   =   [∆Q]   (3.28) 
        maxii
min
i V      V      V ∆≤∆≤∆             ( i ∈  NG∪NR ) (3.29) 
        *jj ∆V      ∆V ≥              ( j ∈  ND )  (3.30) 
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        maxii
min
i Q      Q      Q ∆≤∆≤∆             ( i ∈  NG∪NR ) (3.31) 
        maxjj ∆Q      ∆Q      0 ≤≤             ( j ∈  ND )  (3.32) 
 
where:   
∆V0  =  Bus voltage change vector associated with generation buses, and static reactive  
             source buses with lower limit ∆Vmin and upper limit ∆Vmax,  
∆V   =   Bus voltage change vector associated with load buses with lower limit ∆Vmin  
             and upper limit ∆Vmax, 
∆V*  =  Voltage violations at load buses, 
∆Q   =  Reactive power change vector with lower limit ∆Qmin and upper limit ∆Qmax, 
[B0] =  Elements of the admittance matrix associated with generation buses, and 
             static reactive source buses, 
[B]   =  Elements of the [B″] matrix in Equation (3.14) associated with load buses, 
NG   =  Set of generator buses, 
ND   =  Set of load buses, 
NR    =  Set of static reactive source buses, 
   α    =  Weighting factor vector associated with generation buses, and static reactive  
             source buses, 
   β    =  Weighting factor vector associated with load buses. 
 
 The main objective of the optimization model is to minimize the total reactive 
load (MVAr) curtailment. The βj weighting factors therefore have to be larger than the αi 
weighting factors. This means that the voltage constraint violations are initially 
corrected by generator bus and/or reactive source bus voltage adjustments without 
reactive load curtailment. If it is not possible to overcome the difficulty by generator bus 
voltage adjustments, then reactive load will be curtailed. The first term in the objective 
function provides the possibility that when there is no need for reactive load curtailment, 
the generator bus voltage adjustments will be minimized. Equation (3.29) indicates that 
the generator and reactive source bus voltage adjustments should be within the 
permissible changes, which are the differences between the bus voltage limits and their 
actual values in the contingency state. Equation (3.30) indicates that load bus voltage 
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changes should be larger than their violations, which are the differences between the 
actual load bus voltages in the contingency state and their limits. Equation (3.31) 
indicates that reactive power adjustments at generator and reactive source buses should 
be within the permissible changes, which are the differences between the bus reactive 
power limits and their actual values in the contingency state. Equation (3.32) indicates 
that when load bus reactive power curtailments are unavoidable, these curtailments 
cannot exceed the actual reactive loads. Therefore maxj∆Q  are basically the bus reactive 
loads. It is important to note that reactive load (MVAr) curtailment cannot be done alone 
without curtailing a portion of real power load (MW). The load power factor is assumed 
to be fixed at each load bus, and is used to calculate the resulting real power load (MW) 
that must be shed corresponding to the required curtailed reactive load (MVAr). This 
optimization model is also used as a corrective action for generating unit reactive power 
(MVAr) limit violations.   
    
3.4.3  Split Network Solution  
 
 Changes in the network configuration due to the outages of line(s) and/or 
transformer(s) may result in splitting a network into two or more than two smaller 
networks. Each network may consist of load buses and generator buses. Under steady-
state conditions, they can be treated as separate independent networks. The most 
appropriate technique for this purpose is to recompute the system matrices [B′] and [B″] 
for each of subnetworks and then use AC load flow to determine the system problem(s). 
This technique requires a large computation time to recompute and factorize the system 
matrices for each network. This method also needs additional memory to store the 
matrices for each of the networks. In a practical bulk electric system, a split network 
situation usually has a low probability of occurrence, and therefore occurs infrequently. 
An approximate method for split network solution can be used to reduce the 
computation time. The following approximate method has been used in this research 
work to solve split network situations [26]. 
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 Figure 3.1 is used to illustrate the approximate method used to solve split 
network situations. Lines on outage can be ideally represented as lines in service having 
infinite impedances. It can, therefore, be assumed that networks A and B in Figure 3.1 
are connected by two lines with very high impedances. The power flow through these 
lines will be very small due to the high impedances and essentially these lines therefore 
do not connect the networks. The change to high impedance values in the network 
matrix [B′] can be easily incorporated using Woodbury’s formula [45]. In order to 
further limit the power flows, the capacity of these lines can be assumed to be close to 
zero in the linear programming model, i.e. in Equation (3.26). The Woodbury formula 
has been used to update the [B′]-1 matrix using high impedances for the line(s) which 
cause the split network. The linear programming model is developed with the updated 
matrix using normal line power capacities for the lines not on outage. The lines on 
outage which cause a split network are considered to be in service with very low power 
flow capacities and high impedance.    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 3.1 Split network situation 
 
3.4.4  Solution of Ill-Conditioned Network Situations 
 
 A drawback when utilizing the AC load flow technique is the possibility of non-
convergent situations in the network. These non-convergent situations are frequently 
encountered while considering the outages of transmission lines/transformers. Most of 
the non-convergent situations result due to high values of mismatch in the reactive 
power beyond the permissible tolerance limit. Very few situations result due to high 
values of mismatch in the active power. Another possibility is that a load flow may not 
converge although a solution, in fact, does exist. This non-convergence could occur due 
to numerical problems with the fast decoupled algorithm and/or the characteristics of the 
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numerical formulations used [46]. In order to avoid these non-convergent situations 
when a solution does exist, an additional algorithm is required in the load flow 
algorithm. Reference [47] suggests that the convergence property of the Newton-
Raphson load flow can be improved by scaling the solution projection calculated by the 
load flow algorithm without changing the direction of the projection. A heuristic 
technique that is adaptable to the fast decoupled AC load flow was suggested [29, 46] to 
adjust the scaling factor by monitoring the sum of the squares of the power mismatches 
before and after each voltage magnitude and phase angle correction. Under normal load 
flow situations, the scaling factor is taken as 1.0, but in the case when the sum of the 
squares of the power mismatches for the new iteration exceeds the value calculated from 
the previous iteration, the scaling factor is decreased from its initial value of 1.0 by a 
factor. The value of the factor is arbitrary and could lie between 0.0 and 1.0. During one 
complete load flow cycle, the value of the scaling factor is decreased whenever the sum 
of the squares of the power mismatches exceeds its previous value [46]. This heuristic 
technique is incorporated in the fast decoupled AC load flow algorithm used in this 
research work when non-convergent situations occur.  
 
 Although the heuristic technique for non-convergence described above is able to 
eliminate the non-convergent situations when a load flow solution does exist, a non-
convergent situation may still persist due to the fact that the AC load flow equations may 
have no real solution under a given operating condition. This kind of problem, which 
can be designated as power flow unsolvability, could happen when a heavily stressed 
system is subjected to a severe contingency situation leading to voltage collapse in the 
system. In the case of a power flow unsolvability situation, the network solution 
technique switches to the DC load flow method described in Section 3.3.1. The DC load 
flow approach is used in this research work as an approximate method to solve a 
problem when there is no AC load flow solution under some severe outage 
contingencies. In the DC load flow approach, reactive power and voltage constraints are 
relaxed. Operating constraints are therefore only focused on generating unit real power 
constraints and branch flow constraints. The linear programming model for load 
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curtailments and generation rescheduling expressed in Equations (3.21) – (3.26) is 
applied to solve operating constraints under power flow unsolvability circumstances.     
 
3.4.5  Load Curtailment Philosophies 
 
During extreme emergency situations, system operators are required to make 
load shedding decisions based on system security concerns, i.e. voltage, current, power 
and frequency constraints, to alleviate system constraints and maintain system stability. 
Load shedding policies can differ from one system to another. These differences are 
basically dependent on the individual utility philosophies and objectives under extreme 
emergency situations. Three load curtailment philosophies designated as the priority 
order, pass-1 and pass-2 policies are utilized in this research work. In these three 
policies, loads are classified according to their importance and divided into the 
categories of firm and interruptible load. Interruptible load is initially curtailed followed 
by firm load, if necessary. The mathematical formulation and algorithms for load 
shedding are described in [13]. The basic concept utilizes an optimization technique 
using linear programming for the minimization model of bus load curtailment described 
by Equations (3.21) – (3.26). A weighting factor (Wi) expressed in Equation (3.21) is 
assigned to each load bus i (delivery point i). Incorporating different load shedding 
policies can be done by quantifying the Wi value of each load bus. When adopting the 
pass-1 policy, the load buses closest to the elements on outage(s) are assigned with a 
relatively small Wi and those far from the outage(s) are assigned with a relatively large 
Wi. The pass-2 policy is an extension of the pass-1 policy to include load buses further 
removed from the contingency area. When the priority order policy is used as the load 
curtailment philosophy, the most important load bus is assigned with the largest Wi 
while the least important load bus has the smallest Wi. The optimization process is then 
conducted in order to provide the optimum solution by assigning a Wi to each load bus 
as input to the linear programming technique. The three load curtailment philosophies 
are used to illustrate the importance of individual delivery points under system 
emergency situations, and are described further in the following. 
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A.  Priority Order Policy  
 
This philosophy is based on ranking all the bulk delivery points using a 
reliability worth index such as the interrupted energy assessment rate (IEAR) in $/kWh 
[2, 48, 49]. This parameter is similar to the value of lost load (VoLL) used in the UK 
[50]. The bulk delivery point that has the highest IEAR will have the highest priority, 
and the delivery point that has the lowest IEAR will have the lowest priority. When the 
bulk power system encounters a severe contingency that requires load curtailments, the 
delivery point that has the lowest priority will be initially curtailed. This policy 
minimizes customer interruption costs due to load curtailments. There are two basic test 
systems used in this research work. These systems are designated as the RBTS [51] and 
the IEEE-RTS [52] and are described in detail later. The priority order for the RBTS and 
IEEE-RTS are shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. 
 
Table 3.1: IEAR values and priority order for each delivery point in the RBTS. 
 
Delivery 
Point (DP) 
IEAR  
($/kWh)
Priority
order 
Delivery 
Point (DP)
IEAR  
($/kWh) 
Priority 
order 
Bus 2 9.6325 1 Bus 5 8.6323 2 
Bus 3 4.3769 5 Bus 6 5.5132 4 
Bus 4 8.0267 3    
 
Table 3.2: IEAR values and priority order for each delivery point in the IEEE-RTS. 
 
Delivery 
Point (DP) 
IEAR  
($/kWh)
Priority
order 
Delivery 
Point (DP)
IEAR  
($/kWh) 
Priority 
order 
Bus 1 8.9815 3 Bus 10 5.1940 14 
Bus 2 7.3606 5 Bus 13 7.2813 6 
Bus 3 5.8990 11 Bus 14 4.3717 16 
Bus 4 9.5992 1 Bus 15 5.9744 10 
Bus 5 9.2323 2 Bus 16 7.2305 7 
Bus 6 6.5238 9 Bus 18 5.6149 13 
Bus 7 7.0291 8 Bus 19 4.5430 15 
Bus 8 7.7742 4 Bus 20 5.6836 12 
Bus 9 3.6623 17    
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B.  Pass-1 Policy 
 
In this load shedding policy, loads are curtailed at the delivery points that are 
closest to (or one line away from) the element(s) on outage. This load shedding policy 
tends to localize the severity of an event within the area in which the element outage(s) 
occur. This policy minimizes the number of delivery points affected by a specific event. 
 
C.  Pass-2 Policy 
 
This load shedding policy extends the concept of the pass-1 policy. Loads are 
curtailed at the delivery points that surround the outaged element. Delivery points which 
are one line away and two lines away from the outaged element are considered for load 
curtailment. Interruptible loads at delivery points that are one line away from the 
outaged element are initially curtailed followed by interruptible loads at delivery points 
that are two lines away from the outaged element. It is important to note that firm load 
curtailments at delivery points that are one line away from the outaged element are not 
initially applied unless interruptible load curtailments at delivery points that are two 
lines away from the outaged element are not sufficient to eliminate the system operating 
constraints.  
 
There is a wide range of possible load curtailment policies. The three policies 
used in this research work are three possible schemes, and are used to illustrate the 
impact on the delivery point indices of an adopted load curtailment policy.  
 
3.5  Sequential Simulation Process for Bulk Electric System Reliability Analysis   
 
The sequential Monte Carlo simulation approach can be used to realistically 
represent most contingencies and the complex operating characteristics inherent in a 
bulk electric system and provide a comprehensive range of reliability indices. Sequential 
Monte Carlo simulation can be used to estimate the indices by simulating the actual 
chronological process and random behavior of the system in fixed discrete time steps. 
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Any event that occurs within a particular time step is considered to occur at the end of 
the time step [23]. Research on the application of the sequential simulation technique to 
bulk electric system reliability evaluation has been published [13, 23, 53, 54]. The 
overall procedure for composite generation and transmission system reliability 
evaluation using a sequential Monte Carlo simulation approach is briefly summed up in 
the following steps:  
 
Step 1: Specify the initial state of each component (all generating units and 
transmission links). Normally, it is assumed that all components are initially in 
the normal state (up state). 
 
Step 2: Simulate the duration of each component residing in its present state using the 
inverse transform method [22] and the distribution functions of the component 
failure and repair rates. For example, given an exponential distribution 
function, i.e. f(t) = λe-λt, then the sampled value of the state duration (T) is: Ti = 
-ln(Ui)/λi, where Ui is a uniformly distributed random number [0,1] 
corresponding to the ith component. λi is a failure rate or repair rate depending 
on the current state of the ith component. 
 
Step 3: Repeat step 2 in a given time span, normally a year. A chronological transition 
process (up and down state) for each component is then constructed in a given 
time span. Chronological hourly load models for individual delivery points are 
constructed and incorporated in the analysis. 
 
Step 4: The simulated operation (fast decoupled AC load flow analysis) is assessed for 
each hour during a given time span. If operating constraints occur, corrective 
actions described in Section 3.4 are required to alleviate the constraints and 
load curtailed if necessary. 
 
Step 5: At the end of each simulated year, the delivery point and system adequacy 
indices described in Section 3.2 are calculated and updated. Steps 2-4 are 
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repeated until the coefficient of variation is less than the specified tolerance 
error. 
 
Bulk electric system reliability analysis software using sequential simulation has 
been developed to incorporate all the considerations described in this chapter. Some 
fundamental algorithms have been taken from the SECOREL program [34] which uses a 
DC-based load flow analysis. The developed computer software includes many features 
to deal with reactive power and bus voltage constraint considerations using the fast 
decoupled AC load flow approach. The software was extended to include a more 
accurate method to calculate reliability worth indices (Chapter 5), and to create 
reliability index probability distributions for both delivery points and the overall system 
(Chapter 6). In addition, the extended adequacy analysis to incorporate security 
considerations in the form of system well-being analysis is integrated into the software 
(Chapter 8). Another significant feature of the developed software is the ability to 
integrate an intermittent energy resource such as wind power generation into bulk 
electric system reliability analysis (Chapter 10). The developed computer software for 
bulk electric system (HL-II) reliability analysis with the above features is designated as 
“RapHL-II” which stands for “Reliability analysis program for HL-II”.  
 
3.6  Study Systems 
 
 The two basic test systems used in this research work are the RBTS [51] and 
IEEE-RTS [52]. Both the original and modified versions of these two study systems are 
utilized in this research work. The original versions of the RBTS and IEEE-RTS are 
briefly described in the following. The basic data for the two test systems are given in 
Appendix C.  
 
3.6.1  Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS)  
 
The RBTS [51] is an educational test system developed by the Power System 
Research Group at the University of Saskatchewan. The RBTS is a 6 bus system 
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composed of 2 generator buses, 5 load buses, 9 transmission lines and 11 generating 
units. The system peak load is 185 MW and the total generation is 240 MW. A single 
line diagram of the RBTS is shown in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: The single line diagram of the RBTS. 
 
 
3.6.2  IEEE-Reliability Test System (IEEE-RTS) 
 
The IEEE-RTS [52] is a 24 bus system with 10 generator buses, 17 load buses, 
33 transmission lines, 5 transformers and 32 generating units. The system peak load is 
2,850 MW and the total generation is 3,405 MW. The single line diagram is shown in 
Figure 3.3. 
 48
 
Figure 3.3: The single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS. 
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The chronological or time varying load curves used in this thesis were created 
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customer sector load profiles. Seven types of customer sectors designated as agricultural, 
industrial, commercial, large users, residential, government and institutions, office and 
building were identified and the chronological load characteristics of these customer 
sectors are presented in Appendix D. The peak load and load factor (L.F.) can be 
calculated from the annual load profile of each sector. The equation and the calculation 
of the sector load factors are shown in Appendix D. Customer sector allocations at 
different load buses for the RBTS and IEEE-RTS are also shown in Appendix D. 
 
3.8  Conclusions 
 
 This chapter presents the basic elements in bulk electric system reliability 
analysis using sequential Monte Carlo simulation. The equations used to obtain the 
delivery point and system reliability indices are presented. The network solution 
techniques and the methods used for corrective action due to system operating 
constraints violations are presented and approximate methods for split network and ill-
conditioned network solutions are addressed. The concept of different load curtailment 
philosophies and their implementation in the linear programming technique is also 
discussed in this chapter. The overall sequential simulation procedure used for bulk 
electric system reliability analysis is demonstrated. The computer software developed in 
this research work is designated as RapHL-II (Reliability analysis program for HL-II) 
and the two test systems used in this research work are briefly illustrated.  
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CHAPTER 4   
IMPACT OF UTILIZING SEQUENTIAL AND NON-
SEQUENTIAL SIMULATION TECHNIQUES IN BULK 
ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The two basic Monte Carlo approaches are designated as the sequential and non-
sequential simulation techniques. In the non-sequential approach, the states of all 
components are sampled and a non-chronological system state is determined. An 
approximate frequency index is obtained using this method. In the sequential approach, 
the chronological up and down cycles of all the components are simulated and the 
system operating cycle is determined by combining all the component cycles. The 
sequential simulation technique provides an opportunity to incorporate chronological 
factors, and reliability index probability distributions can be calculated using this 
method. This approach normally requires considerably more computation time and effort 
than the non-sequential method. This chapter demonstrates the effects of using the non-
sequential and the sequential Monte Carlo simulation techniques in bulk power system 
reliability evaluation. The focus is primarily on frequency-related index calculations as 
this index is largely affected by factors associated with failure state transitions and 
chronology. These two factors are discussed and investigated in this chapter. The 
sequential (state duration sampling) and non-sequential (state sampling) techniques are 
applied to the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS. Two computer software packages were used in 
the studies described in this chapter. The first is a commercial software known as 
MECORE [55] which utilizes the state sampling (non-sequential) method. The second 
computer program is known as SECOREL [34] and uses the sequential technique. Both 
software packages utilize a DC-based load flow approach and therefore can be used for 
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comparison purposes. The developed computer software RapHL-II was not employed in 
the studies described in this chapter. The RapHL-II software is illustrated in the 
following chapters.   
 
4.2  Sequential and Non-Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation Procedures 
 
As noted earlier, this chapter utilizes the two basic Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques designated as the non-sequential (state sampling) and sequential methods. A 
brief outline of the two techniques is given in the following: 
 
4.2.1  Non-Sequential Technique 
 
The state sampling method is used to simulate a non-sequential approach in this 
chapter. In the state sampling technique, the states of all components are sampled and a 
non-chronological system state is obtained. The basic sampling process is conducted 
using the random behavior of each component categorized by uniform distributions 
[0,1]. The probability of each component outage is given by its forced outage rate 
(FOR). All components are sampled using a random number generator. If a sampled 
random number of component i is less than FORi, this component is assumed to be in an 
outage state, otherwise it is in the normal state. When all components are sampled, the 
states of all components are combined, and the system state can be determined. The 
simulation procedure in this approach can be briefly summarized as follows.  
 
Step 1: A system state is simulated. 
 
Step 2: If the system is in a normal state, then there is no load curtailment. Go back to 
step 1 for the next sampling. If the sampled state is a contingency state, load 
curtailment may be required. Load flow analysis is conducted in this case. 
 
Step 3: If constraints occur such as line overload, corrective actions, i.e. generation 
rescheduling, load curtailment, may be needed to alleviate the constraints. 
 52
Step 4: Reliability indices are calculated and updated. Steps 1-3 are repeated until the 
coefficient of variation is less than the specified tolerance error. 
 
This state sampling technique is relatively simple. Distribution functions of the 
component failure and repair rates are not required. This method, however, cannot be 
used by itself to calculate the actual frequency index. It provides only an approximate 
estimate of the frequency index. 
 
4.2.2  Sequential Technique 
 
The sequential or state duration sampling approach is based on sampling the 
probability distributions of the component state durations. This technique can be used to 
model all the contingencies and operating characteristics inherent in the system. 
Chronological load models can also be easily incorporated. The overall process used in 
the sequential approach for bulk electric system reliability analysis is given in Section 
3.5. 
 
4.3  Simulation Results  
 
There are two basic types of reliability indices. They are designated as 
annualized indices when derived using a constant peak load, and annual indices when 
calculated using a load duration curve or a chronological load model. In the non-
sequential (state sampling) approach, the expected number of load curtailments (ENLC) 
is the sum of the occurrences of the load curtailment states. The ENLC is a surrogate for 
the more accurate frequency index designated as the expected frequency of load 
curtailment (EFLC) [13]. The sequential and non-sequential techniques are applied to 
two test systems designated as the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS. The results obtained using 
the two computer programs are given in the following subsections. 
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4.3.1  Annualized Indices 
 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the annualized system indices for the RBTS and the 
IEEE-RTS respectively. Similar indices can be obtained for each individual load point in 
the composite generation and transmission systems. The load point and system indices 
complement each other in providing an overall assessment of system adequacy. The 
system indices are used in this chapter to illustrate the variability of the frequency 
related index due to the technique and factors used in the calculation. 
 
Table 4.1:  Annualized system indices for the RBTS. 
Annualized Indices Non-Sequential Sequential 
Expected Number of Load Curtailments (occ/yr), ENLC 5.40 -- 
Expected Frequency of Load Curtailments (occ/yr), EFLC -- 3.70 
Probability of Load Curtailments, PLC 0.01024 0.00914 
Expected Energy Not Supplied (MWh/yr), EENS 1110.8 998.7 
Computation time (seconds) 0.14 19.10 
 
 
Table 4.2:  Annualized system indices for the IEEE-RTS. 
Annualized Indices Non-Sequential Sequential 
Expected Number of Load Curtailments (occ/yr), ENLC 54.72 -- 
Expected Frequency of Load Curtailments (occ/yr), EFLC -- 18.57 
Probability of Load Curtailments, PLC 0.07980 0.08451 
Expected Energy Not Supplied (MWh/yr), EENS 122192.5 134590.6 
Computation time (seconds) 0.24 75.04 
 
 
An accurate frequency index (EFLC) cannot be obtained using the non-
sequential technique. The ENLC shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 is a surrogate or 
approximate value for the more accurate frequency index obtained using the sequential 
method. When a constant load is used, the annualized ENLC obtained using the non-
sequential method is a high estimate of the annualized EFLC obtained using the 
sequential approach. It is important to note, however, that both techniques provide quite 
similar estimates for other reliability indices such as the PLC and EENS, which are not 
frequency-related indices. The EENS index is used in a wide range of power system 
reliability studies and is often extended to estimate the expected customer outage costs 
 54
using an interrupted energy assessment rate in $/kWh [2]. The computation times are 
also shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 in order to illustrate the computational effort required 
in the two cases. 
 
4.3.2  Annual Indices 
 
Annual indices are normally calculated using a chronological load model or a 
load duration curve (LDC) on an annual basis (8760 hours). A segment of the 
chronological load model used for the overall RBTS is shown in Figure 4.1. 
Chronological load models for the individual customer types were developed using a 
bottom-up approach [34, 54]. The complete time-varying load model in the form shown 
in Figure 4.1 was transformed to an annual load duration curve (LDC) and is shown in 
Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Chronological load model of the RBTS (1st week of the annual model). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Annual load duration curve of the RBTS. 
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The cumulative chronological load model shown in Figure 4.2 has a peak load of 
179.28 MW. This peak value is different from the peak demand in [51] which is 185 
MW. The reason is that individual delivery points have different chronological load 
characteristics dominated by the customer types, i.e. industrial, commercial or 
residential, embedded in each delivery point. The peak demands occurring at each 
individual delivery point may not be coincident. The system peak demand, therefore, is 
lower than that of a load model in which all the delivery points reach their peak loads at 
the same time. In a similar manner, the peak load of the IEEE-RTS derived from the 
chronological loads is 2754.75 MW instead of 2850 MW. 
   
The results shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, obtained using the sequential technique, 
utilize the chronological load model shown in Figure 4.1. The results obtained using the 
non-sequential technique utilize a multi-step model derived from the load duration curve 
(LDC) shown in Figure 4.2. The LDC is divided into 40 non-uniform load steps. 
 
Table 4.3:  Annual system indices for the RBTS. 
Annual Indices Non-Sequential (40-step LDC) 
Sequential 
(Chronological)
Expected Number of Load Curtailments (occ/yr), ENLC 1.44 -- 
Expected Frequency of Load Curtailments (occ/yr), EFLC -- 1.66 
Probability of Load Curtailments, PLC 0.00171 0.00152 
Expected Energy Not Supplied (MWh/yr), EENS 180.3 140.0 
Computation time (seconds) 3.89 110.44 
 
 
Table 4.4:  Annual system indices for the IEEE-RTS. 
Annual Indices Non-Sequential (40-step LDC) 
Sequential 
(Chronological)
Expected Number of Load Curtailments (occ/yr), ENLC 3.00 -- 
Expected Frequency of Load Curtailments (occ/yr), EFLC -- 8.20 
Probability of Load Curtailments, PLC 0.00422 0.00357 
Expected Energy Not Supplied (MWh/yr), EENS 4387.0 3911.4 
Computation time (seconds) 11.25 955.88 
 
 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that the ENLC provides a high estimate of the EFLC 
when calculating annualized indices using a constant peak load model. This conclusion, 
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however, cannot be drawn for annual indices obtained by utilizing a load duration curve 
or a chronological load model. The ENLC obtained using the non-sequential method and 
a load duration curve is a low estimate of the EFLC determined using the sequential 
approach and a chronological load model, as shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. An 
explanation of this variance in the frequency index calculation is given in the following 
section. 
 
4.4  Discussion on the Frequency Index Calculation 
 
The non-sequential (state sampling) technique can be used to provide reasonably 
accurate probability and energy-related indices. It cannot, however, be used to directly 
calculate accurate frequency-related indices [13]. Consequently, this method calculates 
the expected number of load curtailments (ENLC) as an approximation to the actual 
frequency index. There are two major factors involved in accurate frequency index 
calculations. They are failure state transitions and chronological load considerations. A 
detailed investigation of the impact of these two factors is presented in the following: 
 
4.4.1  Impact of the Failure State Transitions 
 
The frequency concept is based on transitions between the system states. It is a 
difficult task in composite system reliability evaluation to calculate the actual frequency 
index particularly when the system is composed of a large number of components. For 
each load curtailment state i, it is necessary to identify all the non-load curtailment states 
that can be reached from state i in one transition [56]. This state transition condition is 
illustrated in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.3 shows that if the system is in state B which is a 
failure state, the transition to state C will not bring the system across a boundary wall to 
a system success state. A system failure event should not be counted in this case as the 
state transition does not cross the boundary wall. This state transition, which does not 
cross the boundary wall, is designated in this thesis as a failure state transition. The basic 
state sampling (non-sequential) technique is not able to recognize this state transition 
problem. Consequently, the state transition from state B to state C or vice versa is seen 
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as an additional system failure event (a failure state transition), and is included in the 
ENLC index. This leads to overestimation of the frequency index. Methods to correct 
this state transition problem in a frequency index calculation are described in [20, 56]. 
The chronology of load demand is another major factor in the frequency index 
calculation and cannot be taken into account using the techniques proposed in [20, 56]. 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Simple system with three states. 
 
4.4.2  Impact of the Chronology of Load Demand 
 
The load duration curve (LDC) shown in Figure 4.2 is used in this section. The 
load duration curve is divided into 10 constant load steps. The accumulated results are 
derived by weighting each load step by its step probability. The results obtained using 
the sequential and non-sequential methods incorporating 10 non-uniform load steps are 
shown in Table 4.5. The sequential and non-sequential results shown in Table 4.5 were 
obtained in a similar manner to that used to calculate the annualized indices shown in 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The difference is that there are now 10 constant load levels. Each 
constant load level is utilized one at a time, and the accumulated results are obtained 
using the appropriate weighting probabilities. As shown in Table 4.5, the ENLC is a 
high estimate of the EFLC at every load step. The accumulated ENLC is also higher 
than the accumulated EFLC. The reason is that the impact of failure state transitions still 
exists. The load duration curve does not convey the impact of chronology in the 
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calculation as each load step represents a constant load level throughout the year of 
simulation.  
 
Table 4.5: Annual indices for the RBTS obtained using 10 non-uniform load steps. 
Non-sequential Sequential Step 
No. 
Load 
(p.u.) 
Probability
of step ENLC PLC EENS EFLC PLC EENS
1 0.97 0.00320 2.899 0.00410 675.1 1.792 0.00354 625.8 
2 0.95 0.07158 2.656 0.00388 587.1 1.792 0.00353 547.8
3 0.90 0.12135 2.510 0.00366 373.5 1.694 0.00331 353.9
4 0.85 0.14384 1.384 0.00154 226.7 1.016 0.00144 213.4
5 0.80 0.10799 1.273 0.00138 196.2 0.972 0.00136 182.0
6 0.75 0.05023 1.227 0.00130 173.4 0.892 0.00118 155.3
7 0.70 0.12774 1.227 0.00130 156.3 0.886 0.00117 141.7
8 0.60 0.08242 1.177 0.00122 128.2 0.870 0.00113 118.5
9 0.40 0.06084 1.177 0.00122 85.5 0.868 0.00113 78.9
10 0.30 0.23082 1.177 0.00122 64.1 0.868 0.00113 59.2
Total -- 1.00000 1.499 0.00179 202.5 1.074 0.00165 188.6
Note: System peak load for RBTS = 179.28 MW (179.28/185.00 = 0.9691 p.u.) 
 
 
The accumulated frequency indices obtained in Table 4.5 can be used to 
determine the impact of failure state transitions. Since both techniques utilize the same 
load curve and the same load step probability, the difference between the accumulated 
ENLC and EFLC is directly influenced by the failure state transition impact, as the 
sequential method recognizes the failure state transitions while the basic non-sequential 
method cannot detect them. The error due to the failure state transition impact, therefore, 
can be approximately expressed as (1.499-1.074)/1.074 = 0.3957 or 39.57%.  
 
The total EFLC shown in Table 4.5 does not include the impact of chronology 
but does incorporate the failure state transition impact. This result can be compared with 
that obtained using the sequential method and a chronological load, as shown in Table 
4.3. In the annual index analysis of the RBTS, the EFLC is equal to 1.66. This value 
includes both the failure state transition and chronology impacts. The chronology 
impact, therefore, can be approximately calculated as (1.660-1.074)/1.074 = 0.5456 or 
54.56%. As shown above, the chronology impact percentage is higher than that of the 
failure state transition impact. Although both impacts amplify the EFLC value, the 
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chronology impact seems to dominate. The IEEE-RTS was also studied in the same 
manner, and the results are shown in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6: Annual indices of the IEEE-RTS obtained using 10 non-uniform load steps. 
Non-sequential Sequential Step 
No. 
Load 
(p.u.) 
Probability 
of step ENLC PLC EENS EFLC PLC EENS
1 0.97 0.00263 33.649 0.04890 73119 11.320 0.04938 73843 
2 0.95 0.06530 28.118 0.04210 54984 8.730 0.04216 54817
3 0.90 0.12877 11.787 0.01585 17532 4.675 0.01553 18660
4 0.85 0.15080 4.169 0.00555 4934 1.930 0.00547 5876
5 0.80 0.10046 1.397 0.00185 1303 0.665 0.00191 1780
6 0.75 0.04658 0.228 0.00030 319 0.225 0.00051 533
7 0.70 0.12934 0.049 0.00016 65 0.070 0.00019 157
8 0.60 0.08447 0.000 0.00000 0 0.015 0.00003 23
9 0.40 0.05571 0.000 0.00000 0 0.010 0.00002 13
10 0.30 0.23596 0.000 0.00000 0 0.010 0.00002 10
Total -- 1.00000 4.228 0.00596 6938 1.583 0.00596 7291
Note: System peak load for IEEE-RTS = 2754.75 MW (2754.75/2850 = 0.9666 p.u.)
 
 
In Table 4.6, the failure state transition impact percentage is approximately 
(4.228-1.583)/1.583 = 1.6709 or 167.09%. The EFLC obtained in Table 4.4 is 8.20, the 
percentage of chronology impact is, therefore, approximately (8.200-1.583)/1.583 = 
4.180 or 418.00%. These results confirm that the impact of chronology in a frequency 
index calculation dominates the impact of the failure state transitions (it is 
approximately 250% different for the IEEE-RTS). It is interesting to note that the 
impacts of failure state transitions and chronology on the IEEE-RTS are much higher 
than those for the RBTS. This implies that there may be a wide range of impacts due to 
failure state transitions and chronology considerations for each individual system 
depending on system topology, size, load patterns, operating strategies, etc. 
 
As noted earlier, the frequency concept is based on the transitions between the 
system states. The chronological load model has a significant effect by changing the 
system state transition conditions. These transitions are not due to component state 
changes as shown in Figure 4.3, but are generated by the changes in the chronological 
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load curve across a boundary wall in which either an increased load leads to load 
curtailments or a decreased load results in no load curtailments. 
 
The impact of chronology is clearly represented when incorporating a 
chronological load model as shown in Figure 4.1. As shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the 
ENLC tends to become a low estimate of the EFLC when a chronological load model is 
applied. The accumulated EFLC of the IEEE-RTS shown in Table 4.6 is significantly 
lower than that shown in Table 4.4 even though both studies utilize the same load data 
but represent it in different forms. The impact of the chronology dominates the impact of 
the failure state transitions in the frequency index calculation, as noted earlier. A 
pictorial appreciation of the impact of the chronology on the interruption frequency 
index calculation is demonstrated in Figure 4.4. 
 
Severe load curtailments can occur in bulk electric power systems due to outages 
of main transmission lines, transformers or generators. Potential load interruptions are 
more likely to occur during heavy load periods rather than light load ones. In some 
situations, load curtailments can exist for relatively long periods under these 
contingencies, as shown in Figure 4.4. The sequential technique utilizes a chronological 
load model as shown in Figure 4.4(a). The non-sequential technique uses a constant step 
load model as shown in Figure 4.4(b). Assume that load curtailment is required for this 
contingency situation if the system load is higher than 0.8 p.u. Under the same 
contingency, all the load steps in Figure 4.4(b) which are higher than 0.8 p.u. will also 
have load curtailments. Figure 4.4(a) will have a load curtailment frequency contribution 
of three, while there is only a single load curtailment event in Figure 4.4(b) in which a 
step load is used. Consequently, the EFLC obtained using the chronological load model 
in the sequential technique tends to be higher than that obtained using the constant step 
load model in the non-sequential technique. In the other words, the EFLC obtained using 
a load duration curve tends to be a low estimate of the EFLC obtained using a 
chronological load model. 
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(a)  Chronological load model 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 20 40 60 80
Hours
Lo
ad
 (p
.u
.)
Load step # 1 Load step # 2 Load step # 3
T4
Load curtailment level
 
(b)  Multi-step load model 
 
Figure 4.4: Comparison of using different load models in load curtailments. 
 
Another possibility that results in an increased interruption frequency when 
utilizing a chronological load model is shown in Figure 4.5. In this case, the delivery 
point load profiles have two significant peak loads in a normal day, i.e. at noon and in 
the evening. If the load curtailment level is 0.83, as shown in Figure 4.5, there could be 
two possible interruptions during a single day when incorporating a chronological load 
model in the sequential approach. 
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Figure 4.5: Load demand with two peaks in a normal day. 
 
4.5  Conclusions 
 
The application of sequential and non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques can have significant impacts on the calculated interruption frequency indices 
in a bulk electric power system. Two major factors that influence the frequency index 
calculation are failure state transitions and load chronology. These two factors are 
discussed and examined in this chapter. The impact of chronology is not presented in an 
annualized index calculation and the impact of failure state transitions is not considered 
in the non-sequential method but is incorporated in the sequential approach. Ignoring 
failure state transitions in the non-sequential method will result in overestimation of the 
frequency indices. In an annual index calculation, the impacts of chronology and failure 
state transitions are not incorporated in the non-sequential method while both impacts 
are included in the sequential technique. Ignoring both the chronology and failure state 
transitions will usually result in underestimating the frequency. The impacts of these two 
factors are illustrated in this chapter. The results show that the impact of chronology is 
highly significant, and can exceed the impact of failure state transitions. The results 
shown in the chapter are based on the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS. The systems are 
relatively different and provide a reasonable indication of the results that would be 
obtained for a wide range of systems.  
 
The non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation technique requires considerably less 
computation time than the sequential technique, particularly in large bulk system 
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reliability studies. The sequential technique can, however, provide more accurate 
reliability indices, particularly in regard to the frequency of load point and system 
failures, but also requires considerable additional data in the form of individual bus 
chronological load profiles. Both techniques therefore have advantages and 
disadvantages in the reliability evaluation of large practical bulk electric power systems. 
Both techniques can, however, be used to provide reasonable estimates of system 
adequacy given that the underlying differences and approximations are understood. 
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CHAPTER 5   
RELIABILITY WORTH ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGIES FOR BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEMS 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The basic function of an electric power system is to supply its customers with 
electrical energy as economically as possible and with a reasonable degree of continuity 
and quality [2]. The two aspects of relatively low cost electrical energy at a high level of 
reliability are often in direct conflict. Balancing these two aspects is a big challenge to 
power system managers, planners and operators. Electric power utilities are also facing 
increasing uncertainty regarding the economic, political, societal and environmental 
constraints under which they operate and plan their future systems. This has created 
increasing requirements for extensive justification of new facilities and increased 
emphasis on the justification of system costs and reliability. An integral element in the 
overall problem of allocating capital and operating resources is the assessment of 
reliability cost and reliability worth. The ability to assess the costs associated with 
providing reliable service is reasonably well established and accepted. On the other 
hand, the ability to assess the worth of service reliability is a difficult and subjective 
task. A practical alternative, which is being widely used, is to evaluate the impacts and 
monetary losses incurred by customers due to electric supply failures. Customer 
interruption costs provide a valuable surrogate for the actual worth of electric power 
supply reliability [57 – 60]. Reliability worth evaluation, therefore, provides the 
opportunity to incorporate cost analysis and quantitative assessment in a common 
framework [61].   
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Utility planners consider important factors such as, capital investment, operating 
and maintenance costs in reliability cost/worth analysis. They also incorporate customer 
interruption costs in the overall cost minimization process. The reliability of a system 
can be improved by installing additional components or better equipment. The customer 
interruption costs in these cases will decrease as the capital and operating costs increase. 
The main objective is to balance the benefits realized from providing higher reliability 
and the cost of providing it. A major objective of reliability cost/worth assessment is to 
determine the optimum level of service reliability. The basic concept is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1:  Reliability cost components. 
 
 As shown in Figure 5.1, the utility cost, i.e. investment cost, maintenance cost 
and operating cost, increases while the socio-economic customer interruption cost 
decreases with increase in the level of service reliability. The total cost is the sum of the 
two curves. The optimum level of reliability occurs at the point of lowest total cost. In a 
reliability cost/worth analysis, the annual expected customer interruption costs are added 
to the predicted annual capital and operating costs to obtain a total cost evaluation. 
Possible alternative configurations are examined to minimize the total cost and to 
identify the most appropriate configuration. The application of reliability cost/worth 
analysis in system reinforcement planning is illustrated in Chapters 9 and 10. 
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5.2  Customer Interruption Cost 
 
When an electricity supply interruption occurs, its result normally has both 
monetary and social customer impacts. The direct monetary impacts include 
interruptions of production processes, idle but paid labor, raw material damages, 
equipment damages, and loss of income etc. The direct social impacts include 
inconvenience in various activities, discomfort and loss of leisure time. In addition, 
indirect social and economic impacts may arise as consequences of the interruption, i.e. 
increases in crime, or decreases in safety at work or leisure etc. The indirect impacts 
depend on many factors and are very difficult to quantify. Most interruption cost 
evaluation methods are therefore focused on direct impact evaluation [57 – 61]. 
 
 The electric utility industry is moving towards an environment of competition 
and customer choices. Reliability is a key factor influencing customer loyalty. Utilities 
must understand and meet their customers’ expectations [1]. Customer satisfaction 
regarding reliable electric supply is becoming increasingly important in the new 
deregulated electric utility environment. Customer outage costs due to electric supply 
failures are of concern to both utilities and customers. Customer outage cost assessments 
have been conducted in many countries [62] and the results applied using both analytical 
and simulation techniques [2, 13] to assess reliability worth. A CIGRE report [62] 
provides a brief summary of survey work conducted in Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Great Britain, Greece, Iran, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, 
Sweden and the United States of America. Reference [62] also includes a bibliography 
of over 150 publications on the subject of interruption cost assessment and application in 
power systems. The most recent North American survey on customer interruption costs 
was conducted by the MidAmerican Energy Company and is described in [63]. The 
CIGRE report [62] also illustrates the use of these data in determining capacity 
payments, expansion planning, network design, determination of security standards and 
reliability cost/worth assessment in generation, transmission and distribution systems. 
There is also increasing interest in the utilization of interruption cost data in the 
determination of appropriate service disruption payment schemes and a number of such 
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schemes are in place [62]. As noted in [64], it is mandatory for all power companies in 
Norway from 2001 to calculate the energy not supplied and the interruption costs for all 
their delivery points. Customer interruption cost surveys [48, 49] conducted by the 
Power System Research Group at the University of Saskatchewan illustrate that 
customer interruption costs vary with customer type and as a function of outage 
duration. Customer damage functions (CDF) can be used to describe the cost ($/kW 
peak load) associated with a power supply interruption as a function of the outage 
duration. The CDF representing a group of customers belonging to particular standard 
industrial classifications (SIC) [65] can be broadly categorized into seven customer 
sectors designated as agricultural, residential, large users, industrial, commercial, 
government and institutions, office and building. The CDF of these seven customer 
types are designated as sector customer damage functions (SCDF). The SCDF used in 
this chapter were obtained from [48, 49] and are presented in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1: Sector customer damage functions (SCDF) in $/kW. 
Interruption Duration Customer Sector 1 hour 4 hours 8 hours 
Agricultural 1.3398 2.3341 3.9229 
Residential 0.1626 1.8126 4.0006 
Large users 3.1900 6.8900 10.4700 
Industrial 9.5600 29.1476 52.0955 
Commercial 32.1991 106.3483 185.9804 
Government and institutions 7.2297 21.3650 40.2121 
Office and building 7.2053 26.8283 52.9923 
  
 
The SCDF shown in Table 5.1 depict the sector customer interruption cost as a 
function of the interruption duration. The cost of interruption in $/kW was obtained for 
interruption durations of 1, 4 and 8 hours. The cost of interruption for any duration in 
between the existing data points can be determined by interpolation and the cost of 
interruption for a longer duration than 8 hours can be calculated using a linear 
extrapolation. The customer costs associated with an outage of any delivery point in the 
system involves the combination of costs associated with all customer types affected by 
the system outage [66]. Conceptually, the composite customer damage function (CCDF) 
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for a particular load bus represents the total costs for that delivery point as a function of 
the interruption duration. The customer load composition has to be known in order to 
proportionally weight the SCDF. In this chapter, the annual energy consumption 
percentage of each customer sector is used (in an approximate method) as a weighting 
factor, and the SCDF can be aggregated to create the composite customer damage 
function (CCDF), which measures the cost associated with power supply interruptions as 
a function of the interruption duration for the customer mix at a load bus.    
 
5.3  Event-Based Customer Interruption Cost Evaluation  
 
A wide range of customer cost evaluations has been done using both analytical 
and Monte Carlo simulation techniques [2, 13]. Relatively little work has been 
published, however, on estimating the cost associated with specific failure events. 
Customer interruption costs due to failure in electrical energy supply depend on many 
factors such as the customer types interrupted, the actual load demand at the time of the 
outage, the duration of the outage, the time of day and the day in which the outage 
occurs. An event-based customer interruption cost evaluation (EBCost) approach was 
developed as a part of the author’s M.Sc. research work [67 – 69], and is incorporated in 
the bulk electric system reliability worth analysis demonstrated in this chapter. The 
EBCost approach provides a realistic and accurate incorporation of the temporal 
variations in customer outage costs in reliability worth analysis.  
 
5.3.1  Calculation Model  
 
 Three basic indices are applied in reliability worth analysis. They are the 
expected energy not supplied (EENS), the expected customer interruption cost 
(ECOST), and the interrupted energy assessment rate (IEAR). The basic equations for 
these indices using the EBCost approach are as follows: 
 
EENSi     =  L1 + L2 +  L3 + . . . + Ln       (5.1) 
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ECOSTi   =  WF1×C(d1)×L1 + WF2×{C(d2) - C(d1)}×L2  + WF3×{C(d3) - C(d2)}×L3 
        + . . . + WFn×{C(dn) - C(dn-1)}×Ln      (5.2) 
 
IEARi       =   
i
i
EENS
ECOST         (5.3) 
 
where:        i    =   Load bus i (delivery point i), 
                   n   =   Duration of an interruption (n hours), 
                 Ln    =   Average load demand interrupted during hour n (MW), 
             C(dn)   =   Interruption cost at hour n from the CCDF of Bus i ($/kW), 
              WFn   =   Cost weight factor at hour n. 
                    
It is important to note that the composite customer damage function (CCDF) of 
each load bus used in the EBCost approach is not a fixed function. This implies that the 
CCDF of each load bus is created using the sector customer damage functions (SCDF) 
of the customer mix at that load bus weighted with the percentages of expected unserved 
energy during a particular interruption. The CCDF is therefore created only when a 
specified interruption occurs. The CCDF created in this way has therefore a time varying 
characteristic (time varying CCDF). This is a significant difference from the fixed set of 
CCDF created by weighting with the annual energy consumptions. The fixed CCDF is 
used in an approximate method and is addressed later in this chapter.   
 
 It is important to note that the customer interruption cost evaluation process for a 
specific outage event and that used for reliability worth simulation are quite different. 
Reliability worth analysis models used in the simulation approach can be quite variable 
and may be different from the actual situation when assessing the consequences of 
specific outage events. Detailed knowledge of each individual outage, i.e. a number of 
customers affected, outage duration of individual customers, feeder outage rotation 
procedures etc., are not specifically known in a simulation approach. This is not the case 
when attempting to assess a monetary loss due to a specific outage event in real life 
where the number of customers affected, customer types affected, individual customer 
 70
outage durations and load shedding rotation procedures are known. There is therefore a 
prerequisite to determine the appropriate reliability worth analysis model to be used in 
the simulation process. Generally, reliability worth analysis models can be broadly 
categorized by two perspectives designated as a single event-based or multiple event-
based models. These two concepts are explained using Figure 5.2.    
 
   
 
Figure 5.2: A bulk supply point interruption scenario. 
 
 
The assumed interruption scenario at a bulk supply point shown in Figure 5.2 is 
used to illustrate the two concepts of reliability worth assessment. This interruption 
scenario describes two coincident or overlapping contingencies that result in two levels 
of power deficiency at the bulk supply point. The first contingency results in a power 
deficiency at one level (during T1+T2) followed by the second contingency which gives 
rise to another level of power deficiency (during T3+T4). The shaded area in Figure 5.2 
indicates the amount of load that must be curtailed to maintain system integrity. A fixed 
time step of one hour is used to describe the chronological load profile. As noted earlier, 
the two concepts are designated as the single event-based and multiple event-based 
models. The basic concept in the single event-based model is that the total interruption 
duration (Ttotal) is used in the reliability worth calculation resulting in a single long 
outage duration. On the other hand, the total interruption duration (Ttotal) is divided into 
multiple sub-events with short outage durations in the multiple event-based model. The 
T2 T1 
Ttotal 
T3 T4 
Load Level 
Available Power at 
Bulk Supply Point 
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division is based on the amount of load curtailment. In other words, if the amount of 
load curtailment changes, a new outage event is considered. As shown in Figure 5.2, the 
interruption scenario can be divided into four outage events with outage durations of T1, 
T2, T3 and T4 respectively. This model can be thought of as a rotating blackout or a load 
shedding rotation which affects a higher number of customers with shorter outage 
durations. Monetary loss predictions [70] indicate that rotating outages with short 
durations will basically result in higher IEAR and ECOST than single outage events 
with long durations. The multiple event-based model can therefore be considered as an 
upper bound of the monetary loss. In bulk electric system reliability simulation, there 
may be hundreds of random outage events occurring in a long simulation sequence in 
which detailed outage knowledge such as the actual customers interrupted, the outage 
durations of the individual customers and the load shedding rotation procedures applied 
to the individual outage events are not clearly known. It is therefore more appropriate to 
assess the reliability worth of a bulk electric system using a single event-based model 
which is more likely to provide a base or a lower bound of the monetary loss rather than 
an upper bound using the multiple event-based model. The single event-based concept is 
therefore adopted in this chapter as the reliability worth analysis model for bulk electric 
system simulation. 
 
5.3.2  Simulation Results  
 
 This section presents reliability worth indices (ECOST and IEAR) obtained 
using the event-based customer interruption cost evaluation (EBCost) approach for the 
original RBTS and IEEE-RTS. The computer software RapHL-II is utilized in this 
chapter. The simulation years used for the RBTS and IEEE-RTS are 8,000 and 6,000 
years respectively and provide a coefficient of variation of the expected energy not 
supplied (EENS) less than 2%. 
 
 Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the reliability worth indices obtained using the 
EBCost approach for the RBTS and IEEE-RTS respectively. The results shown in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 are obtained using the pass-1 load curtailment philosophy described 
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in Section 3.4.5. The ECOST with and without incorporating time varying cost weight 
factors are also compared. Cost weight factors represent the impact of the time that the 
interruption occurred and have a maximum value of 1.0 per unit. The interrupted energy 
assessment rates (IEAR) are also provided. 
 
Table 5.2: Reliability worth indices for the RBTS using the pass-1 policy. 
With Cost Weight Factors Without Cost Weight Factors Bus  
No. ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh)
2 12.01 7.3201 12.93 7.8858 
3 75.69 2.5566 79.62 2.6891 
4 105.65 6.0126 110.40 6.2824 
5 9.35 6.6889 10.41 7.4456 
6 373.21 3.6326 395.44 3.8490 
System 575.92 3.7662 608.80 3.9812 
 
 
Table 5.3: Reliability worth indices for the IEEE-RTS using the pass-1 policy. 
With Cost Weight Factors Without Cost Weight Factors Bus  
No. ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh)
1 161.38 6.9957 170.04 7.3710 
2 315.51 5.8339 344.18 6.3640 
3 418.65 4.9022 435.47 5.0992 
4 287.29 7.4202 313.04 8.0853 
5 420.38 7.6271 441.67 8.0134 
6 595.49 5.3744 623.01 5.6227 
7 378.62 5.7350 394.99 5.9829 
8 820.91 5.6719 870.04 6.0113 
9 12.10 2.8831 12.78 3.0469 
10 22.50 4.7159 23.46 4.9167 
13 3265.41 5.1488 3460.67 5.4567 
14 20.58 3.4993 21.20 3.6054 
15 873.79 3.6598 926.66 3.8813 
16 857.19 4.9473 920.06 5.3102 
18 8527.98 3.3528 8992.46 3.5354 
19 718.53 2.8259 757.84 2.9805 
20 237.97 4.4010 254.17 4.7005 
System 17934.29 3.9938 18961.73 4.2226 
 
 Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that the ECOST incorporating time varying cost weight 
factors are slightly less than those obtained without time varying cost weight factor 
consideration. The cost weight factors are used to incorporate the effect of different days 
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and seasons on outage costs. As noted earlier, the single event-based concept used in this 
research establishes a lower bound for customer interruption cost estimates. 
Incorporating cost weight factors will further lower the ECOST values and has not been 
applied in the following analyses. The results obtained without incorporating cost weight 
factors shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 are used as the base case results in a comparison 
with the approximate methods developed later in this chapter.  
 
 In a bulk system reliability simulation, the ECOST results are not only based on 
pertinent factors such as customer types and time of outages, but are also dependent on 
the system operating policies employed, i.e. different load curtailment philosophies. As 
noted in Section 3.4.5, the priority order policy tends to minimize customer interruption 
costs due to load curtailments while the pass-1 policy minimizes the number of delivery 
points affected by a given load curtailment without considering customer outage cost 
minimization. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 respectively show the reliability worth indices for the 
RBTS and IEEE-RTS without cost weight factor considerations using the priority order 
philosophy. 
 
Table 5.4: Reliability worth indices for the RBTS using the priority order policy. 
Without Cost Weight Factors Bus  
No. ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) 
2 2.38 7.6920 
3 120.71 2.7048 
4 12.10 6.2932 
5 9.09 7.3879 
6 404.33 3.8552 
System 548.61 3.5873 
 
 
 Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that the ECOST and IEAR obtained using the priority 
order policy for both RBTS and IEEE-RTS are considerably lower than those obtained 
using the pass-1 policy shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. This indicates that considerable 
differences in customer interruption cost estimates can occur due to how the bulk power 
system is operated. 
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Table 5.5: Reliability worth indices for the IEEE-RTS using the priority order policy. 
Without Cost Weight Factors Bus  
No. ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) 
1 10.40 9.1286 
2 8.78 7.7393 
3 209.71 5.0819 
4 9.64 9.0172 
5 9.62 9.2743 
6 38.06 6.0012 
7 23.51 6.6536 
8 17.97 7.2838 
9 4247.02 2.4314 
10 1572.18 4.0522 
13 29.18 6.8261 
14 3666.89 2.9932 
15 134.04 4.0239 
16 14.81 5.9988 
18 1168.99 3.6629 
19 1975.44 2.9754 
20 224.77 4.4610 
System 13360.99 2.9752 
 
  
5.4  Approximate Methods for Customer Interruption Cost Evaluation 
 
 The ECOST results shown in the previous section are obtained using the event-
based customer interruption cost evaluation (EBCost) technique. This method provides 
accurate results when dealing with a specific outage event and the results therefore can 
serve as benchmarks in the development of more approximate methods required due to 
the absence of detailed information in most real life situations. In this section, a series of 
approximate method are developed and compared with the results obtained using the 
EBCost approach shown in the previous section. The chronological load profile for each 
customer sector in a bulk electric system may be quite difficult for most power utilities 
to assess. The data available may be only the annual or monthly energy consumption of 
the customer load mix at the bulk supply point monitored. The approximate methods are 
aimed at reducing the detailed information required and the computation process 
involved while maintaining reasonable customer interruption cost estimates in bulk 
electric systems. 
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5.4.1 Average Demand Interrupted Approach     
 
 This approximate method relies on the single event-based concept. The average 
load curtailment (average demand interrupted) can be calculated as the ratio of the 
unserved energy during an interruption to the duration of the interruption. This 
approximate method is similar to the process designated as Method A1 in [71]. The 
composite customer damage function (CCDF) of each load bus is formed using the 
sector customer damage functions (SCDF) allocated at that bus weighted by their sector 
annual energy consumptions. The CCDF formed for each load bus is therefore a fixed 
function, and is calculated at the beginning as input data before starting the simulation. 
This is the major difference between the EBCost and average demand interrupted 
approaches where the CCDF used in the EBCost method is formed during the simulation 
when the specific outage event occurs and it is a time varying CCDF. The CCDF used in 
the average demand interrupted approach is a fixed function. Equation (5.2) used in the 
EBCost approach is therefore reduced to Equation (5.4) when the cost weight factor 
(WFi) is neglected and the load curtailment is presented as the average demand 
interrupted (Lavg). 
 
ECOSTi   =  C(dn)×Lavg       (5.4) 
 
where:        n   =   Duration of an interruption (n hours), 
               Lavg    =   Average demand interrupted (MW) as the ratio of the total unserved 
                              energy divided by the duration of the outage (EENS/n),  
             C(dn)   =   Interruption cost at duration n from the CCDF of Bus i ($/kW). 
 
The fixed CCDF for all the load buses (delivery points) in the RBTS and the 
IEEE-RTS are shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 respectively. These CCDF were formed and 
weighted using the annual energy consumptions. 
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Table 5.6: Composite customer damage functions (CCDF) for all the delivery points and  
                  the overall RBTS. 
CCDF formed using annual energy percentages ($/kW) Bus 
No. C(d1) at 1 hr. C(d4) at 4 hrs. C(d8) at 8 hrs. 
2 9.6299 31.0063 55.5004 
3 4.3536 12.1565 20.5634 
4 7.9887 25.6599 45.7731 
5 8.5667 28.4677 51.5559 
6 5.4781 17.4849 31.1432 
System 6.2990 19.4771 34.3165 
 
 
Table 5.7: Composite customer damage functions (CCDF) for all the delivery points and  
                  the overall IEEE-RTS. 
CCDF formed using annual energy percentages ($/kW) Bus 
No. C(d1) at 1 hr. C(d4) at 4 hrs. C(d8) at 8 hrs. 
1 8.9893 28.5880 51.1420 
2 7.2643 23.7361 42.9401 
3 6.4470 20.7470 37.1455 
4 9.4700 30.5485 55.0380 
5 9.1513 29.9145 53.1093 
6 6.9738 22.6030 40.4540 
7 7.6155 24.3085 43.2714 
8 7.1922 23.8749 42.4934 
9 3.7364 10.4673 17.8266 
10 5.5961 17.3417 30.5833 
13 7.4685 23.5102 41.9196 
14 4.7307 13.7685 23.9277 
15 5.7062 16.6311 28.3838 
16 6.9168 21.0724 36.7938 
18 5.6002 16.4487 28.5402 
19 4.3816 12.4892 21.0616 
20 5.5013 17.0328 29.9137 
System 6.2575 19.3452 34.0628 
 
 
Table 5.6 shows that Bus 2 has the highest interruption cost function while Bus 3 
has the lowest interruption cost function in the RBTS. In the IEEE-RTS, Bus 4 has the 
highest interruption cost function and Bus 9 has the lowest interruption cost function, as 
shown in Table 5.7. The CCDF shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 are used as fixed functions 
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to estimate the customer interruption costs using the average demand interrupted 
approach. 
 
 Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show the reliability worth indices obtained using the average 
demand interrupted approach for the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS respectively. The results 
obtained using the pass-1 and priority order load curtailment policies are shown. It is 
important to note that cost weight factors cannot be applied in the approximate method 
due to the constant CCDF utilization. The results obtained using the approximate 
method can be compared with the base case results (EBCost approach without cost 
weight factors) shown in Tables 5.2 – 5.5.  
 
Table 5.8: Reliability worth indices obtained using the average demand interrupted  
          approach for the RBTS with two different load curtailment policies. 
Pass-1 Policy Priority Order Policy Bus No. 
ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh)
2 11.99 7.3079 2.09 6.7407 
3 80.14 2.7069 120.32 2.6959 
4 104.15 5.9272 11.69 6.0796 
5 9.34 6.6815 8.15 6.6253 
6 361.57 3.5193 370.55 3.5331 
System 567.19 3.7091 512.79 3.3530 
 
 
 The results shown in Table 5.8 for the RBTS can be directly compared to those 
shown in Table 5.2 for the pass-1 policy and those shown in Table 5.4 for the priority 
order policy without considering cost weight factors. The differences in the ECOST 
obtained using the EBCost and the average demand interrupted approaches are 
approximately 7% for both the pass-1 and priority order cases.    
 
The results shown in Table 5.9 for the IEEE-RTS can be directly compared to 
those shown in Table 5.3 for the pass-1 policy and those shown in Table 5.5 for the 
priority order policy without considering cost weight factors. The differences in the 
ECOST obtained using the EBCost and the average demand interrupted approaches are 
approximately 0.02% for the pass-1 case and 0.7% for the priority order case. These 
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small differences indicate that the average demand interrupted approach can provide 
reasonable results when compared to the base case results obtained using the EBCost 
method.  
 
Table 5.9: Reliability worth indices obtained using the average demand interrupted  
                  approach for the IEEE-RTS with two different load curtailment policies. 
Pass-1 Policy Priority Order Policy Bus No. 
ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh)
1 160.46 6.9559 9.10 7.9919 
2 314.00 5.8059 7.27 6.4090 
3 429.02 5.0237 205.01 4.9681 
4 291.87 7.5384 8.39 7.8479 
5 402.97 7.3112 7.90 7.6221 
6 606.25 5.4714 35.42 5.5851 
7 388.70 5.8877 21.95 6.2128 
8 816.79 5.6434 14.77 5.9899 
9 12.02 2.8659 4201.35 2.4053 
10 22.18 4.6478 1581.07 4.0751 
13 3442.52 5.4281 27.14 6.3485 
14 21.37 3.6340 3895.88 3.1801 
15 908.78 3.8064 131.39 3.9444 
16 866.06 4.9986 13.81 5.5932 
18 9313.86 3.6618 1202.18 3.7669 
19 723.55 2.8457 1888.65 2.8447 
20 237.20 4.3866 207.15 4.1113 
System 18957.60 4.2217 13458.43 2.9969 
 
 
The percentage differences introduced by the average demand interrupted 
approach for the RBTS (approximately 7%) are considerably larger than those for the 
IEEE-RTS. The reason for this comes from the RBTS topology and customer mix at Bus 
6. Bus 6 is a single circuit delivery point at which most of customers are agricultural and 
residential (approximately 75% altogether). Their annual energy consumptions are quite 
seasonally dependent. The sector customer damage functions for these two sectors are 
relatively low. The fixed set of CCDF formed using annual energy consumption 
percentages is, therefore, quite different than the time varying CCDF (formed at a 
particular time of the outage) used in the EBCost approach. The total system customer 
interruption cost is considerably influenced by the loss of load at Bus 6 (approximately 
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65%). The customer interruption cost differences at this delivery point when using the 
EBCost approach (utilizing the time varying CCDF) and the average demand interrupted 
approach (utilizing the fixed CCDF) are therefore larger due to the major contribution of 
this load point to the total system cost. If the customer interruption cost at Bus 6 is 
excluded, the percentage differences between the two methods reduce to approximately 
3% and 1% for the pass-1 and priority order cases respectively. 
 
In conclusion, the average demand interrupted approach generally provides a 
reasonable estimate of the customer interruption cost. The magnitude of error is 
relatively low and it is system dependent. As noted above, if the fixed set of CCDF for a 
load bus is quite different from the time varying CCDF of the bus, this will introduce 
more error in the approximation. This error, however, may not be significant if the 
contribution of this load bus to the total system cost is relatively small. 
 
5.4.2  Average Delivery Point Restoration Duration Approach     
       
 This approximate approach is generally much simpler than the average demand 
interrupted method introduced in the previous section. The customer interruption cost in 
this case is not calculated during the simulation process, but it is estimated using the 
outcome of the simulation results. This approximate method is focused on the utilization 
of delivery point indices to estimate the customer interruption costs of the individual 
load points. The total system customer interruption cost can be aggregated from all the 
delivery point customer outage costs. The basic delivery point reliability indices used in 
the approximate method are described in Section 3.2.1 and are the expected duration of 
load curtailment (EDLC), the expected frequency of load curtailment (EFLC) and the 
expected energy not supplied (EENS). Two additional indices can be directly derived 
using the three basic reliability indices and are designated as the expected restoration 
duration (ERD) and the expected demand not supplied (EDNS). The ERD is 
approximately obtained as the ratio of EDLC to EFLC. The EDNS is calculated as the 
ratio of EENS to ERD. The concept in this approximate method is to use the delivery 
point ERD as the outage duration (n hours) to estimate the value ($/kW) from the fixed 
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cost function (CCDF), which is equivalent to the element C(dn) shown in Equation (5.4). 
The EDNS is equivalent to the average demand interrupted (Lavg) shown in Equation 
(5.4). The delivery point customer interruption cost (ECOST) can be calculated by 
multiplying the C(dERD) by the EDNS. 
 
 Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the reliability indices and cost functions for the RBTS 
obtained using the pass-1 and priority order load curtailment policies respectively. The 
interruption cost value C(dERD) shown in the last column of Tables 5.10 and 5.11 are 
interpolated from the delivery point CCDF shown in Table 5.6 using the ERD as the 
outage duration. Similarly, Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show reliability indices and cost 
functions for the IEEE-RTS obtained using the pass-1 and priority order load 
curtailment policies respectively. The interruption cost values C(dERD) shown in the last 
column of Tables 5.12 and 5.13 are interpolated from the delivery point CCDF shown in 
Table 5.7. The delivery point ECOST can be obtained by multiplying the values in the 
last and second last columns. The delivery point IEAR can be calculated using the 
resulting ECOST divided by the delivery point EENS. The delivery point ECOST and 
IEAR obtained using the average delivery point restoration duration approach are shown 
in Tables 5.14 and 5.15 for the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS respectively. It is important to 
note that the system indices presented in the last row of Tables 5.10 – 5.13 are not used 
in this approximate method (the system indices are used in the next approximate method 
addressed later). The delivery point ECOST are summed to produce the system ECOST 
in the average delivery point restoration duration approach.  
 
Table 5.10: Reliability indices and cost functions for the RBTS obtained using  
                            the pass-1 policy. 
Bus 
No. 
EDLC
hrs/yr 
EFLC 
occ/yr
EENS 
MWh/yr
ERD 
hrs/occ
EDNS 
MW 
C(dERD)  
$/kW 
2 0.56 0.21 1.64 2.63 0.62 21.7695 
3 3.27 0.76 29.61 4.29 6.90 12.8192 
4 2.54 0.58 17.57 4.34 4.05 27.4687 
5 0.27 0.10 1.40 2.68 0.52 20.1228 
6 9.70 0.92 102.74 10.49 9.80 39.6455 
System 13.32 1.72 152.96 7.73 19.79 33.3672 
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Table 5.11: Reliability indices and cost functions for the RBTS obtained using  
                            the priority order policy. 
Bus 
No. 
EDLC
hrs/yr 
EFLC 
occ/yr
EENS 
MWh/yr
ERD 
hrs/occ
EDNS 
MW 
C(dERD)  
$/kW 
2 0.10 0.07 0.31 1.45 0.21 13.1745 
3 3.83 0.88 44.63 4.35 10.27 12.9549 
4 0.29 0.11 1.92 2.58 0.75 17.7400 
5 0.24 0.09 1.23 2.68 0.46 20.1228 
6 10.49 1.19 104.88 8.79 11.93 33.8407 
System 13.32 1.72 152.97 7.73 19.79 33.3672 
 
 
Table 5.12: Reliability indices and cost functions for the IEEE-RTS obtained using 
                        the pass-1 policy. 
Bus 
No. 
EDLC 
hrs/yr 
EFLC 
occ/yr
EENS 
MWh/yr
ERD 
hrs/occ
EDNS 
MW 
C(dERD)  
$/kW 
1 0.70 0.22 23.07 3.23 7.13 23.9160 
2 1.91 0.62 54.08 3.08 17.56 18.9872 
3 1.82 0.60 85.40 3.03 28.15 16.4158 
4 1.65 0.55 38.72 2.98 13.01 23.8223 
5 2.44 0.80 55.12 3.05 18.09 23.7284 
6 2.77 0.89 110.80 3.13 35.45 18.3575 
7 1.88 0.61 66.02 3.11 21.25 19.6902 
8 2.97 0.85 144.73 3.51 41.20 21.3217 
9 0.05 0.02 4.20 2.52 1.67 7.4255 
10 0.06 0.03 4.77 2.22 2.15 10.7267 
13 8.10 2.02 634.21 4.01 158.16 23.5592 
14 0.08 0.03 5.88 2.69 2.19 10.1415 
15 3.04 0.86 238.75 3.54 67.38 15.1349 
16 5.21 1.48 173.26 3.53 49.14 19.0586 
18 25.97 6.20 2543.54 4.19 607.35 17.0669 
19 4.38 1.24 254.26 3.52 72.18 11.3393 
20 1.54 0.64 54.07 2.40 22.53 11.2312 
System 35.26 9.02 4490.88 3.91 1148.56 18.9901 
 
 
Table 5.14 shows that the delivery point and system ECOST for the RBTS 
obtained using the average delivery point restoration duration approach are reasonable 
estimates when compared to the base case results shown in Tables 5.2 (pass-1) and 5.4 
(priority order). The results obtained using this approach are slightly higher than the 
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base case values. The percentage differences in the results with respect to the base case 
values are approximately less than 2.5%. In a similar manner, Table 5.15 demonstrates 
that the system ECOST for the IEEE-RTS obtained using this approximate approach are 
slightly higher than the base case results shown in Tables 5.3 (pass-1) and 5.5 (priority 
order) with percentage differences of  approximately 10% for both cases.  
 
Table 5.13: Reliability indices and cost functions for the IEEE-RTS obtained using  
                        the priority order policy. 
Bus 
No. 
EDLC 
hrs/yr 
EFLC 
occ/yr
EENS 
MWh/yr
ERD 
hrs/occ
EDNS 
MW 
C(dERD)  
$/kW 
1 0.02 0.01 1.14 1.92 0.59 15.4938 
2 0.03 0.01 1.13 2.17 0.52 14.0787 
3 0.87 0.26 41.27 3.28 12.58 17.5506 
4 0.04 0.01 1.07 2.62 0.41 21.3670 
5 0.03 0.01 1.04 2.61 0.40 20.7711 
6 0.15 0.05 6.34 2.88 2.21 17.1060 
7 0.18 0.07 3.53 2.52 1.40 16.5105 
8 0.03 0.01 2.47 2.27 1.09 14.6218 
9 35.14 8.98 1746.71 3.91 446.46 10.2918 
10 7.48 2.10 387.98 3.57 108.75 15.8050 
13 0.04 0.02 4.27 2.24 1.91 14.5532 
14 22.29 5.90 1225.07 3.78 324.48 13.1812 
15 0.46 0.14 33.31 3.29 10.11 14.3033 
16 0.06 0.02 2.47 2.59 0.95 14.8603 
18 4.24 1.17 319.14 3.61 88.46 15.1881 
19 12.85 3.38 663.93 3.81 174.45 12.0383 
20 1.35 0.42 50.39 3.20 15.74 14.1998 
System 35.26 9.03 4491.26 3.91 1148.66 18.9901 
 
 
The average delivery point restoration duration approach provides a slightly 
better system and delivery point ECOST estimate than that obtained using the average 
demand interrupted approach in the case of the RBTS. This is, however, not the case for 
the IEEE-RTS where the average demand interrupted approach provides a better ECOST 
estimation. This implies that the factors that affect the degree of error in the 
approximation do not only come from the methods used, but also depend on the system 
itself.  
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Table 5.14: Reliability worth indices for the RBTS obtained using the average delivery  
                     point restoration duration approach with the two load curtailment policies. 
Pass-1 Policy Priority Order Policy Bus No. 
ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh)
2 13.56 8.2711 2.82 9.0862 
3 88.48 2.9883 133.02 2.9806 
4 111.26 6.3323 13.23 6.8927 
5 10.50 7.5029 9.24 7.5092 
6 388.46 3.7809 403.64 3.8486 
System 612.27 4.0038 561.95 3.6746 
 
 
Table 5.15: Reliability worth indices for the IEEE-RTS obtained using the average  
      delivery point restoration duration approach with the two load 
                         curtailment policies. 
Pass-1 Policy Priority Order Policy Bus No. 
ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh)
1 170.59 7.3946 9.20 8.0717 
2 333.50 6.1667 7.37 6.5198 
3 462.16 5.4117 220.72 5.3481 
4 309.90 8.0037 8.71 8.1414 
5 429.17 7.7861 8.26 7.9429 
6 650.75 5.8732 37.73 5.9509 
7 418.32 6.3362 23.15 6.5570 
8 878.40 6.0692 15.91 6.4395 
9 12.38 2.9488 4594.86 2.6306 
10 23.07 4.8374 1718.87 4.4303 
13 3726.13 5.8752 27.76 6.5009 
14 22.19 3.7736 4277.04 3.4913 
15 1019.73 4.2711 144.62 4.3417 
16 936.58 5.4056 14.16 5.7311 
18 10365.52 4.0752 1343.48 4.2097 
19 818.46 3.2190 2100.09 3.1631 
20 253.04 4.6798 223.57 4.4367 
System 20829.88 4.6387 14775.49 3.2901 
 
 
5.4.3  Average System Restoration Duration Approach 
 
 This approximate method uses a similar process to the average delivery point 
restoration duration approach described in the previous section. The difference is that 
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this approximate method utilizes the system reliability indices rather than delivery point 
reliability indices. The system reliability indices presented in the last row of Tables 5.10 
– 5.13 shown in the previous section are used in the system customer interruption cost 
evaluation. This approximate method can be used to provide a quick estimate of the 
overall system monetary loss. Tables 5.16 and 5.17 show the system customer 
interruption cost obtained using the average system restoration duration approach for the 
RBTS and the IEEE-RTS respectively. 
 
Table 5.16: Reliability worth indices for the RBTS obtained using the average system 
                    restoration duration approach with the two load curtailment policies. 
Pass-1 Policy Priority Order Policy 
ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh)Overall System 660.26 4.3166 660.31 4.3166 
 
 
Table 5.17: Reliability worth indices for the IEEE-RTS obtained using the average  
                   system restoration duration approach with the two load curtailment policies. 
Pass-1 Policy Priority Order Policy 
ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh) ECOST (k$/yr) IEAR ($/kWh)Overall System 21811.32 4.8568 21813.16 4.8568 
 
 
 Tables 5.16 and 5.17 show that the reliability worth indices obtained using the 
average system restoration duration approach are insensitive to the load curtailment 
strategies used. This is due to the fact that there is no insight on delivery point index 
contributions to the overall system indices. The degrees of error when utilizing this 
approximate method are considerably larger than those obtained using the other two 
approximate methods described in the previous sections. This method could, however, 
be useful in system customer interruption cost estimates in the absence of detailed 
information on the individual delivery points.     
 
 Three approximate methods for reliability worth analysis in a bulk electric 
system are described in this section. The degree of error associated with each 
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approximate method is obtained by comparing the results with those obtained from the 
base case using the EBCost approach. The average demand interrupted approach appears 
to provide reasonable results and offers the closest approximation, following by the 
average delivery point restoration duration and the average system restoration duration 
approaches respectively. The average demand interrupted method, however, requires the 
implementation of an additional algorithm in the simulation software. The average 
delivery point restoration duration and the average system restoration duration 
approaches do not require an embedded algorithm in the simulation process. The 
methods utilize the outcome from the simulation to estimate the customer interruption 
costs. This may be more flexible for some power utilities who already have the software 
to estimate the basic reliability indices without performing the reliability worth 
assessment function. The reliability worth assessment can be done by hand using the 
basic outcomes from the software.  
 
5.5  Conclusions 
 
 This chapter presents four reliability worth assessment methodologies for bulk 
electric systems. Two reliability worth assessment procedures designated as the single 
and multiple event-based models are discussed. The event-based customer interruption 
cost evaluation (EBCost) technique has been implemented in the simulation software 
(RapHL-II). The EBCost approach provides realistic and accurate incorporation of the 
temporal variations in customer outage costs, and its results are used as benchmarks in 
the development of more approximate methods. Three approximate methods are 
presented and the results obtained using these methods are compared with those 
obtained using the EBCost approach. The three methods are designated as the average 
demand interrupted, the average delivery point restoration duration and the average 
system restoration duration approaches. The approximate methods described in this 
chapter provide power utilities with the ability to perform meaningful reliability worth 
analysis in the absence of detailed customer information or sophisticated reliability 
software functions to evaluate customer monetary losses. A summary of the data 
requirements for the four reliability worth assessment methodologies presented in this 
chapter is shown in Table 5.18.     
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Table 5.18: A summary of the data requirements for the reliability worth assessment 
                       methodologies. 
Approach Requirements 
EBCost 
- Sector customer damage functions (SCDF) are used directly in  
   the calculation process to form a “time varying” composite  
   customer damage function (CCDF) for each load point when  
   interruption occurs.  
- Chronological load curve of each customer sector is required. 
- Cost weight factors can be incorporated if required. 
- Computer is required in order to implement the calculation algorithms.
Average 
Demand 
Interrupted 
- A “fixed” CCDF for each load point is calculated prior to the  
   simulation process. This fixed CCDF is formed by using the annual  
   energy consumption percentages. 
- Computer is required in order to implement the calculation algorithms.
Average 
Delivery 
Point 
Restoration 
Duration 
- Computer is not required for ECOST calculation (no algorithm is 
   implemented). 
- This approach is conducted after the simulation results are obtained.  
   The delivery point reliability indices (EDLC, EFLC, EENS) are, 
   used to incorporate the “fixed” CCDF for each delivery point in the 
   ECOST calculation. 
Average 
System 
Restoration 
Duration 
- Computer is not required for ECOST calculation (no algorithm is 
   implemented). 
- This approach is conducted after the simulation results are obtained.  
   The delivery point reliability indices (EDLC, EFLC, EENS) are not 
   required. The system reliability indices are used to incorporate 
   the “fixed” system CCDF in the ECOST calculation. 
- This approach cannot be used to estimate delivery point ECOST. 
 
   
It is important to note that the customer interruption cost evaluation process 
applied to a specific outage event and that used for reliability worth simulation are quite 
different. The objective in the first case is to estimate the consequences of specified 
outage events and therefore the EBCost approach is directly applicable. The focus in the 
second case is on reliability worth analysis in a simulation process. The EBCost 
approach used in this case may not be significantly better when compared with the other 
approximate methods as there may be hundreds of outage events occurring in the 
simulation and a detailed knowledge of the individual outages in terms of the number of 
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customers affected, actual customer types and outage rotation procedures is unknown. 
The customer interruption cost obtained in the simulation is, therefore, an average of all 
the random outage consequences. The customer interruption cost estimates obtained 
from a simulation are, however, extremely valuable and can be used in reliability 
cost/worth analysis in system planning.  
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CHAPTER 6   
RELIABILITY INDEX PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 
ANALYSIS OF BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEMS 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
 A significant advantage when utilizing sequential Monte Carlo simulation in 
bulk electric system reliability analysis is the ability to provide reliability index 
probability distributions in addition to the expected values of these indices. Reliability 
index probability distributions provide a pictorial representation of the annual variability 
of the parameters around their mean values. At the present time, sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation is the only realistic option available to investigate the distributional aspects 
associated with system index mean values. There is an interest in applying reliability 
index probability distributions to manage bulk electricity system risks. Reliability index 
probability distribution analysis and its utilization are relatively new concepts in 
composite power system reliability analysis and decision making. There is frequently a 
need to know the range of a predictive reliability index and the likelihood of a certain 
value being exceeded. These factors can be assessed using the probability distribution 
associated with the expected value. System reliability index probability distributions 
provide additional valuable information and a more complete understanding of 
composite power system behavior. In certain situations, the system can be determined to 
be “very” reliable but the probability distribution is highly skewed [2]. In these cases, 
the average value is very close to the ordinate axis (zero). An appreciation of the very 
important distribution tail values, which although they may occur very infrequently, is 
important as these events can have serious system consequences. The average values, in 
these cases, may not be valid indicators of satisfactory system performance. Reliability 
index probability distributions can provide valuable additional system insight. Research 
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on the application of the sequential simulation technique to bulk electric system 
reliability evaluation has been published [13, 23, 53, 54]. These publications are 
valuable references in the evolution of composite power system reliability evaluation 
using sequential simulation. References [13, 23, 53, 54], however, do not focus on the 
development of reliability index probability distributions. Reference [72] illustrates the 
use of sequential simulation to obtain system reliability index distributions. These 
concepts are extended in this chapter to examine the delivery point index probability 
distributions in a composite generation and transmission system. 
 
Bulk electric system reliability indices can be classified into two basic types 
designated as predictive indices [73] and past performance indices [74, 75]. Predictive 
indices provide relevant information associated with future system reliability and are 
normally associated with system planning. Past performance indices reflect the actual 
system reliability and are  therefore  related  to  the  actual  operation  of  the  system. 
Virtually all the major utilities in Canada are actively engaged in reporting past 
performance indices, using the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA), Electric Power 
System Reliability Assessment protocols [76 – 78]. The reliability performance of a bulk 
electricity system can be predicted using probability techniques. The predicted indices 
can be directly linked to past performance using the indices presently compiled and used 
by the participating Canadian utilities. The performance data for successive years 
presented in References [76 – 78] show that the indices vary from year to year and that 
the annual performance indices can be considered as random variables. The historical 
data can be used to create reliability performance index probability distributions. In 
order to compare the predicted future performance with past performance, it is important 
to link the predictive and past performance indices. When planning additions to an 
existing bulk system, the predicted reliability can be directly compared with the past 
performance indices if the future performance indices and the past performance indices 
are in a similar form. Sequential Monte Carlo simulation can be used to estimate the 
reliability indices more accurately than those provided by other traditional methods. 
Delivery point reliability indices obtained using the sequential technique can, therefore, 
be realistically used to forecast future system reliability performance. This chapter 
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presents the development of probability distributions for delivery point and system 
predictive indices, and presents a technique to create performance index probability 
distributions for bulk electric systems.  
 
6.2  Predictive Reliability Indices 
 
 The descriptions of the basic predictive delivery point and system reliability 
indices for bulk electric systems are presented in Section 3.2. Selected predictive 
reliability indices are presented in this section in the form of expected values and their 
associated probability distributions.    
 
6.2.1  Mean or Expected Predictive Indices 
 
 The mean or expected predictive delivery point and system reliability indices 
utilized in this section are as follows: 
 
EDLC – Expected Duration of Load Curtailment (hours/year) 
EFLC – Expected Frequency of Load Curtailment (occurrences/year) 
EENS – Expected Energy Not Supplied (MWh/year) 
ECOST – Expected Customer Interruption Cost (M$/year) 
 
 The delivery point and system EDLC, EFLC and EENS for the RBTS are 
presented in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 using the pass-1 and priority order load curtailment 
policies respectively. The delivery point and system ECOST are also shown in Tables 
5.2 and 5.4 using the pass-1 and priority order load curtailment policies respectively. 
These ECOST were obtained using the event-based customer interruption cost 
evaluation (EBCost) technique. This reliability worth analysis approach is utilized in 
subsequent studies in this thesis. The results presented in the tables noted above are 
summarized and shown in Table 6.1 together with results obtained using the pass-2 load 
curtailment policy described in Section 3.4.5. Similarly, Table 6.2 summarizes the four 
selected predictive indices for the IEEE-RTS obtained using the pass-1 and priority 
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order policies (EDLC, EFLC and EENS presented in Tables 5.12 and 5.13, and the 
ECOST shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.5) together with the indices obtained using the pass-2 
load curtailment policy. The simulation years used for the RBTS and IEEE-RTS are 
8,000 and 6,000 years respectively and provide a coefficient of variation of the EENS 
less than 2%. The computation time is approximately 6 and 68 minutes on a PC Pentium 
IV, 2.66GHz for the RBTS and IEEE-RTS respectively. 
 
Table 6.1: Delivery point and system predictive reliability indices for the RBTS using 
                    the three different load shedding policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy Bus 
No. EDLC hrs/yr 
EFLC 
occ/yr 
EENS 
MWh/yr 
ECOST
k$/yr 
EDLC
hrs/yr
EFLC
occ/yr
EENS 
MWh/yr
ECOST
k$/yr 
EDLC 
hrs/yr 
EFLC 
occ/yr 
EENS 
MWh/yr
ECOST
k$/yr 
2 0.10 0.07 0.31 2.38 0.56 0.21 1.64 12.93 0.56 0.21 1.64 12.93
3 3.83 0.88 44.63 120.71 3.27 0.76 29.61 79.62 3.27 0.76 29.61 79.62
4 0.29 0.11 1.92 12.10 2.54 0.58 17.57 110.40 2.54 0.58 17.57 110.40
5 0.24 0.09 1.23 9.09 0.27 0.10 1.40 10.41 0.27 0.10 1.40 10.41
6 10.49 1.19 104.88 404.33 9.70 0.92 102.74 395.44 9.70 0.92 102.74 395.44
Sys. 13.32 1.72 152.97 548.61 13.32 1.72 152.96 608.80 13.32 1.72 152.96 608.80
 
 
Table 6.1 shows that the load shedding policy selected has a significant impact 
on the delivery point indices for the RBTS. Delivery points that have lower economic 
priority have a higher number of interruptions (lower reliability) with the priority order 
policy. These delivery points may or may not experience a high number of interruptions 
when the pass-1 or pass-2 policies are used. Delivery point No. 6 (DP6) has the lowest 
reliability for all the load shedding policies even though it does not have the lowest 
economic priority. The reason is that DP6 is a single circuit delivery point connected by 
a radial line. The loss of this radial line will result in total load curtailment at DP6. It is 
important to note that the pass-1 and pass-2 policies provide identical results (both 
delivery point and system) for the RBTS. The reason is that the RBTS is a relatively 
small system and the pass-2 policy is not really effective in this case. Table 6.1 clearly 
shows that the system reliability indices are, in general, basically the same with the 
different load curtailment policies. The EDLC, EFLC and EENS are basically 
unchanged. The ECOST, however, are quite different depending on the load shedding 
policy employed. As noted earlier, the priority order policy tends to minimize the overall 
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customer interruption costs by heavily curtailing loads at lower priority load points, 
while the pass-1 policy does not involve any customer outage cost considerations. The 
system ECOST obtained using the pass-1 and pass-2 policies are, therefore, higher than 
those obtained using the priority order policy. 
 
Table 6.2: Delivery point and system predictive reliability indices for the IEEE-RTS 
                     using the three different load shedding policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy Bus 
No. EDLC hrs/yr 
EFLC 
occ/yr 
EENS 
MWh/yr 
ECOST
M$/yr
EDLC
hrs/yr
EFLC
occ/yr
EENS 
MWh/yr
ECOST
M$/yr
EDLC 
hrs/yr 
EFLC 
occ/yr 
EENS 
MWh/yr
ECOST
M$/yr
1 0.02 0.01 1.14 0.010 0.70 0.22 23.07 0.170 0.88 0.27 28.74 0.211
2 0.03 0.01 1.13 0.009 1.91 0.62 54.08 0.344 1.91 0.62 53.30 0.340
3 0.87 0.26 41.27 0.210 1.82 0.60 85.40 0.435 1.82 0.60 84.72 0.433
4 0.04 0.01 1.07 0.010 1.65 0.55 38.72 0.313 1.70 0.57 38.64 0.314
5 0.03 0.01 1.04 0.010 2.44 0.80 55.12 0.442 2.44 0.80 53.89 0.434
6 0.15 0.05 6.34 0.038 2.77 0.89 110.80 0.623 2.86 0.92 108.00 0.612
7 0.18 0.07 3.53 0.024 1.88 0.61 66.02 0.395 1.88 0.61 63.47 0.382
8 0.03 0.01 2.47 0.018 2.97 0.85 144.73 0.870 2.98 0.85 135.45 0.821
9 35.14 8.98 1746.71 4.247 0.05 0.02 4.20 0.013 0.86 0.26 41.28 0.105
10 7.48 2.10 387.98 1.572 0.06 0.03 4.77 0.023 1.65 0.52 83.02 0.343
13 0.04 0.02 4.27 0.029 8.10 2.02 634.21 3.461 8.09 2.02 615.39 3.367
14 22.29 5.90 1225.07 3.667 0.08 0.03 5.88 0.021 0.37 0.12 20.85 0.067
15 0.46 0.14 33.31 0.134 3.04 0.86 238.75 0.927 3.26 0.93 249.70 0.973
16 0.06 0.02 2.47 0.015 5.21 1.48 173.26 0.920 5.22 1.48 165.84 0.888
18 4.24 1.17 319.14 1.169 25.97 6.20 2543.54 8.992 25.96 6.20 2430.96 8.646
19 12.85 3.38 663.93 1.975 4.38 1.24 254.26 0.758 4.76 1.35 250.34 0.758
20 1.35 0.42 50.39 0.225 1.54 0.64 54.07 0.254 1.89 0.75 67.16 0.313
Sys. 35.26 9.03 4491.26 13.361 35.26 9.02 4490.88 18.962 35.26 9.02 4490.77 19.008
 
 
In Table 6.2, DP9 has the lowest reliability when using the priority order policy 
as this load point has the lowest priority in the list. DP18 has the lowest reliability when 
using the pass-1 and pass-2 policies, as this load point is connected to several critical 
components, i.e. two major generating units. The loss of these components coincident 
with other contingencies can create an extreme emergency situation. There are also no 
other load points around DP18. If load curtailments are required due to contingencies 
occurring in this area, DP18 will suffer load curtailment. The pass-2 policy is quite 
effective for the IEEE-RTS. The use of the pass-2 policy tends to reduce the severity at 
DP18 by curtailing interruptible loads from other delivery points in its proximity. The 
pass-2 policy, therefore, tends to share wellbeing and risk among all the delivery points 
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within the system rather than heavily curtailing the load at one particular bus and leaving 
some buses relatively untouched. In a similar manner to that shown for the RBTS, Table 
6.2 clearly illustrates that the system reliability indices are, in general, basically identical 
for the different load curtailment policies. The EDLC, EFLC and EENS are relatively 
unchanged. The ECOST, however, are considerably different. The system ECOST 
obtained using the pass-1 and pass-2 policies are relatively similar, and are higher than 
that obtained using the priority order policy. 
 
6.2.2  Predictive Reliability Index Probability Distributions 
 
The results shown in the previous section are based on the average or expected 
values of the predictive reliability indices. One advantage when utilizing sequential 
Monte Carlo simulation in bulk electric system reliability analysis is the ability to 
provide reliability index probability distributions associated with their expected values. 
The reliability index probability distributions for the delivery points and the overall 
system provide a pictorial representation of the annual variability of the indices, and are 
illustrated in this section. The probability distributions associated with the system 
reliability indices shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are illustrated in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for 
the RBTS and IEEE-RTS respectively, using the priority order and pass-1 policies. The 
annual values for each simulated year are designated as the frequency of load 
curtailment (FLC), the duration of load curtailment (DLC), the energy not supplied 
(ENS) and the customer interruption cost (COST). The mean values given in Figures 6.1 
and 6.2 are the EFLC, EDLC, EENS and the ECOST respectively. 
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Figure 6.1: Probability distributions of the system reliability indices of the RBTS for the 
                   priority order and pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that the probability distributions of the DLC, FLC and 
ENS for the two load curtailment policies are basically the same. The probability 
distributions of the COST for the two load shedding policies are, however, slightly 
different for both study systems. The pass-1 philosophy results in higher COST than 
those of the priority order policy with more dispersion in the COST shape as this load 
curtailment policy is not focused on minimizing the customer outage cost. In summary, 
the different load curtailment policies have relatively little impact on the probability 
distributions of the DLC, FLC and ENS while the probability distribution of COST is 
dependent on the load shedding philosophy used.  
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Figure 6.2: Probability distributions of the system reliability indices of the IEEE-RTS  
                     for the priority order and pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
 
 The computer software RapHL-II can also produce the annual variations in the 
reliability indices for all the delivery points. The index probability distributions at 
several selected delivery points in the two test systems are illustrated in this section. 
Delivery points No. 3, 4 and 6 (DP3, DP5 and DP6) were selected in the RBTS. Figures 
6.3 – 6.5 respectively demonstrate the FLC, DLC and ENS for the selected delivery 
points using the two different load curtailment policies. The mean values, standard 
deviations (S.D.) and the probability distributions are shown. The mean values of the 
delivery point FLC, DLC and ENS given in Figures 6.3 – 6.5 are the EFLC, EDLC and 
EENS shown in Table 6.1 respectively.  
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Figure 6.3: Probability distributions of the frequency of load curtailment (FLC) for the 
                    selected delivery points in the RBTS based on the priority order and pass-1  
                    load curtailment policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Probability distributions of the duration of load curtailment (DLC) for the 
                     selected delivery points in the RBTS based on the priority order and pass-1  
                     load curtailment policies. 
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Figure 6.5: Probability distributions of the energy not supplied (ENS) for the selected 
                     delivery points in the RBTS based on the priority order and pass-1 load  
                     curtailment policies. 
 
The probability distributions of FLC, DLC and ENS for each delivery point 
shown in Figures 6.3 – 6.5 have their own unique characteristics. The FLC distribution 
shape for DP6 tends to deviate from the basic exponential form. It is worth noting that 
the degree of difference between the two load curtailment policies may not be significant 
for the RBTS. There are two obvious reasons for this. First, the delivery points in the 
RBTS are dependent on the system topology and DP6 is a single circuit delivery point 
connected to the system through a radial line. This is not the case for DP3 and DP4 
which are multi-circuit delivery points connected to several lines. DP6 is adversely 
affected by the system topology, but not significantly affected by different load 
curtailment philosophies. The second reason is that the RBTS is a small system with five 
delivery points. The different load shedding policies are more likely to have less impact 
on the small system than on a larger system. 
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were selected for illustration. DP4 has the highest priority order and DP9 has the lowest 
priority order, as shown in Table 3.2. DP18 is a load bus connected to many elements, 
and with no other load buses in close proximity. In contrast, DP19 is a delivery point 
that is directly connected to other two load buses. Figures 6.6 – 6.8 respectively show 
the FLC, DLC and ENS for the four selected delivery points using the two different load 
curtailment policies. The mean values of the delivery point FLC, DLC and ENS given in 
Figures 6.6 – 6.8 are the EFLC, EDLC and EENS shown in Table 6.2 respectively.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Probability distributions of the frequency of load curtailment (FLC) for the 
                    selected delivery points in the IEEE-RTS based on the priority order and  
                    pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
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highest priority whereas DP9 tends to encounter more interruptions due to its lower 
priority. Figure 6.6 indicates that the FLC for each delivery point based on the pass-1 
policy is significantly different from those obtained using the priority order policy. In 
the pass-1 policy scenario, DP9 is a very reliable load point as it has a number of 
connected transmission lines and neighboring load buses. DP18 has the lowest reliability 
(highest FLC). The reason for this is that DP18 is attached to many elements, and there 
are no other load buses in close proximity. Any system constraints that occur in this area 
and result in load curtailments will create interruptions at this load bus. An important 
related factor is that the biggest generating unit (400 MW) is connected to this load 
point, and another 400 MW generating unit is connected to the neighboring bus. Losing 
either one of these generating units coincident with other element outages will bring the 
system to an emergency state. This will increase the interruption frequency at this point.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Probability distributions of the duration of load curtailment (DLC) for the 
                     selected delivery points in the IEEE-RTS based on the priority order and  
                     pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
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The probability distributions of the DLC and ENS for the selected delivery 
points in the IEEE-RTS are shown in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. In general, they tend to have 
exponential characteristics, and are relatively more dispersed than the probability 
distributions of FLC shown in Figure 6.6. The probability of ENS for DP18 exceeding 
12 GWh/yr is 0.011. As noted earlier, DP18 is closely connected to two critical 
generating units and there are no other load buses in the immediate area. DP18 will, 
therefore, experience significant load curtailments under the pass-1 policy. In general, 
the dispersions of the DLC and ENS probability distributions are related to the 
dispersion characteristics of the FLC probability distributions. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Probability distributions of the energy not supplied (ENS) for the selected 
                     delivery points in the IEEE-RTS based on the priority order and  
                     pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
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manner in which the parameters vary around their mean values. Reliability index 
probability distribution analysis shows that the reliability indices of the individual 
delivery points have unique characteristics. These unique characteristics are basically 
dependent on the system topology and system load shedding philosophy. The 
distributions of very reliable delivery points have mean values close to the ordinate axis 
and have exponential characteristics. Delivery points which have low reliability have 
their mean values further away from the ordinate axis and can have quite different 
distribution characteristics. The distributions can be identified by Weibull characteristics 
with different shape factors. The exponential, Rayleigh and normal distributions are 
Weibull distributions with shape factors of 1, 2 and 3.5 respectively. One benefit of 
being able to determine the variability in the individual delivery point indices is the 
ability to provide probabilistic input data to distribution system reliability analysis. 
HLIII reliability evaluation composed of generation, transmission and distribution 
elements can be conducted using sequential simulation in which the input data to a 
distribution system are the reliability index probability distributions at the specific bulk 
delivery point. The development of system reliability index probability distributions 
provides additional information and an understanding of composite power system 
behavior. 
 
6.3  Reliability Performance Indices 
 
 As noted earlier, there are two basic types of bulk electric system reliability 
indices. They are predictive indices and past performance indices. Predictive indices 
provide relevant information associated with future system reliability and are normally 
associated with system planning. The predictive indices for the delivery points and for 
the overall system are presented in the previous section. Past performance indices reflect 
the actual system reliability and are therefore related to the actual operation of the 
system. Even though the two types of bulk electric system reliability indices have been 
proposed and discussed in a number of papers [73 – 75], relatively little attention has 
been given to developing the linkage between them. In order to compare the predicted 
future performance with past performance, it is important to link the predictive and past 
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performance indices. When planning additions to an existing bulk electric system, the 
predicted reliability can be directly compared with the past performance indices if the 
future performance indices and the past performance indices are in a similar form. This 
section is focused on how to forecast the future performance indices and their 
probability distributions using the predictive indices developed in the previous section. 
 
6.3.1  Bulk Electric System Performance Protocol 
 
 Virtually all the major utilities in Canada are actively engaged in reporting past 
performance indices, using the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA), Electric Power 
System Reliability Assessment protocols [76, 77]. The performance data for successive 
years show that the indices vary from year to year and that the annual performance 
indices can be considered as random variables. The following is a brief summary of 
some relevant definitions and the basic performance index equations. The detailed 
definitions in the CEA bulk system reliability performance protocol are given in [76, 
77]. 
 
Delivery Point (DP)  
 
The delivery point is the point of supply where the energy from the BES is 
transferred to the Distribution System or the retail customer. This point is generally 
taken as the low voltage busbar at step-down transformer stations (the voltage is stepped 
down from a transmission or sub-transmission voltage, which may cover the range of 
60-750 kV to a distribution voltage of under 60 kV). For customer-owned stations 
supplied directly from the transmission system, this point is generally taken as the 
interface between utility-owned equipment and the customer’s equipment. 
 
Single-Circuit Supplied Delivery Point (SC)  
 
A DP supplied from the BES by one circuit whereby the interruption of that will 
cause an interruption to the delivery point.  
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Multi-Circuit Supplied Delivery Point (MC)  
 
A DP supplied from the BES by more than one circuit such that the interruption 
of one circuit does not cause a delivery point interruption. 
 
Delivery Point Primary Supply Voltage  
 
The transmission voltage level before transformation to the delivery point. For 
the purpose of this reporting system, four Voltage Classes have been identified. 
Voltage Class 1:   60 -   99 kV 
Voltage Class 2: 100 - 199 kV 
Voltage Class 3: 200 - 299 kV 
Voltage Class 4: 300 - 750 kV 
 
System Average Interruption Frequency Index – Sustained Interruptions (SAIFI-SI) 
 
 A measure of the average number of sustained interruptions that a DP 
experiences during a given period, usually one year (occurrences/year). In this thesis, 
SAIFI is used as a short form of SAIFI-SI. 
 
 MonitoredPointsDelivery  of Number Total
onsInterrupti  Sustainedof Number Total      SISAIFI =−   (6.1) 
 
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) 
 
A measure of the average total interruption duration that a DP experiences during 
a given period, usually one year (hours/year). 
 
 MonitoredPointsDelivery  of Number Total
onsInterrupti all of Duration Total      SAIDI =    (6.2) 
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System Average Restoration Index (SARI)  
 
A measure of the average duration of a delivery point interruption. In essence, it 
represents the average restoration time for each delivery point interruption 
(hours/occurrence). 
onsInterrupti of Number Total
onsInterrupti all of Duration Total      SARI =     (6.3)
    
Delivery Point Unavailability Index (DPUI)  
 
A measure of overall BES performance in terms of a composite index of 
unavailability in System Minutes (system·minutes). 
 
(MW) Load Peak System
Minutes)-(MWEnergy  Unsupplied Total      DPUI =    (6.4)
  
The system performance indices expressed in Equations (6.1) – (6.4) can be 
predicted using conventional composite system reliability evaluation [2]. This can be 
done using a contingency evaluation approach or by Monte Carlo simulation. References 
[79, 80] presented techniques to predict reliability performance indices using analytical 
and non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation methods respectively. These two 
approaches, however, cannot provide performance index probability distributions. The 
concept of predicting reliability performance indices is extended in this chapter to 
creating the system performance index probability distributions in bulk electric systems 
using the sequential simulation approach. 
 
 The delivery points in the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS are classified in Tables 6.3 
and 6.4 respectively based on the CEA definition.  
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Table 6.3: Classification of delivery points for the RBTS. 
Circuit Voltage ClassDelivery
Point 
(DP) 
Single
(SC) 
Multi  
(MC) 1 2 3 4 
2  ?   ?  
3  ?   ?  
4  ?   ?  
5  ?   ?  
6 ?    ?  
 
 
Table 6.4: Classification of delivery points for the IEEE-RTS. 
Circuit Voltage ClassDelivery
Point 
(DP) 
Single
(SC) 
Multi  
(MC) 1 2 3 4
1  ?  ?   
2  ?  ?   
3  ?  ?   
4  ?  ?   
5  ?  ?   
6  ?  ?   
7  ?  ?   
8  ?  ?   
9  ?  ?   
10  ?  ?   
13  ?   ?  
14  ?   ?  
15  ?   ?  
16  ?   ?  
18  ?   ?  
19  ?   ?  
20  ?   ?  
 
 
Table 6.3 shows that the RBTS consists of both single-circuit (1 DP) and multi-
circuit (4 DPs) at the 230 kV Voltage level (Class 3) based on the CEA definitions. The 
IEEE-RTS contains only multi-circuit delivery points with the two different voltage 
classes of 138 kV (Class 2) and 230 kV (Class 3), as shown in Table 6.4. In order to 
demonstrate how to calculate performance indices, sampled interruption frequencies and 
durations of the delivery points based on two consecutive simulation years are shown in 
Table 6.5 for demonstration purposes. Frequencies of load curtailment (FLC) of all the 
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delivery points are used to calculate SAIFI, while the durations of load curtailment 
(DLC) of all the delivery points are used to calculate SAIDI as shown in Table 6.5. The 
DPUI is calculated using the energy not supplied (ENS) divided by the system peak load 
(185 MW in this example), and then multiplied by 60 minutes. Table 6.5 shows example 
sequentially simulated results for two consecutive years. The performance indices vary 
from year to year due to the random behavior of the system. 
 
Table 6.5: Performance index calculations for two consecutive simulation years. 
Delivery Point (DP) Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5 Bus 6 
FLC (occ/yr) for year 1 1.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 
FLC (occ/yr) for year 2 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SAIFI (year 1) = (1+4+1+1+3)/5 = 2.0 
SAIFI (year 2) = (0+1+0+0+0)/5 = 0.2 
DLC (hrs/yr) for year 1 1.0 6.0 1.0 1.0 8.0 
DLC (hrs/yr) for year 2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SAIDI (year 1) = (1+6+1+1+8)/5 = 3.4 
SAIDI (year 2) = (0+2+0+0+0)/5 = 0.4 
ENS (MWh/yr) for year 1 2.5 91.3 11.6 15.4 70.8 
ENS (MWh/yr) for year 2 0.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DPUI ((year 1) = (2.5+91.3+11.6+15.4+70.8)×60/185 = 62.1 
DPUI ((year 2) = (0.0+18.2+0.0+0.0+0.0)×60/185 = 5.9 
  
 
6.3.2  Mean or Expected Performance Indices 
 
 Simulation periods of 8,000 and 6,000 years respectively were used for the 
RBTS and IEEE-RTS, as noted in Section 6.2, to create the probability distributions of 
the system reliability performance indices. The mean values of SAIFI, SAIDI and DPUI 
can therefore be obtained by summing up the individual year results and dividing by the 
total number of simulation years.  
 
Tables 6.6 – 6.9 show the expected values of the RBTS performance indices 
obtained using the three different load shedding policies. The results clearly show that 
the adopted load curtailment policy has a considerable impact on the system reliability 
performance indices. Table 6.6 shows that the priority order policy results in a higher 
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SAIFI for the single circuit (SC) and lower SAIFI for the multi-circuit (MC) compared 
with those obtained using with the pass-1 and pass-2 policies. The priority order policy, 
however, provides the lowest value for the overall SAIFI (total circuits). Similarly, the 
overall SAIDI of the RBTS obtained using the priority order policy is the lowest among 
the three load shedding policies as shown in Table 6.7. This shows that system reliability 
performance can be improved by selecting appropriate operating strategies. The SARI 
shown in Table 6.8 is dependent on the SAIFI and SAIDI, as it is the ratio of SAIDI and 
SAIFI. An approximate SARI can be calculated using the results in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. 
The SARI shown in Table 6.8 are, however, slightly different from those obtained by 
dividing SAIDI by SAIFI. The reason for this is that the SARI shown in Table 6.8 are 
calculated for only the simulation years that have load curtailments. For example, if load 
curtailments occur for 7,500 of the 8,000 simulation years, the SARI is calculated based 
on these 7,500 years while SAIFI and SAIDI are still calculated based on 8,000 
simulation years. The pass-1 and pass-2 policies create no differences in the SAIFI, 
SAIDI and SARI. As noted earlier, the RBTS is a relatively small system and the pass-2 
policy is not effective in this case. The results obtained using the pass-1 and pass-2 
policies are therefore identical. The DPUI is referred to as the Severity Index. The DPUI 
can be used for reliability comparisons between different size systems, as it is 
normalized by the system peak load. It can be seen in Table 6.9 that the DPUI obtained 
using the three different load shedding policies are the same.  
 
Table 6.6: SAIFI (occ/yr) for the RBTS using the three different load shedding policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy 
Volt. 
Class 
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt.
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt.
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - - 
3 1.19 0.29 0.47 3 0.92 0.42 0.52 3 0.92 0.42 0.52 
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 - - - 
Total 1.19 0.29 0.47 Total 0.92 0.42 0.52 Total 0.92 0.42 0.52 
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Table 6.7: SAIDI (hrs/yr) for the RBTS using the three different load shedding policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy 
Volt. 
Class 
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt.
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt.
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - - 
3 10.49 1.11 2.99 3 9.70 1.66 3.27 3 9.70 1.66 3.27 
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 - - - 
Total 10.49 1.11 2.99 Total 9.70 1.66 3.27 Total 9.70 1.66 3.27 
 
 
Table 6.8: SARI (hrs/occ) for the RBTS using the three different load shedding policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy 
Volt. 
Class 
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt.
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt.
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - - 
3 8.00 2.34 6.94 3 8.32 2.13 6.94 3 8.32 2.13 6.94 
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 - - - 
Total 8.00 2.34 6.94 Total 8.32 2.13 6.94 Total 8.32 2.13 6.94 
 
 
Table 6.9: DPUI (sys.mins) for the RBTS using the three different load shedding policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy 
51.19 51.19 51.19 
 
 
Tables 6.10 – 6.13 show the system performance indices for the IEEE-RTS 
obtained using the three different load shedding policies. Table 6.10 shows that the 
priority order policy results in higher SAIFI for the Voltage Class 2 delivery points and 
lower SAIFI for the Voltage Class 3 delivery points than those obtained using with the 
pass-1 and pass-2 policies. The overall SAIFI obtained using the priority order policy is, 
however, considerably higher than those obtained using the pass-1 and pass-2 policies. 
The pass-1 policy provides slightly lower SAIFI than the pass-2 policy. Similarly, the 
overall SAIDI obtained using the priority order policy shown in Table 6.11 results in the 
highest value followed by the values obtained using the pass-2 and pass-1 policies 
respectively. This conclusion is opposite to that for the RBTS. This implies that the 
system performance indices are significantly dependent on the system topology and the 
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system operation. An operating policy such as the load curtailment philosophy that 
provides better system performance on one system may not result in better system 
performance on another system. The technique provided in this chapter could prove 
useful for system operators attempting to determine the most appropriate load shedding 
policy for their particular system. The overall SARI obtained using the pass-1 policy 
shown in Table 6.12 is slightly higher than that obtained using the priority order and 
pass-2 policies. The pass-2 policy provides the lowest SARI. This implies that the 
benefit of the pass-2 policy is to reduce the average restoration time of the overall 
system. Table 6.13 shows that the DPUI obtained using the three load shedding policies 
are basically the same. As noted earlier for the RBTS, an operating policy such as the 
load shedding philosophy has basically no impact on the DPUI. 
 
Table 6.10: SAIFI (occ/yr) for the IEEE-RTS using the three different load shedding 
                       policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy 
Volt. 
Class 
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt. 
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt. 
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 
2 - 1.15 1.15 2 - 0.52 0.52 2 - 0.60 0.60 
3 - 1.58 1.58 3 - 1.78 1.78 3 - 1.84 1.84 
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 - - - 
Total - 1.33 1.33 Total - 1.04 1.04 Total - 1.11 1.11 
 
 
Table 6.11: SAIDI (hrs/yr) for the IEEE-RTS using the three different load shedding 
                       policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy 
Volt. 
Class 
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt. 
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt. 
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 
2 - 4.40 4.40 2 - 1.63 1.63 2 - 1.90 1.90 
3 - 5.90 5.90 3 - 6.90 6.90 3 - 7.08 7.08 
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 - - - 
Total - 5.01 5.01 Total - 3.80 3.80 Total - 4.03 4.03 
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Table 6.12: SARI (hrs/occ) for the IEEE-RTS using the three different load shedding 
                       policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy 
Volt. 
Class 
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt. 
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
Volt. 
Class
SC MC Total 
Circuits
1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 
2 - 3.38 3.38 2 - 1.74 1.74 2 - 1.67 1.67 
3 - 2.87 2.87 3 - 3.40 3.40 3 - 3.37 3.37 
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 - - - 
Total - 3.15 3.15 Total - 3.16 3.16 Total - 3.11 3.11 
 
 
Table 6.13: DPUI (sys.mins) for the IEEE-RTS using the three different load shedding 
                     policies. 
Priority Order Policy Pass-1 Policy Pass-2 Policy 
97.82 97.81 97.81 
 
 
6.3.3  Reliability Performance Index Probability Distributions 
 
 The expected values of the performance indices for the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS 
are presented in the previous section. Performance index probability distributions of the 
indices shown in the previous section are illustrated in this section. Figures 6.9 – 6.12 
provide pictorial representations of the RBTS reliability performance index annual 
variability with the two different load curtailment policies.  
 
Figure 6.9 shows that the two different load shedding policies provide relatively 
different SAIFI distributions. The SAIFI distributions for the subsystems and the overall 
system are also different. The distributions of the more reliable multi-circuit DP have 
mean values close to the ordinate axis and have exponential characteristics. On the other 
hand, the single-circuit DP has a lower reliability. The mean values are further from the 
ordinate axis and the probability distributions have different characteristics.  
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Figure 6.9: Single-circuit, multi-circuit and overall SAIFI of the RBTS using the priority 
                   order and pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Single-circuit, multi-circuit and overall SAIDI of the RBTS using the 
                          priority order and pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
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Figure 6.11: Single-circuit, multi-circuit and overall SARI of the RBTS using the 
                           priority order and pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12: DPUI of the RBTS using the priority order and pass-1 load curtailment  
                         policies. 
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satisfactory system performance. In such a case the performance index probability 
distributions provide significant additional information. Figure 6.11 shows the 
distributional aspects of SARI for the RBTS. The single-circuit SARI tends to be more 
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dispersed with a lognormal distribution form when using the pass-1 policy. The multi-
circuit SARI has an exponential shape while the total SARI has more of a lognormal 
form. Figure 6.12 shows that the distribution shapes of the DPUI obtained using the two 
different load shedding policies are basically the same. 
 
Figures 6.13 – 6.16 provide pictorial representations of the IEEE-RTS reliability 
performance index annual variability with the two different load curtailment policies. 
Figure 6.13 shows the distributions of SAIFI for the IEEE-RTS. Different load shedding 
policies provide relatively different distribution shapes. The mean values of SAIFI for 
the IEEE-RTS are further from the ordinate axis than those for the RBTS as the IEEE-
RTS encounters more interruptions than the RBTS. Utilizing the pass-1 policy in the 
IEEE-RTS positively changes the distribution of SAIFI as the probabilities move closer 
to the ordinate axis, and the system performance is improved. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13: Single-circuit, multi-circuit and overall SAIFI of the IEEE-RTS using the  
                       priority order and pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
  
Figure 6.14 shows the probability distributions of SAIDI for the IEEE-RTS. As 
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value and the probability distributions of the total SAIDI are significantly improved by 
using the pass-1 policy rather than the priority order policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Single-circuit, multi-circuit and overall SAIDI of the IEEE-RTS using the  
                      priority order and pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Single-circuit, multi-circuit and overall SARI of the IEEE-RTS using the  
                       priority order and pass-1 load curtailment policies. 
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Figure 6.16: DPUI of the IEEE-RTS using the priority order and pass-1 load curtailment  
                     policies. 
 
Figure 6.15 shows the probability distributions of SARI for the IEEE-RTS based 
on the two different load shedding policies. The probability distributions of the Voltage 
Class 2 and Class 3 DP and overall system SARI are more likely to have lognormal or 
normal distribution characteristics. Figure 6.16 shows that the distribution shapes of 
DPUI obtained using the two different load shedding policies are very similar. The 
probability distributions of DPUI are highly dispersed. This is also true for the RBTS. 
The mean DPUI of the IEEE-RTS is considerably higher than that of the RBTS. 
 
In conclusion, the concept of predicting system reliability performance index 
probability distributions for composite generation and transmission systems is presented 
in this section. The mean index values are important indicators of system and delivery 
point performance but provide only single risk dimensions. The resulting appreciation of 
the risk may be insufficient when the index distribution is highly skewed. Performance 
index probability distributions can provide valuable additional insight. System 
performance indices have unique characteristics that are dependent on the system 
topology and the system operating conditions. System operating strategies, involving 
load curtailment procedures, have considerable impact on the system performance 
indices. The results indicate that the system performance indices can be improved by 
utilizing appropriate load shedding philosophies. A load curtailment policy that provides 
the best system performance for one system may not be the right choice for another. The 
appropriate load curtailment policy is, therefore, system dependent.  
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6.4  Sensitivity Analyses of Performance Index Probability Distributions 
 
 In this section, sensitivity studies have been conducted to investigate the 
reliability index probability distribution characteristics under different selected 
situations. Two factors are examined, namely the effect of repair process distributions 
and the effect of changing system conditions such as increased system peak loads. 
Performance index probability distributions are used to illustrate these effects in this 
section. 
 
6.4.1  Effect of the Repair Process Distributions  
 
Bulk electric power systems are basically repairable systems. If a component in 
the system such as a generating unit or a transmission link fails, it is usually repaired and 
put back into operation. The restoration times in this process can be considered as 
random variables. An integral part of the sequential simulation approach is to sample 
random variates from probability distributions. This section presents the effect that 
repair process probability distributions have on the bulk electric system reliability 
performance index probability distributions. The failure processes (time to failure, TTF) 
are assumed to follow an exponential distribution similar to that used in the previous 
section. The hazard rate of the failure process in this case is therefore constant. This is a 
reasonable assumption in normal operation. Different distributions for the repair process 
(time to repair, TTR) are examined in order to identify the effect of the distributions on 
the reliability performance indices. The mean time to failure (MTTF) and mean time to 
repair (MTTR) of each component are kept the same in order to maintain consistency. It 
is also assumed that all components have the same underlying distribution for each case 
study. It should be noted, however, that no added complexity is imposed on the 
simulation if different components have different distributions. In this study, the Weibull 
distribution models are used to present the probability distribution function of the repair 
time process. The Weibull distribution is composed of two important parameters 
designated as the scale factor (α) and the shape factor (β). The time-dependent Weibull 
probability distribution function, f(t), is shown in Equation (6.5) [22]: 
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 The simulated duration, T, using the inverse transform of the Weibull probability 
distribution function is: 
    βα
1
)ln( UT −=      (6.6) 
 
where:  U   =   A uniformly distributed random number [0,1], 
   α   =   Scale factor, 
   β   =   Shape factor. 
 
 The three different shape factors (β), 1.0, 2.0 and 3.5 used in this study are 
illustrated in Figure 6.17. The Weibull distributions with these three shape factors have 
quite different and distinct distribution shapes. The exponential, Rayleigh and normal 
distributions are Weibull distributions with shape factors of 1, 2 and 3.5 respectively as 
shown in Figure 6.17. As shown in Equation (6.6), when the Weibull distribution has a 
shape factor of 1.0 (β = 1), this equation is equivalent to Equation (2.4) in Chapter 2, 
which is the inverse transform of the exponential distribution. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.17: Weibull distribution characteristics with three different shape factors. 
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 It is worth noting that the use of distribution shapes other than an exponential 
requires more detailed investigation to identify the shape of the repair time distribution 
using actual data. It may not be an easy task for most utilities to determine accurate 
shapes for TTF and TTR from the outage database. The MTTF and MTTR are the most 
available data and are generally used in conjunction with an exponential distribution. 
When using the Weibull distribution model, the scale factor and shape factor need to be 
identified, and mean value and variance can then be calculated. This is not usually the 
case for most utilities and they are more likely to start modeling using a knowledge of 
the mean values such as MTTF and MTTR. In order to use Weibull distributions to 
characterize the TTF and TTR, the shape factor is specified initially. When the shape 
factor (β) and mean value (µ) are identified, the scale factor (α) can be heuristically 
calculated using a gamma function as shown in the following equation. 
 
    ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +Γ= 11. βαµ      (6.7) 
 
where:  Γ   =   The gamma function, 
             µ   =   Mean value, i.e. MTTF and MTTR. 
 
 Figures 6.18 – 6.20 respectively illustrate the probability distributions of the 
selected SAIFI, SAIDI and SARI for the RBTS obtained using the three different repair 
time shape factors. Figures 6.21 – 6.23 respectively show the probability distributions of 
the selected SAIFI, SAIDI, SARI and DPUI for the IEEE-RTS obtained using three 
different repair time shape factors. The pass-1 load curtailment philosophy is utilized in 
this study. The simulation results are based on 8,000 and 6,000 simulation years for the 
RBTS and the IEEE-RTS respectively. Reliability index probability distributions are 
normally created as frequency histograms with discrete intervals (bins) as shown in the 
previous sections. The probability distributions shown in this section are, however, 
presented using approximate continuous distributions for illustration purposes rather 
than histograms. The use of smooth curves in representing the probability distributions 
facilitates comparisons of the various scenario results on the same axis. Figure 6.18 
shows that the probability distributions of the single and multi-circuit SAIFI for the 
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RBTS associated with the three different repair time distributions are considerably 
similar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Probability distributions of single and multi-circuit SAIFI for the RBTS 
                        associated with the three different repair process distributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.19: Probability distributions of single and multi-circuit SAIDI for the RBTS 
                        associated with the three different repair process distributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.20: Probability distributions of single and multi-circuit SARI for the RBTS 
                         associated with the three different repair process distributions. 
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Figures 6.19 and 6.20 respectively show that the single circuit SAIDI and SARI 
is significantly affected when using different repair time distribution shapes, whereas 
these impacts on the probability distributions of the multi-circuit SAIDI and SARI are 
relatively small. This is due to the fact that the probability distributions of SAIDI and 
SARI are directly dependent on the component repair time model. Another reason is that 
a single circuit delivery point is basically dependent on a single component, the loss of 
which will result in load curtailment. A single circuit delivery point is therefore very 
sensitive to the component modeling process. The probability distributions of the single 
circuit SARI are therefore basically similar to the distribution shapes of the component 
repair time. On the other hand, the multi-circuit delivery points are considerably less 
affected by the component repair time distribution characteristics as such delivery points 
are well meshed and the loss of a single element will not cause load curtailment. 
 
Figures 6.21 – 6.23 show that the IEEE-RTS probability distributions for SAIFI, 
SAIDI and SARI with the three different repair time distributions are relatively similar 
for both voltage classes. This is due to the fact that the IEEE-RTS has no single circuit 
delivery points. The impact of component repair time distributions is therefore less 
significant on the performance index probability distributions for the IEEE-RTS. 
 
 In conclusion, the component repair time distributions have a considerable 
impact on the probability distributions of the performance indices of the single circuit 
delivery point. The impact is however less significant for the performance index 
probability distributions of the multi-circuit delivery points. Many load points in 
practical bulk electric systems are usually highly meshed, and many bulk supply points 
are therefore categorized as multi-circuit delivery points. Consequently, the impact of 
component repair time distributions on bulk electric system reliability index probability 
distributions is relatively insignificant. On the other hand, reliability index probability 
distributions of electric distribution systems, which are basically radial systems, tend to 
be greatly affected by the component repair time distribution model. 
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Figure 6.21: Probability distributions of Voltage Class 2 and Class 3 SAIFI for the  
     IEEE-RTS associated with the three different repair process  
                          distributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.22: Probability distributions of Voltage Class 2 and Class 3 SAIDI for the  
    IEEE-RTS associated with the three different repair process 
                         distributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.23: Probability distributions of Voltage Class 2 and Class 3 SARI for the  
      IEEE-RTS associated with the three different repair process 
                          distributions. 
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6.4.2  Effect of Changing System Conditions 
 
 The results obtained in the previous sections indicate that performance index 
probability distributions have unique characteristics that are basically dependent on the 
system topology and operating philosophy. In this section, the impact on the 
performance index probability distributions of system conditions such as peak load level 
changes and system reinforcement options is investigated and illustrated by application 
to the RBTS. The probability distributions of the overall SAIFI, SAIDI and DPUI are 
illustrated using two study scenarios. The first scenario presents the results obtained 
using the original RBTS configuration shown in Figure 3.2. In the second scenario, the 
RBTS is reinforced by adding another transmission line between Bus 5 and Bus 6 in 
order to diminish the impact of a single circuit delivery point at Bus 6.  
 
The results obtained using the first scenario with different system peak load 
levels are graphically presented together with the expected values in Figure 6.24. Figure 
6.24 shows that load growth not only results in increased expected performance indices 
but also significantly impacts the associated distributions. The variation in the 
performance index probability distribution characteristics is dependent on the system 
conditions. The distributions shown in Figure 6.24 exhibit Weibull distribution 
characteristics with different shape factors. For example, the exponential, Rayleigh and 
normal distributions are Weibull distributions with shape factors of 1, 2 and 3.5 
respectively. The distributions of SAIFI, SAIDI and DPUI at the individual peak loads 
shown in Figure 6.24 are generally similar in form, but the shape factors are not identical 
in each case. This implies that each reliability performance index has a unique 
distribution characteristic for each particular circumstance. The performance index 
probability distributions under lower system peak load levels, i.e. 179 and 188 MW, are 
less dispersed with higher predicted probability of occurrence, whereas higher system 
peak loads such as 206 MW create more dispersion and uncertainty in the performance 
indices with lower predicted probability of occurrence. Operating a system in a highly 
stressed environment will result in increased difficulties for system engineers to manage 
the system risk with a high degree of confidence.  
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Figure 6.24: Performance index probability distributions of the original RBTS at 
                           different system peak loads. 
 
Figure 6.25 shows the probability distributions of SAIFI, SAIDI and DPUI at the 
different system peak loads for the reinforced RBTS (the second scenario). The original 
RBTS results shown in Figure 6.24 are also compared and presented as dashed curves in 
Figure 6.25. Two lines (dashed and undashed) indicate the expected values of the 
performance indices at the different peak loads for the original and reinforced RBTS 
respectively. Figure 6.25 shows that there is a noticeable improvement due to the 
reinforcement in all the performance index probability distributions at the original 
system peak load (179 MW) as the distributions transform from log-normal to 
exponential shapes. The degree of uncertainty (dispersion) is decreased significantly by 
adding a transmission line between Bus 5 and Bus 6. There is still a considerable 
improvement due to the reinforcement in all the performance index probability 
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distributions when the system peak load increases to 188 MW. As the system peak load 
increases to 197 MW, the improvement in the SAIFI probability distribution is relatively 
small while the improvements in the probability distributions of SAIDI and DPUI are 
still quite obvious. This implies that the addition of a transmission line between Bus 5 
and Bus 6 does not effectively reduce the interruption frequency at this system peak load 
(197 MW), but it is effective in reducing the interruption duration and unserved energy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.25: Performance index probability distributions of the original and reinforced 
                       RBTS at different peak load levels. 
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When the system peak load increases to 206 MW, there is relatively little improvement 
in the SAIFI and SAIDI probability distributions due to adding this transmission line. 
The main reason for this is that the system with this peak load, i.e. 206 MW, is 
generation deficient. Under these conditions, the system can no longer satisfy the N-1 
deterministic criterion, i.e. the loss of the largest unit (40 MW). Generation 
reinforcement should be considered under these circumstances. 
 
It should be noted that the above comments are focused on performance index 
probability distribution aspects directly related to the degree of risk uncertainty. As 
shown in Figure 6.25, the gap between the two lines illustrates the marginal 
improvement due to this transmission line addition using the expected values of SAIFI, 
SAIDI and DPUI. The width of the gap with increasing system peak loads is reasonably 
constant for each index. The expected values, therefore, provide only a single risk 
dimension without any knowledge of the residual uncertainty. Performance index 
probability distributions offer additional information insight and provide a multi-
dimensional risk assessment. The concept of reliability index probability distribution 
analysis can be used as a supplementary tool in risk management to manage and control 
future potential risks arising within the system. This risk assessment tool could provide 
power engineers and risk managers with a more profound knowledge of their bulk 
electric system, and help them recognize system risk with higher confidence when 
making decisions. It offers additional information insight for planning engineers on 
when system improvement and reinforcements should be conducted to reduce future 
potential risk and uncertainty. 
 
6.5  Conclusions 
 
 This chapter presents the development of reliability index probability 
distributions for bulk electric systems using a sequential simulation approach. Reliability 
index probability distributions for both delivery point and overall system are illustrated. 
The results show that the reliability index probability distributions at the individual 
delivery points have unique characteristics. These unique aspects are basically due to 
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system topology and system operating conditions. System operating strategies, 
especially those related to load curtailment policies, have important impacts on the 
individual delivery point characteristics. In contrast, the load curtailment policies have 
relatively little impact on the overall system reliability indices other than those related to 
reliability worth. The concept of predicting the future reliability performance indices 
associated with their probability distributions for bulk electric systems is also 
demonstrated in this chapter. The mean index values are important indicators of system 
and delivery point performance but provide only single risk dimensions. The resulting 
appreciation of the risk may be insufficient when the index distribution is highly 
skewed. Performance index probability distributions provide valuable additional 
information. The results indicate that the system performance indices can be improved 
by utilizing appropriate load shedding philosophies. A load curtailment policy that 
provides the best system performance for one system may not be the right choice for 
another. The appropriate load curtailment policy is, therefore, system dependent.  
 
 Sensitivity analyses have also been conducted to investigate the impacts of repair 
time distribution modeling and changes in the system conditions, i.e. increased peak load 
and system reinforcement, on performance index probability distributions. The results 
show that component repair time distribution characteristics can have considerably 
impact on the probability distributions of the duration-related indices such as SAIDI and 
SARI of a single circuit delivery point. The impact is, however, less significant on the 
probability distributions of SAIDI and SARI for multi-circuit delivery points. The 
impact of system peak loads and transmission reinforcement on performance index 
probability distribution characteristics is investigated in this chapter. The results show 
that changing system conditions can have a significant impact on the performance index 
probability distribution characteristics. Synthesizing bulk electric system reliability 
performance index probability distributions provides a multi-dimensional risk 
assessment tool that complements the single risk dimension provided by an expected or 
average value. This concept can prove useful in managing and controlling system risks 
with acceptable confidence.   
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CHAPTER 7   
RELIABILITY INDEX PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 
UTILIZATION IN A PERFORMANCE BASED 
REGULATION (PBR) FRAMEWORK  
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
 The electric power industry in North America and indeed throughout the world is 
undergoing deregulation in regard to its structure, operation and governance [81]. The 
basic intention of deregulation in the power industry is to increase competition in order 
to obtain better service quality and lower production costs. The demand for electricity is 
very sensitive to price, and therefore the lowest cost power supplier will be the most 
attractive to a customer. This has put great pressure on electric utilities to reduce costs, 
either by deferring capital projects or by increasing maintenance intervals, which can 
result in deterioration of the system reliability [82]. The question of achieving a balance 
between costs and service quality is therefore a key issue in today’s power market. A 
mechanism known as performance based regulation (PBR) has been introduced to 
encourage power utilities to become more economically efficient, and at the same time 
to discourage utilities from sacrificing service quality in the pursuit of economic 
objectives [83]. The concept of PBR in the power industry was initially introduced for 
electric distribution systems [82 – 86]. The PBR concept is also under consideration in 
the field of composite generation and transmission systems and bulk electric system 
performance indices have the potential to be key elements in this regulated approach. 
The reliability performance index probability distributions described in the previous 
chapter are used as integral elements in the PBR mechanism described in this chapter to 
incorporate the risk uncertainties associated with expected financial payments in a PBR 
regime.     
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7.2  Performance Based Regulation (PBR) for Bulk Electric Systems 
 
 A regulatory approach designated as performance based regulation (PBR) has 
been proposed by policymakers involved in deregulating the electric power industry. 
The PBR approach decouples the price that a utility charges for its service from its cost, 
and is intended to provide an electricity utility with incentives for economic gain. This 
mechanism is offered as an alternative to more traditional cost-of-service regulatory 
practices. The PBR regime attempts to link rewards to desired results or targets. It works 
like a contract that rewards a power utility for providing good reliability or service 
quality and penalizes a utility for providing poor reliability [82, 86].  
 
 7.2.1  A Basic PBR Framework  
  
 Generally, a PBR framework is composed of three different sections designated 
as the reward, penalty and dead zones. In implementing PBR, a neutral zone or dead 
zone is introduced where neither a penalty nor a bonus is given. If the reliability 
performance is worse than the neutral zone boundary, a penalty is applied. Penalties are 
usually increased as the performance deteriorates and are frozen when a maximum 
penalty value is reached. Rewards for good reliability performance work in a similar 
way. Rewards are increased as the performance improves and are frozen when a 
maximum bonus value is reached, as shown in Figure 7.1 [82].      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: A general structure of performance based regulation (PBR). 
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An appropriate PBR framework has to be constructed in order to initiate a PBR 
mechanism. The attention is initially focused on the location and the width of the dead 
zone. References [84 – 87] suggest that the historical average reliability index should 
reside in the dead zone of the proposed PBR framework, and preferably at the dead zone 
center. The dead zone should not be too wide in order to create an effective and efficient 
PBR framework. A very wide dead zone makes it difficult for a utility to benefit from 
improving its reliability performance and may also lead a utility to let its system 
reliability performance deteriorate in the pursuit of economic objectives without 
encountering the penalty zone. On the other hand, the dead zone should not be too 
narrow as this may make it too difficulty for a power utility to maintain its reliability 
performance in the dead zone due to the highly random behavior of bulk systems. Such a 
situation will therefore create increased pressure and introduce the utility to more 
financial risk rather than creating economic incentives.    
 
It appears that BES reliability index probability distributions are considerably 
more dispersed than those of electric distribution systems, and the standard deviations of 
bulk electric system performance indices are usually large or even larger than their mean 
values. This is due to the fact that bulk electric systems are normally much more reliable 
than distribution systems as bulk electric systems are usually well meshed and 
interconnected. The width of the dead zone was therefore arbitrarily set at one standard 
deviation (± S.D./2) in the PBR framework applied in this research. The basic PBR 
framework is shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the proposed PBR framework for bulk electric system 
reliability performance utilization. The width of the dead zone is set at one standard 
deviation with the mean value of the reliability index at the center of the dead zone. The 
width of the reward transition from the starting reward point to the maximum reward is 
one half of the standard deviation (S.D./2). The width of the penalty transition is set in a 
similar way. The reward and penalty payments shown on the vertical axis are 
represented as a per unit (p.u.) value in order to make its values adjustable to any 
maximum payment criterion determined by the regulator. On the horizontal axis, the 
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reliability performance indices used in the PBR protocol are normally SAIFI and SAIDI 
for distribution systems [82 – 87] as both SAIFI and SAIDI are required to provide an 
overall appreciation of customer service reliability reflecting different customer impacts 
(interrupted frequency and accumulated duration respectively). These two performance 
measures are also applied in the PBR applications in bulk electric systems. In this 
research work, the PBR procedure is applied to SAIFI and SAIDI separately. The two 
components are added to provide the overall reward/penalty payment. The mathematical 
model of the reward/penalty payment structure (RPS) based on a power utility 
perspective is formulated as shown in Equation (7.1) using SAIFI and the parameters 
shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: A basic PBR framework for bulk electric systems. 
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 -1       SAIFI ≥ d 
 
 
 As noted earlier, the width of the slope for the reward/penalty zones is half of the 
standard deviation and the maximum payment is 1.0 per unit. The slope shown in Figure 
7.2 and expressed in Equation (7.1) can be therefore calculated as follows: 
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Slope   =   
2
S.D.
) 0-1 (    =   
S.D.
2       (7.2) 
 
The SAIFI can be modeled by its probability distribution. The expected 
reward/penalty payment (ERP) is calculated using Equation (7.3). The SAIDI model can 
also be formulated in the same way. 
 
 ERP   =   ( )∑ × ii PRP       (7.3) 
 
where:         i    =   An individual element or a class interval in the frequency histogram, 
                RPi   =   The reward/penalty payment (per unit) calculated using  
                              Equation (7.1) based on SAIFIi or SAIDIi, 
                  Pi   =   The probability of SAIFIi or SAIDIi.  
 
 The maximum reward/penalty payments can be determined based on regulatory 
concerns or on negotiations between the regulatory agency and the power utility. For 
example, if regulators and power utilities adopt customer interruption cost in the 
planning and operation process, the IEAR or VoLL can be used in conjunction with the 
annual unserved energy to determine the maximum reward/penalty payments. If the 
regulator and the power utility do not utilize customer outage costs, then other monetary 
factors such as an annual price cap identified by the regulatory agency can be applied, 
i.e. if the annual price cap is equal to 10 cents/kWh and the annual energy consumption 
in the system is 1000 GWh/year, the maximum reward/penalty payment could be 
calculated by the multiplying these two factors to give 100 million dollars. This amount 
is given as a simple example, and could be scaled up or down as appropriate in a 
practical application. Other monetary keys such as the annual allowed revenue (revenue 
cap) for a power utility could also be used to identify the maximum payments. These are 
simply some of the possible factors that could be used to determine the maximum 
reward/penalty payments. The actual maximum payments for an individual power utility 
will depend on the policy adopted by the associated regulator. The maximum 
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reward/penalty payments applied in this research are therefore presented in terms of per 
unit (p.u.) values and are adaptable to any payment criterion adopted.  
 
7.2.2  PBR Application Using Actual Historical Reliability Data 
 
The service reliability indices in this section are past performance measures 
obtained by compiling system outage statistics. Power utilities are normally required to 
monitor the reliability indices and report them to a regulator on an annual basis. 
Virtually all the major utilities in Canada are actively engaged in reporting past 
performance indices, using the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) protocols [76, 
77]. There are also several online publications on bulk electric system reliability 
performance reporting [88, 89]. This section illustrates the potential utilization of 
available bulk electric system reliability data in the PBR framework described in the 
previous section. Table 7.1 presents actual historical bulk electric system reliability 
performance data from Canada [76, 77], Philippines (two separate areas) [88] and 
Thailand [89]. Bulk electric system reliability performance statistics in terms of the 
mean values and standard deviations (S.D.) of the historical data presented in Table 7.1 
are shown in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.1: Actual historical data on bulk electric system reliability performance. 
Year Country Reliability Index 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
SAIFI (occ/yr) 1.40 1.10 1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00 -- Canada 
(Overall) SAIDI (hrs/yr) 6.19 1.90 1.46 1.40 1.69 6.02 -- 
SAIFI (occ/yr) 2.56 2.13 5.44 1.73 1.63 -- -- Philippines 
(Mindanao) SAIDI (hrs/yr) 3.50 3.52 8.82 3.30 16.22 -- -- 
SAIFI (occ/yr) 4.38 2.45 2.48 3.82 1.92 -- -- Philippines 
(Luzon) SAIDI (hrs/yr) 12.87 7.34 8.07 10.02 5.48 -- -- 
SAIFI (occ/yr) -- 0.91 0.92 0.74 0.45 0.36 0.42 Thailand SAIDI (hrs/yr) -- 1.40 0.85 0.63 0.25 0.37 0.43 
 
 
The results shown in Table 7.2 are calculated using the available data presented 
in Table 7.1. The calculated mean values and standard deviations (S.D.) shown in Table 
7.2 are used to set the dead zone and other components in the PBR framework described 
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in the previous section. Figure 7.3 illustrates the superposition of the SAIFI and SAIDI 
distributions on the PBR framework for each individual system. The expected 
reward/penalty payments (ERP) shown in Figure 7.3 were calculated using Equations 
(7.1) – (7.3) and the data presented in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.2: Historical data statistics of bulk electric system reliability performance. 
SAIFI (occ/yr) SAIDI (hrs/yr) System Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Canada (overall) 1.05 0.19 3.11 2.33 
Philippines (Mindanao) 2.70 1.58 7.07 5.62 
Philippines (Luzon) 3.01 1.04 8.76 2.82 
Thailand 0.63 0.26 0.65 0.42 
 
 
Figure 7.3 shows that each individual bulk system will face different reward and 
penalty payments for its reliability performances. A positive ERP value implies that the 
utility will expect a reward from the regulator while the negative ERP value indicates an 
expected penalty payment. The hypothetical PBR structure associated with the historic 
data tends to provide a reasonable reliability performance range and a target for the 
power utilities to compete as all the expected reward/penalty payments are relatively 
small (close to neutral) with exception of Canada in which the expected penalty payment 
based on SAIDI is quite high (-0.15 p.u.) and the dead zone width for SAIFI is quite 
small. This is due to the fact that the historic data for Canada are aggregated values from 
all the major utilities in Canada, not just from a specific utility.   
 
  The monitoring and reporting of the annual reliability indices shown in Table 
7.1 is intended to encourage utilities to maintain or exceed their existing service 
reliability performance. The application of PBR introduces a form of financial risk to a 
power utility that did not previously exist. In order to manage this risk, a power utility 
should attempt to estimate the uncertainty associated with this aspect of system 
performance. The concept of reliability index probability distribution analysis can assist 
power utilities to deal with the financial uncertainty associated with their reliability 
performance. 
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Figure 7.3: Combination of the SAIFI and SAIDI histograms and the hypothetical PBR 
                    for individual bulk electric systems. 
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7.2.3  PBR Application Using Simulation Results 
 
 This section demonstrates the utilization of reliability performance index 
probability distributions obtained using simulation in the PBR framework. As shown in 
the previous chapter, reliability performance index probability distributions are usually 
represented by frequency histograms with discrete class intervals. The class interval 
selection can affect the shapes of the probability distributions and also the calculation of 
the expected reward/penalty payments in a PBR protocol. This effect is relatively small 
when an appropriate class interval is selected. A popular class interval selection criterion 
designated as Sturges’ rule [90] is shown in Equation (7.4) and can be used in the 
probability distribution studies. This criterion is appropriate for moderate sample sizes 
less than 200, but it leads to oversmoothed histograms for large sample sizes [91, 92]. 
Sturges’ rule is appropriate for practical PBR applications as the available historical data 
obtained from power utilities is usually given by a small number of years, i.e. 10 years. 
In this research, the simulation is done over a few thousand years. The class interval 
selection criterion designated as Scott’s rule [93] shown in Equation (7.5) is adopted in 
this chapter to approximately estimate reasonable class intervals in frequency histogram 
construction using the simulation results. 
 
Sturges’ rule: 
 A class interval (bin width)   =   
Nlog  1
Data of Range
2+
           (7.4) 
 
Scott’s rule: 
 A class interval (bin width)   =   
3
1
N
S.D.3.49×        (7.5) 
where:   N is the number of samples, and S.D. is the standard deviation.   
 
 The class intervals of the probability distributions shown in the previous chapter 
are designated by the upper bound values, not the mid values of the intervals. The 
calculation of the expected reward/penalty payments (ERP) expressed in Equation (7.3) 
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is, however, obtained using the mid interval values rather than the designated upper 
bound values shown in the frequency histograms.  
 
 Figure 7.4 presents the probability distribution of the overall SAIFI for the IEEE-
RTS using the priority order policy, implanted on a designated PBR framework based on 
the structure noted earlier. The ERP calculation using Equation (7.3) is shown in Table 
7.3. 
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Figure 7.4: The SAIFI distribution for the IEEE-RTS obtained using the priority order 
                     policy implemented in a PBR framework. 
 
The expected reward/penalty payment (ERP) shown in Table 7.3 and in Figure 
7.4 is a positive value (+0.0526 p.u.). This indicates that the IEEE-RTS based on SAIFI 
in this PBR framework expects to receive a reward payment from the regulator. For 
example, if the maximum payment is M$ 100, the power utility can expect to receive 
5.26 M$/year on average based on the SAIFI performance. In a similar manner, Figure 
7.5 shows the SAIDI distribution for the IEEE-RTS using the priority order policy under 
the designated PBR structure. Figure 7.5 also shows that the ERP is a positive value 
(+0.0034 p.u.). The power utility in this case expects to receive reward payments from 
the regulator based on both SAIFI and SAIDI performances. 
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Table 7.3: The ERP calculation for the overall SAIFI distribution of the IEEE-RTS. 
SAIFIi 
(mid value)
Probability 
(Pi) 
RPi 
(p.u.) 
Payment 
(p.u.) 
0 0.0418 1 0.0418 
0.1 0.0892 1 0.0892 
0.3 0.0917 0.6683 0.0613 
0.5 0.1107 0.3423 0.0379 
0.7 0.0873 0.0163 0.0014 
0.9 0.0920 0 0 
1.1 0.0658 0 0 
1.3 0.0513 0 0 
1.5 0.0658 0 0 
1.7 0.0433 0 0 
1.9 0.0472 0 0 
2.1 0.0288 -0.2608 -0.0075 
2.3 0.0268 -0.5868 -0.0157 
2.5 0.0285 -0.9128 -0.0260 
2.7 0.0172 -1 -0.0172 
2.9 0.0197 -1 -0.0197 
3.1 0.0120 -1 -0.0120 
3.3 0.0117 -1 -0.0117 
3.5 0.0127 -1 -0.0127 
3.7 0.0068 -1 -0.0068 
over 3.7 0.0497 -1 -0.0497 
   ∑ = 0.0526 
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Figure 7.5: The SAIDI distribution for the IEEE-RTS obtained using the priority order 
                     policy implemented in a PBR framework. 
  
As noted in the previous chapter, adopting an appropriate load shedding policy 
can improve the reliability performance of a bulk electric system. If the IEEE-RTS 
initially operated using the priority order philosophy, the system operator could adjust 
the future operating policy in order to improve overall system reliability performance 
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and therefore increase the potential to receive more reward payments under a specified 
PBR regime. Figures 7.6 and 7.7 respectively present the IEEE-RTS SAIFI and SAIDI 
distributions obtained using two different load shedding policies implemented in a PBR 
framework. In this example, it is assumed that the system is initially operated using a 
priority order policy before the PBR protocol is activated. The PBR structure is therefore 
based on the past performance utilizing the priority order policy. The system operator 
tries to maintain or improve the system reliability performance by changing the 
operating philosophy to the pass-1 policy after the PBR mechanism has been adopted. 
The distributions illustrated in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 are represented using approximate 
continuous curves for comparison purposes.  
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Figure 7.6: The SAIFI distributions for the IEEE-RTS obtained using two different load 
                    curtailment policies implemented in a PBR framework. 
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Figure 7.7: The SAIDI distributions for the IEEE-RTS obtained using two different load 
                   curtailment policies implemented in a PBR framework. 
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Figure 7.6 shows that by changing the load curtailment philosophy from the 
priority order policy to the pass-1 policy, the utility can expect to receive considerably 
more reward payments based on the SAIFI distribution performance. Similarly, Figure 
7.7 indicates that there is also the potential to receive more reward payments based on 
the SAIDI distributions. 
 
 The results shown above are based on the utilization of the overall IEEE-RTS 
SAIFI and SAIDI distributions under the PBR protocol. In practical situations, the PBR 
mechanism could be applied to individual subsystems rather than the overall system as 
system topology can have a considerable impact on reliability performance. The 
reliability performance of individual subsystems may be quite different. The overall 
system reliability performance may seem reasonably good, but the performance for 
some areas (subsystems) in the system may be poor and undesirable. The following 
example demonstrates the application of the PBR mechanism to the two individual areas 
designated as Voltage Class 2 and Class 3 in the IEEE-RTS.  
 
Figures 7.8 and 7.9 respectively show the reliability performance index 
distributions of the areas designated by Voltage Class 2 and Class 3 in the IEEE-RTS. 
The system is assumed to be initially operated using the priority order policy before the 
PBR protocol is activated. The PBR structure is therefore based on the past performance 
utilizing the priority order policy for each subsystem. Figure 7.8 indicates that there is a 
significant improvement in the reliability performance of the Voltage Class 2 subsystem 
when the utility switches the system operating philosophy from the priority order policy 
to the pass-1 policy. The resulting ERP for both SAIFI and SAIDI improve significantly 
under the PBR mechanism after changing the load curtailment philosophy. It is 
important to note that the maximum reward/penalty payments used in this case are not 
the same as the designated amounts for the overall system. The maximum payment for 
the subsystem should be some proportion of the maximum payment for the overall 
system based on the annual energy consumption or revenue allowance for the individual 
subsystem. The proportion of the annual energy consumption for the Voltage Class 2 
subsystem is approximately 47% of the overall system energy consumption. 
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Consequently, if the maximum payment for the overall system is M$ 100, the maximum 
payment for the Voltage Class 2 subsystem is therefore M$ 47. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8: SAIFI and SAIDI distributions for the Voltage Class 2 subsystem in the  
        IEEE-RTS obtained using two different load curtailment policies  
                       implemented in a PBR framework. 
 
While there is a significant improvement in the reliability performance of the 
Voltage Class 2 subsystem and its resulting ERP, the reliability performance indices of 
the Voltage Class 3 subsystem as shown in Figure 7.9 deteriorate by changing the load 
curtailment philosophy from the priority order policy to the pass-1 policy. The reliability 
degradation for the Voltage Class 3 subsystem is, however, less significant than the 
major reliability improvement in the Voltage Class 2 subsystem. The resulting ERP for 
the Voltage Class 3 subsystem under the new operating policy is expected to be a 
penalty payment (negative value) for both SAIFI and SAIDI. These expected penalty 
payments due to the Voltage Class 3 subsystem are considerably less than the expected 
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reward payments in the Voltage Class 2 subsystem. The overall system performance 
shown in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 therefore yield positive values of ERP which imply 
expected utility rewards when combining the expected payments from both subsystems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.9: SAIFI and SAIDI distributions for the Voltage Class 3 subsystem in the  
       IEEE-RTS obtained using two different load curtailment policies  
                       implemented in a PBR framework. 
  
7.3  Discussion on PBR Applications for Bulk Electric Systems 
 
 The basic methodology in a PBR application to bulk electric systems is 
introduced in the previous section. This process will involve considerable details and 
negotiations between power utilities and regulators in actual situations and each situation 
could be quite unique. The general concepts described in the previous section are quite 
basic in each process. A power utility could negotiate an initial PBR which is easy for it 
to meet based on its operating situation. The utility could adjust its reliability 
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performance strategy based on its position in the PBR framework. It may want to spend 
less money on reliability if the operating point is less than the initial penalty point, and it 
may want to spend more on reliability if the operating point is a little larger than the 
reward commencement point [85]. A reliability assessment model is required in both 
cases to determine the impact of a reliability improvement and cost saving strategy. A 
detailed understanding of the probability distribution of the relevant reliability indices 
will help a power utility to effectively negotiate and manage the PBR.  
 
 It is important to note that considerable care is required to establish appropriate 
dead zone boundaries for both SAIFI and SAIDI. These boundaries should not unduly 
penalize a utility and should provide appropriate incentives for a utility to improve its 
reliability performance (both SAIFI and SAIDI). The imposed reward/penalty policies 
should therefore be carefully designed in order to encourage power utilities to maintain 
appropriate reliability levels. Possible PBR structure modifications can encourage 
utilities to move their reliability performances in the direction intended by the regulator. 
As noted in the previous section, the decision to use ± S.D./2 is arbitrary and the 
assigned dead zone width should be carefully considered by the regulator. The SAIDI 
reward payment for the IEEE-RTS cannot, however, reach the capped value (maximum 
payment) when utilizing half a standard deviation as the width of the reward transition 
zone, i.e. Figures 7.5, and 7.7 etc. This is due to that fact that the SAIDI distributions for 
bulk electric systems are considerably more dispersed than the SAIFI distributions as 
severe contingencies due to a single event can result in long outage durations. The 
regulator in this case could try to encourage the utility to improve outage durations 
(SAIDI) by adjusting the reward zone and making it more attractive for the utility to 
move in the required direction. The structure adjustments can be done in various ways. 
One possible approach for encouraging SAIDI improvement is illustrated in Figure 7.10.     
 
Figure 7.10 is similar to the basic PBR framework shown in Figure 7.2. The 
difference is only the width of the reward transition zone. The width is reduced from 
S.D./2 to S.D./4, and therefore the reward slope is increased (4/S.D.). This adjusted 
framework will provide more incentive for the utility (IEEE-RTS in this case) to 
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improve its SAIDI performance. The adjusted PBR framework for the SAIDI parameter 
may prove to be more efficient in regard to encouraging the power utility to improve its 
system than the framework shown in Figure 7.2. As previously noted, establishing a 
PBR process will involve considerable discussion and negotiations between the utilities 
and regulators in actual situations. The adjustment described above is only one of many 
possible ways to modify the PBR framework in a particular case. The possible 
adjustments are system dependent, and require agreement between the regulatory agency 
and the power utilities concerned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10: An adjusted PBR framework for SAIDI parameter. 
  
 It is worth noting that applying PBR to the reliability performance of a bulk 
electric system could be quite different than applying PBR to electric distribution 
systems. Distribution systems are basically monopoly companies, and have the 
responsibility to provide electric service within a designated area. This is not the case for 
bulk electric systems particularly in a deregulated electricity environment where 
conventional vertically integrated utilities are decomposed into separate commercial 
entities dealing with generation and transmission functions. The effect of unbundling 
these functions has, in some cases, made it difficult to assign specific responsibility for 
providing continuity of electric supply to the system customers. The question of 
responsibility is becoming increasingly important, as no commercial entity wants to 
assume responsibility or receive the blame for the actions of another. This therefore 
   0.5 
      1 
Payment 
(p.u.) 
SAIDI (hrs./yr.)
0 
Reward 
zone 
  Penalty 
zone 
4
S.D. 2
S.D.
2
S.D.
2
S.D.
  Dead zone 
  Mean value
a b c d
 144
creates a potential difficulty in directly assigning PBR frameworks for bulk electric 
systems. 
 
 If the bulk electric system (composite generation and transmission system) is 
owned by a single utility, i.e. a vertically integrated utility, the regulator can directly 
negotiate the PBR protocol with the utility who owns and operates all the generation and 
transmission facilities in the system. However, this is not likely the case in restructured 
electric utilities where separate generation and transmission companies own and operate 
their own facilities, and Independent System Operators (ISO) coordinate the activities of 
all these entities to ensure the reliability and security of the entire electric system. An 
ISO is theoretically a not-for-profit organization who does not participate in the 
electricity market trades nor own generation facilities for business. The ISO’s activities, 
however, significantly impact all the power companies as well as the overall system 
reliability performance due to the key role it plays. Consequently, if the ISO works and 
operates inefficiently, the overall system reliability performance could deteriorate. On 
the other hand, the ISO can improve the reliability performance of the overall system if 
it operates efficiently. As shown in the previous section, the overall bulk electric system 
reliability performance can be improved by adopting appropriate operating policies such 
as the load curtailment philosophy. It may therefore be possible to link the ISO to the 
PBR framework set by the regulator. This could be quite controversial if the basic PBR 
protocol is applied directly to the ISO as the ISO is a not-for-profit organization and 
does not own generation nor transmission facilities for business, and therefore the ISO 
should not be penalized and faced with financial risk. In order to encourage the ISO to 
work efficiently, the PBR mechanism could be applied by establishing a reward zone 
while leaving out a penalty zone in the PBR framework or setting a penalty zone at a 
very low penalty payment level. In such a framework, the ISO might be motivated by 
the regulator to work efficiently and receive a bonus (reward payment) based on system 
reliability performance improvement. This could encourage the ISO to coordinate more 
effectively with the generation and transmission companies in the system planning, 
operating and design phases in order to improve the current and future system reliability 
performance. The above discussion presents the possibility of potential PBR mechanism 
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application to the ISO function. This concept will, however, require considerable study 
before it can be applied in practice.  
 
 Another potential utilization of a PBR protocol in bulk electric system reliability 
performance is to apply it directly to transmission companies (Transcos) who own and 
operate the regional wires. A potential PBR application to encourage the reliability 
performance of a transmission company has been recently proposed [88]. Reference [88] 
demonstrates the five year historical reliability performance indices of three 
transmission companies. These reliability data show the variation in the reliability 
performance indices from year to year, and also the variation in the reliability 
performance indices from one transmission company to another. The bulk electric 
system reliability performance indices are monitored under the Grid Code in order to 
develop future performance reward/penalty mechanisms for the transmission companies 
(Transcos). The performance index probability distribution analysis described in this 
thesis could prove useful in such an application. The following example is focused on 
the reliability performance index probability distributions of a transmission company 
(Transco) in a PBR framework by application to the RBTS. 
 
Electric power systems are moving towards restructured electricity regimes by 
creating competition and commercialization of electric power supply among relevant 
participants under the transmission open access paradigm. This restructured environment 
results in an increased utilization of transmission networks which were not originally 
designed for competition and the extremely heavy utilization purposes. The trend to 
increased transmission network utilization continues to grow. In order to illustrate this, 
the original RBTS described in Section 3.6.1 has been modified in order to create a 
scenario where there is an increased utilization of the transmission network. The system 
modification is as follows: 
 
− Add 3×20MW generating units at Bus 1. 
− Add a transmission line between Buses 5 and 6 to support the single circuit at Bus 6. 
− The system peak load is increased by 20%. 
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This modified system is designated as the modified RBTS and used as the base 
case. Under this system condition, the total generation is 300 MW and the system peak 
demand is 215.14 MW (39.4% reserve margin). The utilization of lines # 1 and 6 (L1 
and L6) shown in Figure 3.2 is approximately 85% of the line rating under the modified 
system peak condition. Losing one of these parallel lines will create an overload on the 
remaining line during high load periods and could result in load curtailments. The 
system under this condition has an abundance of generation, but the system tends to 
have a transmission deficiency. The results obtained using the above modified condition 
are designated as the base case results.  
 
 It is assumed in this example that all the transmission facilities of the modified 
RBTS are owned by one transmission company (Transco), and all the generation 
facilities are owned by other utilities. Since the focus of this example is specifically on 
the transmission network, all the generating units are assumed to be 100% reliability 
which means that the loss of supply due to generation is excluded from the resulting 
reliability performance measures, and therefore only the impact of transmission 
contingencies is considered. Figures 7.11 and 7.12 respectively show the SAIFI and 
SAIDI distributions due to transmission contingencies in the modified RBTS 
implemented in a PBR framework. The PBR framework in this case follows the 
structure shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6
SAIFI (occ./yr.)
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
0.0
1.0
PB
R
 (p
.u
.)
Probability PBRMean = 0.38, S.D. = 0.37
ERP = + 0.2212 p.u.
 
Figure 7.11: SAIFI distribution due to transmission contingencies in the modified RBTS 
                     obtained using the pass-1 policy implemented in a PBR framework. 
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Figure 7.12: SAIDI distribution due to transmission contingencies in the modified RBTS 
                     obtained using the pass-1 policy implemented in a PBR framework. 
 
Figures 7.11 and 7.12 indicate that the transmission company expects to receive 
reward payments from the regulator based on both SAIFI and SAIDI performances 
under the base case condition. Figures 7.13 and 7.14 respectively show the SAIFI and 
SAIDI distributions implemented in the PBR mechanism when the peak load increases 
by 5%. Figures 7.13 and 7.14 show that when the system peak load is increased by 5%, 
the SAIFI and SAIDI distributions change considerably. The expected SAIFI and SAIDI 
approximately increase by a factor of two over the base case. The resulting ERP for both 
SAIFI and SAIDI switch from positive values to negative values. This implies that the 
transmission company under this circumstance should expect penalty payments for both 
SAIFI and SAIDI performances. As noted earlier, the modified RBTS is transmission 
deficit due to the significant utilization of lines # 1 and 6. The loss of either line on this 
parallel circuit will lead to an overload on the remaining line and load curtailment may 
be required. The transmission company in this case should pursue transmission 
reinforcement in order to support the future load growth. Without any transmission 
improvement, the transmission company should expect significant penalty payments in 
future operation under this PBR mechanism. 
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Figure 7.13: SAIFI distributions due to transmission contingencies for the two scenarios  
                     in the modified RBTS obtained using the pass-1 policy implemented in a 
                     PBR framework. 
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Figure 7.14: SAIDI distributions due to transmission contingencies for the two scenarios  
                     in the modified RBTS obtained using the pass-1 policy implemented in a 
                     PBR framework. 
 
7.4  Conclusions  
 
This chapter presents the potential utilization of bulk electric system reliability 
performance index probability distributions in a performance based regulation (PBR) 
mechanism. The concept of applying a PBR structure in a bulk electric system is 
discussed. The SAIFI and SAIDI for a bulk electric system are individually utilized in 
the PBR protocol. Reliability performance index probability distributions of bulk electric 
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systems tend to be more dispersed than those of electric distribution systems. The 
determined dead zone width in the PBR framework could therefore be quite different 
than that proposed for electric distribution systems. Both historical and simulated bulk 
electric system reliability performance indices are applied to hypothetical PBR 
frameworks in this chapter. The results show that power utilities may be able to adopt 
appropriate operating policies such as those related to load curtailment in order to 
improve system reliability performance and therefore receiving increased reward 
payments from the regulator. The potential utilization of a PBR protocol for overall bulk 
electric systems is presented and an example of the utilization of reliability performance 
index probability distributions in a PBR mechanism applied to a transmission company 
is demonstrated. The concept of using bulk electric system reliability performance index 
probability distributions in PBR applications as presented in this chapter could prove 
useful to power utilities in managing and controlling financial risk in the new 
restructured power industry.  
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CHAPTER 8   
BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEM WELL-BEING ANALYSIS  
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
Bulk electric system (BES) reliability assessment can be divided into two basic 
aspects designated as system adequacy and system security. Bulk electric system 
adequacy assessment is focused on the existence of sufficient facilities within the system 
to satisfy the consumer load demand within the basic system operational constraints. A 
BES includes the facilities necessary to generate sufficient energy and the associated 
transmission required to transport the energy to the actual bulk supply points 
(distribution delivery points). Adequacy assessment of BES has been generally 
conducted using probabilistic techniques [2, 13, 94, 95].  Security considerations in BES 
are generally considered by focusing on the operation of the system in different 
operating conditions designated as normal, alert, emergency and extreme emergency 
states [44, 96, 97] as shown in Figure 8.1. A BES security assessment normally utilizes 
the traditional deterministic criterion known as the N-1 security criterion [6, 7] in which 
the loss of any BES component (a contingency) will not result in system failure. In this 
approach, a system is able to withstand disturbances, i.e. due to BES equipment failures, 
without violating any system constraints when the system is initially operating in its 
normal state. There are two types of security analysis: transient (dynamic) and steady-
state (static). Transient stability assessment consists of determining if the system 
oscillations following an outage or a fault will cause loss of synchronism between 
generators. The objective of static security analysis as focused in this chapter is to 
determine whether, following the occurrence of a contingency, there exists a new 
steady-state secure operating point where the perturbed power system will settle after the 
dynamic oscillations have damped out.  
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Figure 8.1: System operating states (security considerations). 
 
Figure 8.1 shows that the overall power system can be divided into several states 
in terms of the degree to which the adequacy and security constraints are satisfied. The 
state definitions of these operating states are as follows [97].  
 
The normal state is defined as “In the normal state, all equipment and operation 
constraints are within limits, including that the generation is adequate to supply the load 
(total demand), with no equipment overloaded. In the normal state, there is sufficient 
margin such that the loss of any elements, specified by some criteria, will not result in a 
limit being violated. The particular criteria, such as all single elements, will depend on 
the planning and operating philosophy of a particular utility”. From the definition it is 
clear that the system is both adequate and secure in the normal state. 
 
The alert state is defined as “If a system enters a condition where the loss of 
some element covered by the operating criteria will result in a current or voltage 
violation, then the system is in the alert state. The alert state is similar to the normal 
state in that all constraints are satisfied, but there is no longer sufficient margin to 
withstand an outage (disturbance). The system can enter the alert state by the outage of 
equipment, by a change in generation schedule, or a growth in the system load”. In the 
alert state, the system is therefore adequate, but not secure. 
 
The emergency state is defined as “If a contingency occurs or the generation and 
load changes before corrective action can be (or is) taken, the system will enter the 
Normal
Restorative Alert
Extreme  
Emergency Emergency
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emergency state. No load is curtailed in the emergency state, but equipment or operating 
constraints have been violated. If control measures are not taken in time to restore the 
system to the alert state, the system will transfer from the emergency state to the extreme 
emergency state”. In this state both adequacy and security constraints are violated. This 
is a temporary state which requires operator action because equipment operating 
constraints have been violated. The first objective will be to remove the equipment 
operating constraints without load curtailment, by such means as redispatch or startup of 
additional generation, voltage sources adjustment, etc. If successful, this could bring the 
system back to the alert state, where further actions would still be necessary to achieve 
the normal state.  
 
The extreme emergency state is defined as “In the extreme emergency state, the 
equipment and operating constraints are violated and load is not supplied”. In this state, 
load has to be curtailed in a specific manner in order to return from this state to another 
state.    
 
The restorative state is defined as “To transfer out of the extreme emergency 
state, the system must enter the restorative state to reconnect load and resynchronize the 
network. The loop can then be close by either entering the alert state or the normal 
state”.  
 
The system can be returned to the normal state from the alert state by taking 
preventive action. Restoration from the emergency state to the alert state can be 
achieved by taking corrective action. The system can be returned to the restorative state 
from the extreme emergency state by means of emergency action. The system can return 
to the alert state or to the normal state from the restorative state by taking the restorative 
action. 
 
The inclusion of the security considerations described above in an adequacy 
evaluation can overcome some of the difficulties associated with the more traditional 
methods. This chapter extends the concept of the BES adequacy assessment described in 
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Chapter 3 by incorporating steady-state security considerations. This extended adequacy 
assessment is designated as “security constrained adequacy analysis”. This analysis is 
directly linked to the operation of a power system by the classification into different 
operating states that are dependent on the degree of adequacy and security. The system 
well-being approach [9, 10] is therefore based on security constrained adequacy 
evaluation and provides the ability to incorporate the deterministic criteria used in static 
security assessment into the probabilistic framework utilized in conventional adequacy 
evaluation. 
 
8.2  System Well-Being Analysis Concepts 
 
Most electric power utilities use deterministic techniques such as the traditional 
N-1 security criterion to assess system reliability in transmission system planning. These 
deterministic techniques do not provide an assessment of the actual system reliability as 
they do not incorporate the probabilistic or stochastic nature of the system behavior and 
component failures. These approaches, therefore, are not consistent [98] and do not 
provide an accurate basis for comparing alternative equipment configurations and 
performing economic analyses. In contrast, probabilistic methods can respond to the 
significant factors that affect the reliability of a system. These techniques provide 
quantitative indices, which can be used to decide if the system performance is acceptable 
or if changes need to be made. Most of the published papers on reliability assessment of 
bulk electric systems are based on probabilistic approaches [2, 13, 94, 95]. There is, 
however, considerable reluctance to use probabilistic techniques in many areas due to 
the difficulty in interpreting the resulting numerical indices. Although deterministic 
criteria do not consider the stochastic behavior of system components, they are easier for 
regulators, managers, system planners and operators to appreciate than numerical risk 
indices determined using probabilistic techniques. This difficulty can be alleviated by 
incorporating the accepted deterministic criteria in a probabilistic framework to assess 
the well-being of the BES. The concept of quantifying the different operating states of a 
power system described in [96, 97] was introduced in [44] using an analytical approach. 
This was extended in [99] using a Monte Carlo state sampling technique. The concepts 
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were further extended to large system analysis in [100] based on a non-sequential Monte 
Carlo simulation approach. The well-being structure shown in Figure 8.2 is a 
simplification of the operating state framework [44, 96, 97] previously presented in 
Figure 8.1 and was proposed in [9]. System well-being can be categorized into the three 
states of healthy, marginal and at risk as shown in Figure 8.2. In the healthy state, all 
equipment and operating constraints are within limits and there is sufficient margin to 
serve the total load demand even with the loss of any element, i.e. generator or 
transmission line. In the marginal state, the system is still operating within limits, but 
there is no longer sufficient margin to satisfy the acceptable deterministic criterion. In 
the at risk state, equipment or system constraints are violated and load may be curtailed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: System well-being framework. 
 
The system well-being concept shown in Figure 8.2 is a probabilistic framework 
incorporating the simplified operating states associated with the accepted deterministic 
N-1 security criterion [6, 7]. System well-being analysis, therefore, provides a combined 
framework that incorporates both the deterministic and probabilistic perspectives. It 
provides system engineers and risk managers with a quantitative interpretation of the 
degree of system security (N-1, healthy) and insecurity (marginal) in a bulk electric 
power system. Reliability indices calculated with the inclusion of appropriate 
deterministic criteria provide power system planners, designers, engineers and operators 
with additional system information. The degree of system well-being can be quantified 
in terms of the probabilities and frequencies of the healthy and marginal states in 
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addition to the traditional risk indices. This chapter is focused on system well-being 
analysis using sequential Monte Carlo simulation. The advantage when utilizing a 
sequential simulation technique, besides providing more accurate frequency and 
duration assessments, is the ability to create well-being index probability distributions. It 
is important to appreciate the inherent variability in the reliability indices and the 
likelihood of specific values being exceeded. This knowledge can be assessed from the 
probability distributions associated with the expected values.  
 
8.3  Overall Sequential Simulation Process for System Well-Being Analysis 
 
8.3.1  Basic Procedure of Bulk Electric System Reliability Evaluation 
 
The procedure for well-being analysis of a composite power system is similar to 
the basic process used in bulk electric system reliability evaluation described in Section 
3.5 and is briefly illustrated as follows:  
 
Step 1: Specify the initial state of each component. Normally, it is assumed that all 
components are initially in the normal state (up state). 
 
Step 2: Simulate the duration of each component residing in its present state using the 
inverse transform method and the distribution functions of the component 
failure and repair rates.  
 
Step 3: Repeat step 2 in a given time span, normally a year. A chronological transition 
process (up and down state) for each component is then constructed in a given 
time span. Chronological hourly load models for individual delivery points are 
constructed and incorporated in the analysis. 
 
Step 4: The simulated operation (fast decoupled AC load flow analysis) is assessed for 
each hour during a given time span. If operating constraints occur, corrective 
actions are required to alleviate the constraints and load curtailed if necessary. 
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Step 5: At the end of each simulated year, the delivery point and system adequacy 
indices are calculated and updated. Steps 2-4 are repeated until the coefficient 
of variation is less than the specified tolerance error. 
 
8.3.2  System Well-Being Analysis Considerations 
 
The procedure described in the previous section is basically the overall process 
for bulk electric system reliability evaluation using sequential simulation. The well-
being analysis process can be implemented and extended as a sub-procedure in Step 4. 
The following procedures are an extension of Step 4 to include system well-being 
considerations.  
 
Step 4.a: In each simulation hour, the simulation results can be categorized in the 
following three categories: 
         Category: 1. There is no system contingency, go to Step 4.b.  
         Category: 2. There exists system contingency(s) but no load curtailed, go to 
                              Step 4.c. 
Category: 3. There exists system contingency(s) and load curtailed. If the 
system is in this category (Category 3), this implies that the system is in a 
risk state. The risk indices are update and then directly proceed to the next 
simulated hour. 
 
Step 4.b: If there is no system contingency, the critical generating unit such as a largest 
unit is assumed to be out of service. The system is then assessed whether 
there is a generation constraint at that simulated hour or not. If there exists a 
generation constraint, update the marginal indices since this simulated hour 
does not meet the N-1 criterion. Otherwise, update the healthy indices and 
then proceed to the next simulated hour. If the system tends to be a 
transmission deficient system, the most critical transmission facility should 
be also considered in a similar process as described above for a generation 
constraint. (If the system contains single circuit delivery points, i.e. radial 
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load buses, these delivery points should be excluded in the system well-being 
analysis as single circuit delivery points are normally categorized as “N-1 
acceptable” in an actual system. Components, i.e. radial lines, connected to 
these delivery points should therefore not be included in the contingency 
selection process of system well-being analysis when determining the 
marginal and healthy states. The at risk state indices for these delivery points 
can, however, still be quantified under Category 3 in Step 4.a.) 
 
Step 4.c: If there is a system contingency(s) but no load curtailment, contingency 
selection is investigated and a contingency list is built (contingency selection 
is addressed in the next section.). Components in the contingency list are 
tested one at the time. If any selected component leads to system violations, 
corrective actions are required to alleviate the constraints and load is 
curtailed if necessary. If load is curtailed, update the marginal indices and 
then skip the rest of components in the contingency list and proceed to the 
next simulated hour. If all the components in the contingency list do not 
cause any load curtailment, update the healthy state and proceed to the next 
simulated hour. 
 
8.3.3  Contingency Selection 
 
The deterministic N-1 criterion is utilized for security assessment in the well-
being framework analysis. The purpose of a contingency selection process is to reduce 
and limit the set of outaged components (contingencies) to be considered. This 
dramatically speeds up the simulation process of security assessment. For generation 
facilities, the largest generating units at different locations in the system are considered, 
i.e. at two or more different generator buses. For transmission facilities, the process for 
transmission contingency selection is as follows: 
 
Step 1: Transmission contingency ranking is used to evaluate a scalar performance 
index (PI) that measures how much a particular component outage might affect 
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the system [42]. The PI can be measured in terms of line flows or bus voltage 
changes or a combination of both. This step (transmission contingency 
ranking) is calculated only once before starting the simulation process and the 
ranking results are stored for the future use. 
 
Step 2: In each simulation hour, when there is transmission contingency(s) but no load 
curtailment (Step 4.c), the concept of a bounding technique [42, 101] is used in 
order to select the critical components to add to the contingency list. The basic 
concept of a bounded network is that a transmission outage tends to have a 
localized effect. The loss of a next transmission facility (N-1) which is located 
far away from the original outaged transmission facility tends to have less 
effect than the loss of one that is close to the original outage. Only transmission 
facilities that are closest to the original outaged one are added into a 
contingency list. An example of the bounded network technique is illustrated in 
Figure 8.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Bounded network. 
 
In Figure 8.3, if a line outage occurs between buses m and n. Lines # 1, 2, 3 
and 4 are added into the contingency list. Lines # 5, 6, 7 and 8 which are two 
lines away from the original outaged line are not considered. After that, 
transmission lines that are in a contingency list (lines # 1-4) will be ranked 
using the performance index (PI) obtained from Step 1. The reason in ranking 
these selected lines is that the computational time can be reduced when the top 
ranked components in the list tend to cause system problems more than the 
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2
3
4
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bottom ranked components in the list. The mis-ranking of PI will not affect the 
result accuracy, but will only relatively affect the computation time of the 
simulation. 
Step 3: The next step is to add the most critical transmission line based on the 
performance index (PI) into the list (if this critical component is not yet 
included in Step 2). Finally, the generation contingencies (the largest 
generating units at different locations selected prior) are added to the list to 
obtain the complete contingency selection list for a particular simulation hour.  
 
8.4  Simulation Results 
 
 This section demonstrates system well-being results based on the reinforced 
RBTS and the original IEEE-RTS case studies. The load shedding philosophy used in 
system well-being analysis is the pass-2 policy described in Section 3.4.5, as its 
philosophy has an impact on delivery points in proximities of elements on outage, which 
are random in nature. The pass-2 policy is, therefore, to share well-being and risk among 
all the delivery points within the system rather than heavily curtailing loads at one 
particular bus while leaving some buses relatively untouched. This load curtailment 
policy is used throughout the research related to system well-being studies. The well-
being indices are the probabilities, frequencies and durations of the healthy, marginal 
and risk states, and are as follows:  
 
Prob{H} = Probability of the healthy state (/year) 
Prob{M} = Probability of the marginal state (/year) 
Prob{R} = Probability of the at risk state (/year) 
Freq{H} = Frequency of the healthy state (occurrences/year) 
Freq{M} = Frequency of the marginal state (occurrences/year) 
 Freq{R} = Frequency of the at risk state (occurrences/year) 
 Dur{H} = Average residence duration in the healthy state (hours/occurrence) 
 Dur{M} = Average residence duration in the marginal state (hours/occurrence) 
 Dur{R} = Average residence duration in the at risk state (hours/occurrence) 
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 The residence duration of each state can be roughly calculated using the ratio of 
the state probability to the state frequency based on the overall simulation years. The 
accurate residence duration, however, should be calculated by considering it on an 
individual simulation year basis. The average residence duration of each state shown in 
this chapter is based on the individual simulation year approach. 
 
8.4.1  Case Studies on the Reinforced RBTS 
 
 In this section, the original RBTS described in Section 3.6.1 has been reinforced 
by adding a transmission line (Line # 10) between Bus 5 and Bus 6 in order to support 
the original single circuit delivery point at Bus 6. The reinforced RBTS is designated as 
the R-RBTS and is shown in Figure 8.4.  
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Figure 8.4: A single line diagram of the reinforced RBTS (R-RBTS). 
  
 System well-being results obtained using the R-RBTS shown in this section are 
based on two study scenarios. The first scenario is designated as the base case and 
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presents the results obtained using the reinforced RBTS configuration and the conditions 
described in Section 3.6.1. In the second scenario, the reinforced RBTS described in 
Section 3.6.1 is modified to simulate a future system condition in which 2×20MW 
generating units are added to Bus 1 and the load growth is 13%.  A simulation period of 
4,000 years was used in these studies instead of 8,000 years utilized in earlier chapters. 
The reason for this is that system well-being analysis using sequential simulation 
requires considerably more computation effort. The simulation year used in the system 
well-being analysis is therefore reduced to a half of the number of the simulation years 
used in earlier chapters. The coefficient of variation of the expected energy not supplied 
(EENS) based on 4,000 simulated years is less than 2.5%. The computation time used in 
this case for the R-RBTS is approximately 27 minutes. 
 
A.  System Base Case 
 
 Table 8.1 presents the base case well-being indices for the delivery points and for 
the overall R-RBTS. It is important to note that the delivery point indices are directly 
affected by the load curtailment philosophy used in the analysis. This effect is however 
relatively minor for the overall system indices [102]. The contingency selection process 
also directly affects the delivery point well-being indices. The main focus in system 
well-being analysis is on the security of the system as a whole rather than on individual 
delivery points as violations of a delivery point are considered to be a system security 
operation problem. The delivery point well-being indices, however, provide 
supplementary information to the overall system well-being indices.     
 
The Prob{R} and Freq(R} respectively shown in Table 8.1 are identical to the 
Probability of Load Curtailment (PLC) and Expected Frequency of Load Curtailment 
(EFLC) used in conventional bulk electric system reliability evaluation [2, 13]. The 
system reliability in the base case shown in Table 8.1 is relatively high (low system risk, 
Prob{R}=0.000434). The degree of system well-being can be appreciated using 
Prob{H}. In this scenario, the degree of system well-being is relatively high 
(Prob{H}=0.931260). This indicates that the probability of the system residing in a state 
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in which the loss of any single component following random system contingencies will 
not result in a load curtailment condition is 93.1%. Freq{H} indicates that there are 
91.59 times on average when the system leaves the healthy state and Dur{H} indicates 
that the system resides in the healthy state for 92.01 hours on average before departure 
to another state. 
 
Table 8.1: Delivery point and overall system well-being indices for the R-RBTS (base 
                    case). 
Delivery Point Indices Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5 Bus 6 
Overall 
System 
Prob{H} 0.999031 0.968715 0.938950 0.936986 0.995899 0.931260
Prob{M} 0.000909 0.030924 0.060758 0.063006 0.004097 0.068307
Prob{R} 0.000060 0.000361 0.000293 0.000008 0.000003 0.000434
Freq{H} 3.95 63.27 89.17 89.81 5.33 91.59
Freq{M} 3.98 63.77 89.65 89.83 5.34 92.37
Freq{R} 0.15 0.71 0.53 0.02 0.01 0.83
Dur{H} 3383.58 140.47 95.61 94.63 2160.93 92.01
Dur{M} 1.91 4.23 5.90 6.11 6.84 6.44
Dur{R} 3.20 4.31 4.57 3.09 3.57 4.37
 
 
B.  System Future Case 
 
 In this scenario, the R-RBTS environment described in Section 3.6.1 in Chapter 
3 has been modified to consider a situation in which 2×20MW generating units are 
added to Bus 1 and the load has grown by 13%. This scenario creates an increased 
utilization of the existing transmission network, which is a common situation under the 
transmission open access paradigm. Table 8.2 shows the future case well-being indices 
for the delivery points and for the overall R-RBTS. 
 
 Table 8.2 shows the system well-being indices for the future case where the 
system conditions have created increased transmission utilization compared to the base 
case. The R-RBTS shown in Figure 8.4 has a generation center located in the northern 
part of the system while the most of the system loads are located in the southern area. 
There are, therefore, significant power transfers from the north to the south through the 
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two double circuits (Lines # 1 and 6, and Lines # 2 and 7). The transmission utilization 
on Lines # 1 and 6 in this scenario is approximately 80% of the line ratings while that of 
Lines # 2 and 7 experiences approximately 50% of the line ratings during the system 
peak demand. The power flow on Lines # 2 and 7 is less than those on Lines # 1 and 6 as 
they are long transmission circuits with relatively high impedances. The loss of any one 
transmission line in the critical path (Lines # 1 and 6) during a high demand period 
could result in an overload on the remaining line. 
 
Table 8.2: Delivery point and overall system well-being indices for the R-RBTS (future  
                   case). 
Delivery Point Indices Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5 Bus 6 
Overall 
System 
Prob{H} 0.999815 0.914914 0.908233 0.900544 0.995425 0.882243
Prob{M} 0.000178 0.084730 0.091696 0.099427 0.004572 0.117378
Prob{R} 0.000007 0.000356 0.000071 0.000028 0.000002 0.000380
Freq{H} 1.06 137.79 152.32 156.37 7.31 146.18
Freq{M} 1.07 137.67 152.42 156.42 7.31 147.09
Freq{R} 0.02 1.02 0.17 0.08 0.01 1.08
Dur{H} 6182.71 59.84 53.73 51.90 1541.53 54.29
Dur{M} 1.36 5.38 5.26 5.56 5.60 6.98
Dur{R} 2.61 3.06 3.44 3.11 3.80 3.07
 
 
 Table 8.2 indicates that even though the system risk under the future scenario 
(Prob{R} = 0.000380) is lower than that of the base case shown in Table 1 (Prob{R} = 
0.000434), the Prob{M} for the future scenario is considerably higher, which indicates 
the potential of the system moving from the marginal state to the at risk state in the near 
future. The Prob{H} is, therefore, relatively low under the future system condition. The 
acceptable healthy state probability level is dependent on the management philosophy, 
which can vary from one system to another. The results shown in Table 8.2 illustrate an 
example of a system with a future scenario in which the system reliability is maintained 
(even lower risk compared to the base case), but with an increased system stress level 
(high marginal probability) as more of the contingencies that resided in the healthy state 
for the base case move to the marginal state for the future scenario. A knowledge of 
contingency movements, particularly when they move from healthy to marginal, is very 
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important and are not identified using traditional probabilistic reliability assessment (risk 
indices) until they actually move into the at-risk region when they suddenly have a 
severe effect. The outcome is not easily identified if only at-risk states are considered 
since the at-risk probabilities do not change to any significant degree [10]. The well-
being approach, therefore, attempts to bridge the gap between the deterministic and 
probabilistic approaches by addressing the need to determine the likelihood of 
encountering marginal system states as well as that of encountering system at-risk states. 
The system well-being concept provides a comprehensive knowledge of specific system 
conditions, and additional information on what the degree of the system vulnerability 
might be under a particular system condition.  
 
C.  System Well-Being Index Probability Distributions 
 
 The results shown in the previous sections are based on the average or expected 
values of the well-being indices. One advantage when utilizing sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation in system well-being analysis is the ability to provide system well-being 
index probability distributions associated with their expected values. The system well-
being index probability distributions, which provide a pictorial representation of the 
annual variability of the indices, are illustrated in this section. The overall system well-
being indices obtained using the two scenarios presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 are 
graphically presented in Figure 8.5 accompanied by the expected or average (avg.) 
values and the standard deviations (S.D.). Reliability index probability distributions are 
normally created as frequency histograms using discrete intervals (bins). The probability 
distributions shown in this chapter are, however, presented using approximate 
continuous distributions for illustration purposes rather than histograms. The use of 
smooth curves in representing the probability distributions facilitates comparisons of the 
various scenario results on the same axis. 
 
 Figure 8.5 shows that the distributions of the healthy and marginal state indices 
(probability, frequency and duration) tend to have normal distribution characteristics for 
both the base case and future scenarios. The distributions of the at risk indices, however, 
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have exponential trends due to the fact that the system reliability under these two 
scenarios is relatively high (low system risk). Figure 8.5 also shows that the well-being 
index probability distributions (probability and frequency) of the less healthy system 
condition (future scenario) have more dispersion and therefore more uncertainty with 
lower predicted probability of occurrence compared to those of the base case. The 
probability distribution of the residence duration in the healthy state for the less healthy 
system (future scenario) is, however, less dispersed with shorter residence times than 
that for the base case. Operating a system in such an environment (less healthy) will, 
therefore, make it more difficult for system engineers to manage the potential system 
risk with a high degree of confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Probabilities of healthy, marginal and at risk states 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequencies of healthy, marginal and at risk states 
 
 
 
 
 
Residence durations in healthy, marginal and at risk states 
 
Figure 8.5: System well-being index probability distributions of the R-RBTS for the 
                       base case and future scenarios. 
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8.4.2  Case Studies on the IEEE-RTS 
 
In this section, the original IEEE-RTS described in Section 3.6.2 is used in the 
system well-being studies. System well-being results obtained using the IEEE-RTS 
shown in this section are also based on two study scenarios. The first scenario is 
designated as the base case and presents the results obtained using the original IEEE-
RTS described in Section 3.6.2. In the second scenario, the original IEEE-RTS described 
in Section 3.6.2 is modified to simulate a future system condition with a 4% load growth 
compared to the original peak load condition.  A simulation period of 3,000 years was 
used in these studies instead of 6,000 years utilized for the IEEE-RTS in earlier chapters 
due to the considerable computation expensive associated with well-being analysis. The 
coefficient of variation of the expected energy not supplied (EENS) based on 3,000 
simulated years is less than 2.5%. The computation time used in this case for the IEEE-
RTS is approximately 1315 minutes. Tables 8.3 – 8.5 respectively show the delivery 
point and overall system well-being probabilities, frequencies and residence durations of 
the two scenarios for the IEEE-RTS. 
 
Table 8.3: Delivery point and system well-being probabilities for the IEEE-RTS. 
Base Case (1.00 p.u. load) Future Case (1.04 p.u. load) Delivery 
Point Prob{H} (/yr) 
Prob{M} 
(/yr) 
Prob{R} 
(/yr) 
Prob{H} 
(/yr) 
Prob{M} 
(/yr) 
Prob{R} 
(/yr) 
1 0.99872 0.00118 0.00011 0.99827 0.00146 0.00027 
2 0.99762 0.00215 0.00023 0.99596 0.00345 0.00060 
3 0.99636 0.00343 0.00021 0.99447 0.00499 0.00054 
4 0.99622 0.00356 0.00022 0.99446 0.00501 0.00053 
5 0.99568 0.00403 0.00029 0.99305 0.00625 0.00069 
6 0.99483 0.00482 0.00035 0.99187 0.00731 0.00082 
7 0.99431 0.00546 0.00023 0.99299 0.00651 0.00050 
8 0.99656 0.00308 0.00035 0.99439 0.00487 0.00074 
9 0.99743 0.00246 0.00011 0.99693 0.00280 0.00026 
10 0.99634 0.00345 0.00020 0.99485 0.00465 0.00050 
13 0.99294 0.00613 0.00093 0.98965 0.00849 0.00186 
14 0.99882 0.00113 0.00004 0.99867 0.00123 0.00010 
15 0.99700 0.00263 0.00037 0.99495 0.00423 0.00083 
16 0.99515 0.00425 0.00061 0.99208 0.00663 0.00130 
18 0.95423 0.04274 0.00303 0.92805 0.06633 0.00562 
19 0.99529 0.00417 0.00055 0.99307 0.00575 0.00118 
20 0.99838 0.00141 0.00021 0.99757 0.00181 0.00062 
System 0.94784 0.04804 0.00412 0.91970 0.07212 0.00818 
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Table 8.3 shows that some of the Prob{H} in the base case transfers to Prob{M} 
or even Prob{R}, and some of the Prob{M} in the base case transfers to the Prob{R} 
when the peak load increases by 4% in the future scenario. Table 8.3 indicates that most 
of the delivery points in the base case are very healthy as the Prob{H}of all the delivery 
points with the exception of DP18 are considerably higher than 0.99. The Prob{H} of 
DP18 is, however, only 0.95423 which drives the Prob{H} of the overall system to 
0.94784. As noted earlier, DP18 is attached to many elements including a 400 MW 
generating unit at the bus and another 400 MW generating unit at a neighboring bus. 
There are also no other load buses in close proximity of DP18. System constraints that 
occur in this area and result in load curtailments will therefore create interruptions at this 
load bus. The basic focus in system well-being analysis is on the security of the system 
as a whole rather than on individual delivery points, as violations of a delivery point are 
considered to be a system security operating problem. The delivery point well-being 
indices, in this case, provide supplementary information to the overall system well-being 
indices under a particular operating strategy and the location of critical components. It is 
interesting to note that although the Prob{R} for the R-RBTS base case shown in Table 
8.1 is approximately 10 times smaller (higher reliability) than that of the IEEE-RTS base 
case shown in Table 8.3, the Prob{M} of the R-RBTS base case is larger than that of the 
IEEE-RTS base case. This implies that the R-RBTS base case has a higher degree of 
system stress (marginal state) compared to the IEEE-RTS base case even though it has a 
lower degree of system risk. 
 
 Table 8.4 shows the well-being frequencies for the IEEE-RTS under the two 
scenarios. The results indicate that when the peak load increases by 4% (future case), 
there are considerably more movements from one state to another than occur under the 
base case condition. Table 8.5 shows the well-being residence durations for the IEEE-
RTS with the two scenarios. The results indicate that when the peak load increases by 
4% (future case), the system resides in the healthy state for shorter periods while 
spending more time in the marginal and risk states.   
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Table 8.4: Delivery point and system well-being frequencies for the IEEE-RTS. 
Base Case (1.00 p.u. load) Future Case (1.04 p.u. load) Delivery 
Point Freq{H} (occ/yr) 
Freq{M} 
(occ/yr) 
Freq{R} 
(occ/yr) 
Freq{H} 
(occ/yr) 
Freq{M} 
(occ/yr) 
Freq{R} 
(occ/yr) 
1 4.02 3.90 0.29 5.99 5.70 0.73 
2 7.42 7.23 0.62 13.83 13.53 1.63 
3 7.13 7.02 0.61 12.77 12.63 1.37 
4 7.38 7.27 0.60 13.02 12.83 1.36 
5 9.24 9.16 0.80 15.55 15.53 1.69 
6 10.89 10.84 0.95 17.40 17.47 1.93 
7 13.70 13.81 0.62 16.34 16.59 1.15 
8 8.29 8.32 0.86 11.22 11.43 1.64 
9 4.66 4.47 0.29 6.22 5.95 0.68 
10 8.17 8.15 0.53 13.31 13.02 1.32 
13 14.48 15.00 2.03 20.77 21.37 4.27 
14 2.01 2.05 0.11 2.51 2.53 0.27 
15 7.52 7.57 0.94 12.05 11.99 1.99 
16 11.27 11.48 1.51 17.08 17.33 3.01 
18 90.27 92.97 6.37 120.07 125.32 10.10 
19 9.24 9.57 1.33 13.54 13.70 2.76 
20 4.75 4.73 0.75 6.90 6.54 1.49 
System 89.67 93.99 9.24 120.18 129.03 15.99 
 
 
Table 8.5: Delivery point and system well-being residence durations for the IEEE-RTS. 
Base Case (1.00 p.u. load) Future Case (1.04 p.u. load) Delivery 
Point Dur{H} (hrs/occ) 
Dur{M} 
(hrs/occ)
Dur{R} 
(hrs/occ) 
Dur{H} 
(hrs/occ)
Dur{M} 
(hrs/occ) 
Dur{R} 
(hrs/occ) 
1 3897.19 2.34 3.00 2846.30 2.06 3.01 
2 2230.01 2.60 3.00 988.58 2.22 2.96 
3 2217.30 3.53 2.97 1046.57 3.06 3.28 
4 1973.66 3.87 2.98 999.74 3.19 3.12 
5 1544.26 3.50 3.03 780.78 3.34 3.43 
6 1266.43 3.73 3.03 688.75 3.55 3.44 
7 1043.63 3.44 3.01 803.94 3.40 3.60 
8 1671.97 3.27 3.49 1190.86 3.75 3.73 
9 3112.65 4.17 3.16 2323.99 3.60 3.07 
10 1721.78 3.74 3.09 929.64 3.10 3.07 
13 871.73 3.61 3.74 534.60 3.48 3.55 
14 4931.50 4.99 2.82 4539.09 4.36 2.71 
15 1918.60 3.00 3.19 1081.18 3.05 3.45 
16 1170.54 3.25 3.31 669.70 3.34 3.54 
18 101.71 4.02 3.93 71.96 4.64 4.55 
19 1441.26 3.80 3.38 872.22 3.66 3.52 
20 3065.74 2.84 2.41 2122.98 2.48 3.52 
System 99.97 4.42 3.66 70.35 4.86 4.25 
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 The results shown in Tables 8.3 – 8.5 are the average or expected values of the 
well-being indices. The overall system well-being index probability distributions for the 
two scenarios are graphically presented in Figure 8.6 together with the expected or 
average (avg.) values and the standard deviations (S.D.). Figure 8.6 shows that the 
distributions of the healthy and marginal state indices (probability, frequency and 
duration) tend to have normal distribution characteristics for both the base case and 
future scenarios. The distributions of the at risk indices are, however, different from the 
general exponential forms shown in Figure 8.5 for the R-RBTS. The reason for this is 
that the IEEE-RTS is basically less reliability than the R-RBTS and the resulting 
distributions move further away from the ordinate axis. In general, the system well-
being index probability distribution characteristics for the healthy and marginal states  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Probabilities of healthy, marginal and at risk states 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequencies of healthy, marginal and at risk states 
 
 
 
 
 
Residence durations in healthy, marginal and at risk states 
 
Figure 8.6: System well-being index probability distributions of the IEEE-RTS for the  
                     base case and future scenarios. 
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shown in Figures 8.5 and 8.6 are quite similar in form. The distributions (probability and 
frequency) of the less healthy system condition (future scenario) have more dispersion 
and therefore more uncertainty with lower predicted probability of occurrence than those 
of the base case. The probability distribution of the residence duration in the healthy 
state for the less healthy system (future scenario) is, however, less dispersed with shorter 
residence times than that of the base case. 
 
8.5  Conclusions 
 
There is growing interest in combining deterministic considerations with 
probabilistic assessment in order to evaluate the “system well-being” of a composite 
generation and transmission system and to evaluate the likelihood, not only of entering a 
complete failure state, but also the likelihood of being very close to trouble. Bulk 
electric system well-being analysis using sequential Monte Carlo simulation is presented 
in this chapter. The overall simulation procedure incorporating system well-being 
considerations and the associated contingency selection process is described. The system 
well-being concept provides a probabilistic framework that incorporates a practical 
simplification of the traditional operating states associated with the accepted 
deterministic N-1 security criterion. Well-being analysis, therefore, provides a combined 
framework that incorporates both deterministic and probabilistic perspectives by 
determining the likelihood of encountering marginal system states as well as 
encountering system at risk states. One advantage when utilizing a sequential simulation 
technique, besides providing accurate frequency and duration assessments, is the ability 
to create well-being index probability distributions. The well-being concept is illustrated 
in this chapter by application to the reinforced RBTS and the IEEE-RTS. The analyses 
indicate that different system conditions that result in a similar degree of system risk 
may not necessarily have the same degree of system stress (marginal state). The system 
well-being concept provides system engineers and risk managers with comprehensive 
information on the degree of system vulnerability under a particular system scenario.  
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CHAPTER 9   
COMBINED BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
FRAMEWORK USING ADEQUACY AND STATIC 
SECURITY INDICES  
 
 
9.1  Introduction 
 
As previously noted in Chapter 1, bulk electric system (BES) reliability 
assessment can be divided into the two basic aspects of system adequacy and system 
security. The basic concepts and some results on bulk electric system adequacy 
assessment are presented in Chapters 3 – 6. The inclusion of static security aspects in 
traditional adequacy evaluation is presented in the previous chapter in the form of 
system well-being analysis that incorporates the deterministic N-1 security criterion. 
This analysis offers a quantitative interpretation of the degree of system security (N-1, 
healthy) and insecurity (marginal) in a bulk electric power system in terms of 
probabilities, frequencies and state residence durations. The degree of severity due to 
system failure is not determined by the basic probability and frequency indices obtained 
using system well-being analysis. In contrast, traditional system adequacy assessment 
does not include a quantitative evaluation of the degree of system security, but estimates 
the system severity in physical and monetary terms. A combined reliability framework 
considering both adequacy and static security perspectives is presented in this chapter. 
This is achieved using a combination of reliability indices obtained using both 
conventional adequacy assessment and system well-being analysis. 
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9.2  Selected Indices for the Overall BES Reliability Framework 
 
There is a wide range of bulk electric system reliability indices. Although all the 
reliability indices have their own purpose and usefulness, presenting them all in an 
overall framework involves a voluminous set, particularly when considering both 
adequacy and static security aspects. A compact or focused combined framework can be 
created by selecting distinctive reliability indices. The selected reliability indices should 
collectively provide an effective overall assessment of the system reliability. It is 
important to emphasize that bulk electric system reliability indices associated with the at 
risk state in system well-being analysis (static security assessment) are identical to the 
predictive reliability indices related to load curtailment in adequacy assessment. These 
relationships are as follows: 
 
• The probability of the at risk state is equivalent to the Probability of Load 
Curtailment (Prob{R} = PLC). 
• The frequency of the at risk state is equivalent to the Expected Frequency of 
Load Curtailment (Freq{R} = EFLC). 
 
In system well-being analysis, the probabilities and frequencies of healthy and 
marginal states are distinctive and provide additional information from a security 
perspective that complements the predictive indices obtained in an adequacy assessment. 
The probability and frequency of the at risk state are also adequacy indices as noted 
above. The probabilities and frequencies of the healthy, marginal and at risk states 
provide a security perspective in the overall framework. The notations of these indices 
are as follows: 
 
Prob{H} = Probability of the healthy state (/year) 
Prob{M} = Probability of the marginal state (/year) 
Prob{R} = Probability of the at risk state (/year) 
Freq{H} = Frequency of the healthy state (occurrences/year) 
Freq{M} = Frequency of the marginal state (occurrences/year) 
Freq{R} = Frequency of the at risk state (occurrences/year) 
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The security indices shown above indicate the system reliability in the form of 
probabilities and frequencies. The magnitude or severity associated with the system at 
risk state is not recognized. This information can be provided by conventional adequacy 
assessment indices such as the delivery point unavailability index (DPUI), the expected 
energy not supplied (EENS) and the expected customer interruption cost (ECOST). The 
DPUI is a severity index that can be used to compare systems of different sizes. The 
EENS estimates the supply unreliability in terms of energy curtailments and the ECOST 
indicates the expected customer monetary losses due to electric supply interruptions. 
These three reliability indices complement the security indices noted earlier. There is a 
direct relationship between the DPUI and the EENS, as the DPUI is the ratio of the 
EENS to the system peak load. The utilization of DPUI associated with the system peak 
load therefore includes an appreciation of the EENS. The DPUI can also be used to 
compare the system severity with that of other bulk electric systems. The reliability 
indices selected to estimate the severity of system failure based on an adequacy 
perspective are as follows:  
 
DPUI = Delivery point unreliability index (system·minutes)   
ECOST = Expected customer interruption cost (dollars/year) 
 
These two adequacy indices together with the six security indices described 
earlier provide a sufficient and effective overall framework that includes both adequacy 
and static security considerations. Prob{R}, Freq{R}, DPUI and ECOST are designated 
as adequacy indices and Prob{H}, Prob{M}, Freq{H} and Freq{M} are designated as 
security indices in the analyses presented in this chapter.     
 
The effectiveness of the proposed overall framework for bulk electric system 
reliability analysis considering both adequacy and static security are examined and 
illustrated by application to several practical case studies involving different systems and 
conditions. The case studies are presented in the following sections using two basic 
scenarios. The first scenario is focused on bulk electric systems with generation 
deficiencies. The second scenario is focused on bulk systems with transmission 
deficiencies. The reinforced RBTS and the IEEE-RTS are used as test systems. 
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9.3  Case Studies on Generation Deficient Systems 
 
 Generation deficient environments were created in both the reinforced RBTS and 
the original IEEE-RTS by increasing the load in each system. 
 
9.3.1  The Reinforced RBTS (R-RBTS) 
 
The R-RBTS is illustrated in Figure 8.4 in the previous chapter. In this system, a 
transmission line has been added between Bus 5 and Bus 6 in order to support the single 
circuit delivery point at Bus 6. This system, therefore, has a relatively strong 
transmission network. The total generation is 240 MW and the original system peak load 
is 179.28 MW. The combined system reliability indices considering both adequacy and 
security for the R-RBTS associated with different system peak demands are shown in 
Table 9.1. The results shown in Tables 9.1 are based on 4,000 simulation years and have 
a coefficient of variation of EENS that is less than 2.5%. The load shedding philosophy 
used throughout this chapter is the pass-2 policy. 
 
 
Table 9.1 shows that the system reliability indices gradually degrade as the 
system peak load progressively increases. When the system peak load is greater than 
197.21 MW, the generation is not able to meet the demand when the largest generating 
unit (40MW unit) is on outage. It is important to note that the system peak demand 
shown in Table 9.1 excludes transmission losses. The transmission loss in the R-RBTS 
is in the range of 3 – 4%. The total system demand (load + loss) for the 197.21 MW 
peak load is therefore slightly in excess of 200 MW. The DPUI increases significantly 
when the system load grows beyond this level. This observation is also applicable to the 
frequency indices such as Freq{H}, Freq{M} and Freq{R}. The Prob{H}, however, 
behaves in a somewhat different manner, as it gradually decreases as the load grows. 
The Prob{H} does not dramatically decrease under the condition when the N-1 security 
criterion (an outage of the largest generating unit) is violated (at the peak load). Security 
indices such as Prob{H} and Prob{M} are less sensitive than adequacy indices such as 
DPUI in a generation deficient environment. The utilization of Prob{H} as a single 
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security index does not provide a valid indicator of the overall system well-being and 
should be used in conjunction with the other indices. The results based on a combined 
reliability framework indicate that the adequacy indices tend to be more adversely 
affected in a generation deficient environment than the security indices. 
 
Table 9.1: Overall system reliability indices (adequacy and security) of the reinforced 
                 RBTS for various system peak demands.  
System peak load demand in MW System 
Indices 179.28 MW 
182.87 
MW 
186.45 
MW 
190.04 
MW 
193.62 
MW 
197.21  
MW 
200.79 
MW 
204.38 
MW 
Prob{H} (/yr) 0.93126 0.92369 0.91747 0.91261 0.90899 0.90579 0.89879 0.88592
Prob{M} (/yr) 0.06831 0.07574 0.08177 0.08637 0.08964 0.09239 0.09896 0.11103
Prob{R} (/yr) 0.00043 0.00057 0.00076 0.00102 0.00137 0.00182 0.00225 0.00305
Freq{H} (occ/yr) 91.59 93.89 98.69 101.43 104.98 108.74 145.55 195.54
Freq{M} (occ/yr) 92.37 94.96 100.27 103.54 107.73 111.90 149.49 202.54
Freq{R} (occ/yr) 0.83 1.15 1.68 2.24 2.91 3.37 4.23 7.44
DPUI (sys.mins) 15.61 21.25 28.80 38.75 51.91 69.12 88.92 116.32
ECOST (M$/yr) 0.195 0.263 0.358 0.484 0.651 0.872 1.120 1.454
 
 
9.3.2  The Original IEEE-RTS 
 
The original IEEE-RTS described in Section 3.6.2 is used in this study. The total 
generation is 3405 MW and the system peak load is 2754.75 MW. The original IEEE-
RTS has a very strong transmission network and a weak generation system. The 
combined system reliability indices considering both adequacy and security for the 
original IEEE-RTS with different system peak demands are shown in Table 9.2. The 
results are based on 3,000 simulation years and have a coefficient of variation of EENS 
that is less than 2.5%. The load shedding philosophy is based on the pass-2 policy. 
 
Table 9.2 shows that the overall system reliability indices degrade as the system 
peak load progressively increases. As discussed earlier, the system peak demand levels 
shown exclude transmission losses. The total system consumption in each case is 
therefore slightly higher than that shown in Table 9.2. In a similar manner to the results 
shown in Table 9.1, the adequacy indices of DPUI and ECOST increase dramatically at 
the high peak loads while the security indices of Prob{H} and Prob{M} gradually 
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deteriorate. Generation deficiencies have a significant adverse effect on the system 
adequacy indices as the severity of supply interruptions increase rapidly as the system 
peak load increases. Generation deficient environments, however, tend to have relatively 
less effect on the system security indices than on the system adequacy indices. Case 
studies on transmission deficient environments are examined in the following section. 
 
Table 9.2: Overall system reliability indices (adequacy and security) of the original 
                      IEEE-RTS for various system peak demands.  
System peak load demand in MW System 
Indices 2699.66 MW 
2754.75 
MW 
2809.85 
MW 
2864.94 
MW 
2920.04 
MW 
Prob{H} (/yr) 0.95888 0.94784 0.93406 0.91970 0.90381 
Prob{M} (/yr) 0.03831 0.04804 0.06002 0.07212 0.08522 
Prob{R} (/yr) 0.00280 0.00412 0.00592 0.00818 0.01097 
Freq{H} (occ/yr) 72.22 89.67 102.91 120.18 145.46 
Freq{M} (occ/yr) 75.88 93.99 109.10 129.03 156.30 
Freq{R} (occ/yr) 6.55 9.24 12.09 15.99 21.85 
DPUI (sys.mins) 66.23 98.39 144.17 207.24 290.97 
ECOST (M$/yr) 14.430 21.517 31.622 45.582 64.221 
 
 
9.4  Case Studies on Transmission Deficient Systems 
 
As previously noted, electric power systems are moving towards restructured 
regimes by creating competition and commercialization of power supply among the 
relevant participants under a transmission open access paradigm. This restructured 
environment results in an increased utilization of transmission networks which were not 
originally designed for competition and heavy utilization. The case studies presented in 
this section are focused on heavily utilized transmission conditions in order to examine 
these impacts on both the adequacy and security indices. The system reliability behavior 
in the transmission deficient cases is compared with that under the generation deficient 
environments described in the previous section. The R-RBTS and IEEE-RTS are 
modified to provide increased utilization of the system transmission facilities. 
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9.4.1  The Modified R-RBTS 
 
The reinforced RBTS (R-RBTS) used in the previous section and shown in 
Figure 8.4 in Chapter 8 has been modified as follows: 
 
− Add 3×20MW generating units at Bus 1. 
− Increase the system peak load by 20% (from 179.28 MW to 215.14 MW). 
 
This modified system is designated as the modified R-RBTS (MR-RBTS) in this 
chapter. In this system, the total generation is 300 MW and the system peak demand is 
215.14 MW (39.4% reserve margin). The utilization of Lines # 1 and 6 is approximately 
85% of the line rating for the system peak condition. Losing one of these parallel lines 
will create an overload on the remaining line during high load periods and may result in 
load curtailments. The system under this condition has an abundance of generation, but 
tends to be transmission deficient. 
 
The combined delivery point and system reliability indices considering both 
adequacy and security for the MR-RBTS are shown in Table 9.3. The load shedding 
philosophy used is the pass-2 policy, and the coefficient of variation of EENS is less 
than 2.5% for 4,000 simulation years. As previously noted, the delivery point indices are 
influenced by the load curtailment philosophy used and the contingency selection 
process employed. The main focus is on the security of the system as a whole rather than 
on the individual delivery points, as violations of a delivery point are considered to be a 
system security operating problem. The delivery point indices, however, provide 
supplementary information to the overall system well-being indices, and are useful when 
selecting system reinforcements for specific areas. 
 
Table 9.3 indicates that the system under this condition has an acceptable 
probability of the at risk state (Prob{R} = 0.00079) and an acceptable DPUI (19.97 
sys.mins). The Prob{M} is, however, quite high, which indicates the potential for the 
system to encounter the at risk state. The Prob{H} is relatively low under this system 
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condition. The acceptable healthy probability level for a given system is one component 
in its reliability criteria and can vary from one system to another. The results shown in 
Table 9.3 illustrate an example of a system that satisfies the adequacy criteria, but has 
considerable potential risk (high Prob{M}) for system security problems. This illustrates 
that security indices are adversely affected in a transmission deficient environment more 
than are the adequacy indices.  
 
Table 9.3: Overall delivery point and system reliability indices (adequacy and 
                           security) of the MR-RBTS. 
Bus 
No. 
Prob{H} 
(/yr) 
Prob{M} 
(/yr) 
Prob{R}
(/yr) 
Freq{H}
(occ/yr)
Freq{M}
(occ/yr)
Freq{R} 
(occ/yr) 
DPUI 
(sys.mins) 
ECOST 
(k$/yr) 
2 0.99975 0.00024 0.000005 1.69 1.73 0.02 -- 0.865 
3 0.89733 0.10190 0.000768 158.47 158.13 1.75 -- 160.912 
4 0.90336 0.09656 0.000069 211.21 211.34 0.19 -- 28.032 
5 0.88756 0.11236 0.000080 196.96 197.08 0.30 -- 11.632 
6 0.99535 0.00464 0.000004 8.98 8.98 0.01 -- 0.545 
Sys. 0.86200 0.13721 0.00079 172.01 173.36 1.80 19.97 201.986 
 
 
 Table 9.4 shows the Prob{H} and DPUI for the R-RBTS at the peak load of 
204.38 MW as presented in Table 9.1 and the MR-RBTS results previously illustrated in 
Table 9.3. The R-RBTS is in a generation deficient condition but its Prob{H} is higher 
than the Prob{H} of the MR-RBTS which is in a transmission deficient condition. The 
DPUI of the R-RBTS is, however, considerably higher than that of the MR-RBTS. This 
indicates that two systems with similar degrees of system security can have quite 
different levels of system adequacy. This situation can also occur in reverse, as two 
systems can have similar adequacy indices and quite different levels of security.   
 
Table 9.4: Comparisons of the Prob{H} and DPUI for the R-RBTS at the 204.38 MW 
                    peak load and for the MR-RBTS. 
System Prob{H}(/yr) 
DPUI 
(sys.mins)
R-RBTS 0.88592 116.32 
MR-RBTS 0.86200 19.97 
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9.4.2  The Modified IEEE-RTS 
 
The original IEEE-RTS described in Section 3.6.2 is modified as follows: 
 
− The load levels of all the delivery points are increased to 1.5 p.u. of the original 
values. The peak load for the modified system is 1.5×2,850 = 4,275 MW. (When 
considering the coincidence of the chronological loads at all the buses, the actual 
system peak load is 4,132.13 MW.) 
− The generation at the five following generator buses is doubled: Buses 16, 18, 
21, 22 and 23 (12 generating unit additions). The total number of generating 
units in the modified system is 32+12 = 44 units with a total system capacity of 
3,405+1,915 = 5,320 MW.    
− The line rating of Line # 10 (an underground cable between Buses 6 and 10) is 
increased to 1.5 p.u. of the original rating.  
− The capacities of the synchronous condenser at Bus 14 and the reactor at Bus 6 
are increased to 1.5 p.u. of the original capacities. 
 
There is significant transmission utilization in the modified IEEE-RTS as a 
considerable amount of power is transferred from the north to the southern system. Even 
though the overall system reserve margin is 24%, the southern part (138 kV) of the 
modified system has both generation and transmission deficiencies. Both the northern 
and southern areas have transmission constraints. The system under this condition is 
similar to many current systems in which electricity competition has resulted in 
increased numbers of independent power producers and heavy increases in transmission 
utilization. 
 
The overall delivery point and system reliability indices considering both 
adequacy and security are shown in Table 9.5. The load shedding philosophy used is the 
pass-2 policy similar to that used for previous cases, and the coefficient of variation of 
EENS is less than 5% with 3,000 simulation years. The delivery point indices shown in 
Table 9.5 provide supplementary information to the overall system indices, and are 
useful in system reinforcement planning. This issue is addressed later. 
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Table 9.5: Overall delivery point and system reliability indices (adequacy and 
                           security) for the modified IEEE-RTS. 
 
Bus 
No. 
Prob{H} 
(/yr) 
Prob{M} 
(/yr) 
Prob{R}
(/yr) 
Freq{H}
(occ/yr)
Freq{M}
(occ/yr)
Freq{R} 
(occ/yr) 
DPUI 
(sys.mins) 
ECOST 
(M$/yr)
1 0.98795 0.01198 0.00007 65.06 65.60 0.39 -- 0.020 
2 0.98890 0.01102 0.00008 55.73 53.59 0.35 -- 0.044 
3 0.96296 0.03670 0.00034 76.13 76.30 0.90 -- 0.859 
4 0.95635 0.04320 0.00044 113.12 113.26 1.07 -- 0.774 
5 0.93537 0.06436 0.00027 171.42 171.23 0.83 -- 0.428 
6 0.90084 0.09876 0.00040 206.12 206.02 1.14 -- 0.828 
7 0.98988 0.01002 0.00010 56.25 55.85 0.55 -- 0.041 
8 0.94524 0.05440 0.00036 151.16 150.88 0.99 -- 1.043 
9 0.97941 0.02019 0.00040 58.26 57.63 0.87 -- 0.621 
10 0.85015 0.14957 0.00028 246.61 246.72 0.81 -- 0.642 
13 0.99669 0.00317 0.00014 15.72 15.86 0.45 -- 0.414 
14 0.99640 0.00354 0.00006 16.69 16.60 0.19 -- 0.137 
15 0.99817 0.00177 0.00006 10.99 10.68 0.20 -- 0.155 
16 0.98895 0.01092 0.00013 63.20 60.04 0.49 -- 0.166 
18 0.98319 0.01596 0.00085 92.45 90.08 2.48 -- 2.593 
19 0.80146 0.19811 0.00043 205.77 205.98 1.43 -- 1.346 
20 0.84962 0.15017 0.00021 153.77 153.85 1.08 -- 0.793 
Sys. 0.69183 0.30656 0.00161 335.15 341.15 4.03 51.90 10.903 
 
 
The results show in Table 9.5 indicate that the modified IEEE-RTS has a very 
high marginal state probability (Prob{M}= 0.30656). The system under this condition is 
not healthy even though the system adequacy indices are reasonable. System security 
analysis provides the opportunity to appreciate future potential risks (marginal state) in 
situations in which the adequacy indices of a system appear acceptable. The combined 
reliability framework provides an overall appreciation of both system security and 
adequacy under a particular condition. Freq{H} indicates that the system under this 
condition is expected to depart from the healthy state 335.15 times in a year. The 
average system residence time in the healthy state before moving to the marginal or at 
risk states is 18.47 hours, which is less than one day. System operators may, therefore, 
have to be prepared to encounter an alert condition every day.  
 
As shown in Tables 9.3 and 9.5, the MR-RBTS and the modified IEEE-RTS 
under the specified conditions are vulnerable to violating the N-1 security criterion. 
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Transmission system reinforcements should therefore be considered and are illustrated 
in the following section. It is again important to note that generation deficiencies tend to 
have more significant impacts on system adequacy than on system security. In contrast, 
transmission deficiencies have more significant impacts on system security rather than 
on system adequacy. The overall system reliability can be examined by utilizing a 
combined framework analysis that incorporates both adequacy and security perspectives. 
 
9.5 Transmission System Reinforcements Incorporating Both Adequacy and Static  
       Security Considerations 
 
The fundamental task in transmission planning is to develop the system as 
economically as possible while maintaining an acceptable reliability level. The 
deterministic N-1 criterion has been widely accepted and used by system planners in 
transmission planning practice for many years. The deterministic N-1 criterion has two 
weaknesses. First, multiple component failure events are excluded from consideration. 
Second, only the outcomes of single component failure events are analyzed but their 
probabilities of occurrence are not considered. A failure event which is extremely 
undesirable, but has a low probability of occurrence cannot be ignored in the 
deterministic approach. Planning alternatives based on deterministic N-1 analysis will 
therefore lead to overinvestment [103]. System well-being analysis alleviates the two 
weaknesses noted above by incorporating the deterministic N-1 criterion in a 
probabilistic framework. In the system well-being framework, the marginal state is 
identified and classified using the deterministic N-1 criterion. The marginal state is, 
therefore, recognized as the N-1 insecure state. As noted above, the utilization of a 
deterministic approach in transmission planning can result in overinvestment. It is 
therefore of interest to translate or transform the N-1 insecure state (marginal) into a 
monetary form and use it as a security cost factor in the transmission planning process. 
This proposed security cost is designated as the expected potential insecurity cost 
(EPIC) and is obtained using the multiplication of the probability of the marginal state 
(Prob{M}) and the expected customer interruption cost (ECOST), as shown in Equation 
(9.1). 
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Expected Potential Insecurity Cost (EPIC)  =  Prob{M}×ECOST  (9.1)        
 
 The ECOST is the expected monetary impact on customers due to supply failures 
and is normally used in the adequacy assessment domain. The Prob{M} indicates the 
potential system insecurity if a specified element based on the N-1 criterion fails and 
results in load curtailments. There is no actual customer outage cost under the N-1 
insecure state (marginal) if the specified element does not actually fail. Operating a 
system under insecure conditions can, however, create system stress and require 
preventive action by the system operators. The insecurity cost can be related to existing 
costs associated with implementing preventive actions under insecure situations. For 
example, when system operators realize that a current operating state will not satisfy the 
next specified N-1 contingency, they may decide to take preventive action such as 
starting additional generating units, redispatching etc., to improve system security or to 
reduce the magnitude of severity if the contingency occurs. Enhancing system security 
can have considerable associated cost. The repetitive cost of preventive actions may be 
much larger than the occasional monetary impact of consumer disconnections [104]. The 
expected potential insecurity cost (EPIC) expressed in Equation (9.1) is designated as 
the deterministic N-1 security cost, and is a surrogate for the preventive cost associated 
with system insecure conditions.  
 
 The deterministic N-1 security cost (EPIC) and the adequacy cost component 
(ECOST) can be combined to determine an overall reliability cost based on both 
adequacy and security concerns. The total monetary loss in the combined reliability 
framework is designated as the expected overall reliability cost (EORC) as shown in 
Equation (9.2). 
 
 Expected Overall Reliability Cost (EORC)  =  ECOST + EPIC  (9.2) 
 
 The deterministic cost (EPIC) can be considered as an increment of the overall 
reliability cost (EORC). For example, if the potential insecurity cost based on the 
deterministic N-1 criterion is low (Prob{M} is low), the EPIC will be relatively small 
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and therefore insignificant. It therefore will not send a signal to the system planner to 
implement system reinforcement, which could lead to overinvestment. In contrast, if the 
EPIC is high (Prob{M} is high), this will add a significant increment to the overall 
reliability cost (EORC) and indicate that the system planner should consider system 
reinforcements based on the deterministic N-1 criterion.           
 
The concept of utilizing an overall reliability cost considering both adequacy and 
security concerns in transmission system reinforcement analysis is demonstrated by 
application to the MR-RBTS and the modified IEEE-RTS. 
 
9.5.1  Transmission Reinforcement in the MR-RBTS 
 
The generation center of the RBTS is located in the northern part of the system 
while the most of the loads are located in the southern area as shown in Figure 8.4. 
Significant amounts of power are therefore transferred from the north to the south 
through two double circuits (Lines # 1 and 6, and Lines # 2 and 7). The transmission 
utilizations of Lines # 1 and 6 are approximately 85% of the line ratings while those of 
Lines # 2 and 7 are approximately 54% of the line ratings during system peak demand. 
The power flows on Lines # 2 and 7 are less than those on Lines # 1 and 6 because they 
are very long transmission circuits with much higher impedances. The loss of any one 
transmission line in the critical path (Lines # 1 and 6) during a high demand period can 
result in an overload on the remaining line.  
 
Transmission reinforcements can be achieved by various transmission planning 
schemes. In this section, two reinforcement options are considered for illustration and 
comparison purposes. The two reinforcement schemes involve either utilizing flexible 
AC transmission system (FACTS) devices or constructing a new transmission line. The 
FACTS technology is based on the concept of using power electronic devices for power 
flow control at the transmission level. The transmission components become active 
elements by self-adjusting their related parameters, and play important roles in meeting 
power transfer requirements and increasing the security margins. New transmission line 
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construction is becoming increasingly difficult due to the lack of financial and 
regulatory incentives, public discouragement due to environmental concerns and 
physical right-of-way restrictions. There is therefore increasing utilization of FACTS 
technology as a means of extending the capability of existing transmission networks 
without adding new transmission lines [105, 106]. The addition of FACTS devices can 
improve the system transfer capability by alleviating the transmission loading 
constraints. There are various types of FACTS devices by which different transmission 
parameters, i.e. line impedance, phase angle etc., can be adjusted. The FACTS devices 
utilized in this section are assumed to be a thyristor-controlled series compensation type 
that can control line impedance. For example, the thyristor-controlled series capacitor 
can vary the impedance to levels below and up to the line’s natural impedance, whereas 
the thyristor-controlled series reactor can add positive impedance to a value above the 
line’s natural impedance [105]. The variable series controlled impedance used in this 
study is permitted to vary by ± 50% of the line impedance [106]. 
 
An assumption made regarding FACTS device additions in this study is that 
FACTS devices perform their function when required to alleviate overloads on the 
corresponding lines. The FACTS devices offer major potential advantages in both the 
static and dynamic operation of transmission lines. The following analyses utilize the 
ability of a FACTS device to increase the load carrying capability of the corresponding 
transmission line. 
 
As noted earlier, the load center of the modified RBTS is located in the southern 
area and the generation center is in the northern area. This results in significant 
transmission utilization of Lines # 1 and 6 during system peak demand. System 
reinforcement using FACTS device additions or a new transmission line are therefore 
initially considered in order to alleviate the potential loading problem on Lines # 1 and 
6. Three possible transmission reinforcement alternatives for the MR-RBTS are listed 
below.  
 
Alternative 1: FACTS additions to Lines # 1 and 6 (between Buses 1 and 3) 
Alternative 2: FACTS additions to Lines # 2 and 7 (between Buses 2 and 4) 
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Alternative 3: A new transmission line between Buses 1 and 3 
 
In Alternative 1, FACTS devices are installed on both parallel lines (Lines # 1 
and 6) between Bus 1 and Bus 3. Installing a FACTS device on only one of the two 
parallel lines will create an unsatisfactory overload on the other parallel line that does 
not have a FACTS device installed. This also applies to Alternative 2 where FACTS 
devices are installed on both Lines # 2 and 7. The new transmission line (Alternative 3) 
is assumed to be in parallel, and have identical line parameters and rating to those of 
Lines # 1 and 6. The overall system reliability indices considering both adequacy and 
static security concerns for the three reinforcement alternatives are shown in Table 9.6 
together with the base case results (no reinforcement) given in Table 9.3.   
 
Table 9.6 shows that adding FACTS on Lines # 1 and 6 (Alternative 1) can 
considerably decrease the probability and frequency of the at risk state, and the severity 
of supply interruption. Alternative 1, however, is not very effective from the security 
perspective as there is relatively little improvement in Prob{H} compared to the base 
case. In this alternative, FACTS devices control the transmission line overloads on Lines 
# 1 and 6 by increasing the line impedance by 50% (at the maximum level) in order to 
force some power to flow through the alternative path (from Bus 1 to Bus 2, and then 
Bus 2 to Bus 4 in this case). Changing the natural power flow direction in this case is, 
however, not very efficient as the Lines # 2 and 7 impedances are relatively large due to 
the long transmission lines.  
 
Table 9.6: Overall system reliability indices (adequacy and security) of the MR- RBTS 
                   associated with the three transmission reinforcement alternatives. 
System Indices Base case Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3
Prob{H} (/yr) 0.86200 0.86703 0.87727 0.99343 
Prob{M} (/yr) 0.13721 0.13256 0.12257 0.00653 
Prob{R} (/yr) 0.00079 0.00041 0.00016 0.00004 
Freq{H} (occ/yr) 172.01 134.85 116.61 10.61 
Freq{M} (occ/yr) 173.36 135.73 117.16 10.68 
Freq{R} (occ/yr) 1.80 1.07 0.60 0.09 
DPUI (sys.mins) 19.97 10.39 3.95 1.33 
ECOST (k$/yr) 201.986 121.880 48.175 16.988 
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Alternative 2 is more effective than Alternative 1 from an adequacy perspective 
and there is a slight improvement in the security indices. In Alternative 2, the FACTS 
devices control the transmission line overloads on Lines # 1 and 6 by decreasing the line 
impedance of Lines # 2 and 7 by 50% (at minimum level) and therefore increase the 
power flow on these two lines. The FACTS additions to Lines # 2 and 7 are more 
effective from a reliability point of view than adding FACTS to Lines # 1 and 6.   
 
The overall system reliability indices are greatly improved by adding a 
transmission line between Bus 1 and Bus 3 (Alternative 3). The adequacy indices of 
DPUI and ECOST obtained for Alternative 2 are comparable to those obtained using 
Alternative 3, but the security indices for the two cases are considerably different. This 
shows that in this case, transmission reinforcement by FACTS additions is quite 
competitive with new transmission line construction based on adequacy assessment. The 
FACTS additions, however, provide only a marginal improvement in the system stress 
level while the line addition alternative provides a significant reduction in the system 
stress level.   
 
The expected overall reliability cost (EORC) for all the reinforcement 
alternatives are presented in Table 9.7. These results show that the EPIC for Alternative 
3 is insignificant compared to its ECOST.  
 
Table 9.7: Associated reliability costs (adequacy and security considerations) in k$/year  
                 for the modified RBTS associated with different reinforcement alternatives. 
Reinforcement Options ECOST EPIC = Prob{M}×ECOST EORC 
Base case (no reinforcement) 201.986 0.13721×201.986 = 27.714 229.700
Alter. 1 (FACTS at Lines # 1 and 6) 121.880 0.13256×121.880 = 16.156 138.036
Alter. 2 (FACTS at Lines # 2 and 7) 48.175 0.12257×48.175 = 5.905 54.080 
Alter. 3 (a new line) 16.988 0.00653×16.988 = 0.111   17.099 
 
 
The reinforcement option of adding a new transmission line to the system has the 
lowest EORC, and provides significant better overall reliability than the FACTS device 
additions (Alternatives 1 and 2). This option cannot, however, be considered to be the 
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optimum choice without conducting a reliability cost/worth analysis. The following 
presents an approach to determine the optimum reinforcement alternative. 
 
 Reliability cost/worth analysis [107, 108] as applied in power system planning is 
sometimes designated as value-based reliability [109], cost-benefit [110] or minimum 
cost planning [111] assessment. The basic concept is illustrated in Figure 5.1. In the 
present era of electricity competition and deregulation, customers and agencies are 
challenging implicit reliability criteria as the only bases for project justification, and are 
pressing for requirements to include customer interruption costs as a component of the 
total project cost [110]. As shown in Figure 5.1, the utility cost increases with increased 
system reliability levels. The customer interruption cost, in contrast, decreases as the 
system reliability increases. Utility customers receive the least cost service when the 
combined utility and customer outage costs are minimized. Reliability cost/worth 
analysis therefore establishes a balance between the costs of improving service 
reliability with the benefits that the improvement brings to the customer. The balance is 
achieved by minimizing the total cost (TOC) shown in Equation (9.3). 
 
 Total Cost (TOC)   =   Utility Cost  +  Expected Overall Reliability Cost (9.3)  
 
 The utility cost consists of two main components, which are the capital 
(investment) cost, and the operating and maintenance costs. In order to simplify the 
calculation, operating cost elements such as production costs are not included in the 
evaluation. The maintenance cost is added to the capital cost as a part of the fixed costs. 
The following economic terms are used to determine the utility investment cost [112]: 
 
Capital Recovery Factor (CRF)  =  
1i)(1
i)i(1
n
n
−+
+     (9.4) 
 
Annual capital payment (ACP)  =  P×CRF     (9.5) 
 
where:   i   =   A discount rate or present worth rate, 
  n   =   A number of years considered, 
  P   =   Present project cost. 
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The capital recovery factor (CRF) indicates the equal regular payments that are 
equivalent to a present amount of money [112]. For example, $1.0 today is equivalent to 
$0.10185 every year for the next 20 years assuming a discount rate (present worth rate) 
of 8% per year. The annual capital payment (ACP) indicates the uniform series of annual 
payments (an annuity) from the beginning of the construction year through n years for 
the useful lifetime of the project.  
 
Reliability cost/worth analysis is applied to the three transmission reinforcements 
in the following.    
 
Alternative 1: FACTS device additions on Lines # 1 and 6 
FACTS device cost = 4.0 M$/unit 
Number of FACTS devices = 2  
Useful lifetime considered = 20 years 
FACTS device maintenance cost (during useful lifetime) = 5% of the project cost  
Discount rate (present worth rate) = 8% per year 
Therefore, CRF  =  
10.08)(1
0.08)0.08(1
20
20
−+
+  = 0.10185 
Project cost (P)  = investment cost + maintenance cost 
     = 2×4.0 (M$) + 0.05×2×4.0 (M$)   = 8.40 (M$) 
Therefore, annual capital payment (ACP) = P×CRF = 8.40×0.10185 = 0.856 M$/yr. 
 
The total cost (TOC) expressed in Equation (9.3) is a summation of the annual capital 
payment (ACP) and the expected overall reliability cost (EORC). As shown in Table 
9.7, the expected overall reliability cost (EORC) associated with adding FACTS devices 
on L1 and L6 is 138.036 k$/yr. 
Total cost (TOC)  = ACP + EORC  =  0.856 M$/yr + 0.138 M$/yr  = 0.994 M$/yr 
 
Alternative 2: FACTS device additions on Lines # 2 and 7 
The expected overall reliability cost (EORC) associated with adding FACTS devices on 
L2 and L7 is 54.080 k$/yr (Table 9.7). The total cost is as follows: 
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Total cost (TOC)  = ACP + EORC  = 0.856 M$/yr + 0.054 M$/yr  = 0.910 M$/yr 
 
Alternative 3: New transmission line addition 
Investment cost of a 230 kV transmission line = 0.48 M$/km 
New transmission line length = 75 km 
Useful lifetime considered = 40 years 
Line maintenance cost (during a useful lifetime) = 5% of the project cost 
Discount rate (present worth rate) = 8% per year 
CRF  =  
10.08)(1
0.08)0.08(1
40
40
−+
+  = 0.08386 
Project cost (P)  = investment cost + maintenance cost 
     = 0.48×75 (M$) + 0.05×0.48×75 (M$)   = 37.80 (M$) 
Therefore, annual capital payment (ACP) = P×CRF = 37.80×0.08386 = 3.169 M$/yr. 
 
The expected overall reliability cost (EORC) associated with adding a new transmission 
line (Table 9.7) is 17.099 k$/yr. 
Total cost (TOC)  =  ACP + EORC  = 3.169 M$/yr + 0.017 M$/yr  = 3.186 M$/yr 
 
The reliability cost/reliability worth components due to the three reinforcement 
options are summarized in Table 9.8.  
 
Table 9.8: Summary of reliability cost/reliability worth components for the three 
                        reinforcement projects in the MR-RBTS. 
Reinforcement Project ACP (M$/yr) EORC (M$/yr) TOC (M$/yr)
Base case (no reinforcement) 0 0.230 0.230 
Alter. 1 (FACTS at Lines # 1 and 6) 0.856 0.138 0.994 
Alter. 2 (FACTS at Lines # 2 and 7) 0.856 0.054 0.910 
Alter. 3 (a new line) 3.169 0.017 3.186 
 
 Table 9.8 indicates that the total cost of the base case (no reinforcement) results 
in the least cost option. The total costs due to FACTS device additions (Alternatives 1 
and 2) are approximately four times larger than that of the base case, while the total cost 
due to a new line addition is over thirteen times higher than that of the base case. In this 
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case, the test system is a small system and the EORC obtained is not very large 
compared to the annual investment cost of a device addition. This does not, however, 
mean that it is not worth conducting system reinforcement in this case. The alternative 
involving FACTS addition on Lines # 2 and 7 is a compromise between the system 
reliability and the economic concerns, and may be an attractive option for short-term 
system reinforcement as the total cost is less than one third of that for a new 
transmission line. This option provides system adequacy indices that are reasonably 
comparable to those provided by building a new transmission line. 
 
It is important to note that the results shown in Table 9.8 are on a one year basis. 
Transmission expansion planning normally considers a longer period than one year, i.e. 
5 or 10 years in the future. For example, an adopted reinforcement scheme should meet 
the reliability criteria over a future target period. The above example is extended to 
investigate a four year transmission planning period during which it is assumed that the 
system should have a Prob{H} at the level of 0.86 or above. An annual system load 
growth of 4.2% is used in the analysis. The transmission reinforcement is assumed to be 
completed at the beginning of the initial year or the first year of the target period, and 
the results for the first year are shown in Tables 9.6 and 9.8. Equations (9.6) and (9.7) 
are used [103] to consider the present value of the total annual capital cost (ACP) and 
the total expected overall reliability cost (EORC) for the four year period. 
 
Total ACP   =  ∑
=
−+
m
1j
1ji)(1
1ACP       (9.6) 
 
Total EORC   =  ∑
=
−+
m
1j
1j
j
i)(1
EORC
       (9.7) 
 
where:   m   =   The planning period in years (4 years in this illustration). 
               i    =   The discount rate described earlier, assumed to be 8% in this study. 
 
The overall system reliability indices and related costs for the next three years 
(2nd, 3rd, 4th years) are presented in Table 9.9. Alternative 1 is not considered further as 
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the results shown in Table 9.6 indicate that Alternative 2 offers a better system reliability 
and a lower total cost than Alternative 1.   
 
Table 9.9: Overall system reliability indices and the related costs of the two 
                            reinforcement alternatives in the MR-RBTS for the three years. 
2nd year 3rd year 4th year System 
Indices Alter. 2 (FACTS)
Alter. 3 
(Line) 
Alter. 2 
(FACTS)
Alter. 3 
(Line) 
Alter. 2 
(FACTS) 
Alter. 3 
(Line) 
Prob{H} (/yr) 0.87032 0.99187 0.86210 0.98761 0.85518 0.98004
Prob{M} (/yr) 0.12922 0.00806 0.13706 0.01219 0.14340 0.01954
Prob{R} (/yr) 0.00046 0.00007 0.00085 0.00020 0.00141 0.00042
Freq{H} (occ/yr) 118.04 13.57 119.23 25.35 120.75 32.39
Freq{M} (occ/yr) 119.00 13.73 120.88 25.88 122.89 33.09
Freq{R} (occ/yr) 1.17 0.20 2.03 0.58 2.79 0.84
DPUI (sys.mins) 9.50 2.55 21.87 5.82 42.67 13.14
ECOST (M$/yr) 0.106 0.032 0.237 0.074 0.465 0.166
EPIC (M$/yr) 0.014 0.000 0.032 0.001 0.067 0.003
EORC (M$/yr) 0.120 0.032 0.269 0.075 0.532 0.169
ACP (M$/yr) 0.856 3.169 0.856 3.169 0.856 3.169
 
 
 Equations (9.6) and (9.7) are used to calculate the present value of the total ACP 
and the total EORC over the four year planning period. 
 
For Alternative 2: 
Total ACP = ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+++++++ 3210 0.08)(1
1
0.08)(1
1
0.08)(1
1
0.08)(1
18560.  =  3.062 (M$) 
Total EORC =  00.08)(1
0.054
+  + 10.08)(1
0.120
+  + 20.08)(1
0.269
+  + 30.08)(1
0.532
+ =  0.818 (M$) 
Total cost (TOC) for the four year period = 3.062 + 0.818 =  3.880 (M$) 
 
For Alternative 3: 
Total ACP = ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+++++++ 3210 0.08)(1
1
0.08)(1
1
0.08)(1
1
0.08)(1
11693.  = 11.335 (M$) 
Total EORC =  00.08)(1
0.017
+  + 10.08)(1
0.032
+  + 20.08)(1
0.075
+  + 30.08)(1
0.169
+ =  0.245 (M$) 
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Total cost (TOC) for the four year period = 11.335 + 0.245 =  11.580 (M$) 
 
 The total costs calculated above indicate that the ratio of the total costs for the 
two alternatives during the four year period is 2.98 (11.580/3.880), whereas the ratio of 
the total costs based on one year shown in Table 9.8 is 3.50 (3.186/0.910). This implies 
that the benefit of the FACTS addition in Alternative 2 decreases when a longer period 
is considered (long term planning). The Prob{H} in the fourth year for the FACTS 
addition alternative is lower than the pre-specified reliability criterion of 0.86 and 
therefore Alternative 2 does not meet the reliability criterion. Additional reinforcement 
would, therefore, be required to achieve the reliability goal over this period. This will 
require additional investment, and a higher total investment over the planning period. In 
contrast, Alternative 3 provides acceptable adequacy and security over the entire period. 
In conclusion, the proposed transmission reinforcement using FACTS device additions 
only temporarily alleviates the transmission constraints and involves relatively high 
system stress and potential risk in the future. Constructing a new transmission line rather 
than installing FACTS devices in this case appears to be promising for long-term system 
planning and should be studied further.   
 
9.5.2  Transmission Reinforcement in the Modified IEEE-RTS 
 
As shown in Table 9.4, the modified IEEE-RTS is transmission deficient due to 
the transmission loads created by the significant power flows from the north to the south 
of the system. This section conducts transmission reinforcement planning in order to 
improve the system reliability. A system investigation is required in order to identify 
proper locations for effective transmission reinforcement, and to identify the possible 
transmission reinforcement schemes. Two criteria are used in order to select effective 
locations for transmission reinforcements. The first criterion is based on line overload 
analysis of the base case. The number of overload hours of all the transmission facilities 
are recorded in the simulation to obtain the average overload in hours/year. This 
criterion can help to identify the critical transmission facilities from a system adequacy 
perspective. The second criterion is based on Freq{H} of all the delivery points of the 
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base case shown in Table 9.5. Freq{H} is the number of times that each delivery point 
leaves the healthy state. This criterion can be used to identify critical locations from a 
security perspective.  
 
As shown in Table 9.5, the delivery point at Bus 10 has the highest Freq{H}. 
This is 246.61 occ/yr and is following by the Bus 6 load point with 206.12 occ/yr. A 
transmission reinforcement plan to improve system security can be focused on these two 
buses. The single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS in Figure 3.3 shows that Buses 10 and 6 
are connected to each other by Line # 10. This line has an average overload of less than 
0.1 hr/yr. The transmission line connecting Bus 6 to Bus 2 (Line # 5) has an average 
overload of 1.0 hr/yr. If Line # 10 is on outage, Line # 5 will not be able to serve all the 
load at Bus 6 during the peak load condition. A potential reinforcement scheme could 
therefore be focused on this location. The transmission line that encounters the highest 
number of average overload hours (18 hrs/yr) is Line # 23 connecting Bus 14 and Bus 
16. The second highest average overload (3 hrs/yr) is on Line # 6 connecting Bus 3 and 
Bus 9. The following five possible reinforcement alternatives were selected for 
investigation using the two selection criteria.  
 
Alternative 1: A one line addition between Buses 2 and 6 
Alternative 2: A one line addition between Buses 14 and 16 
Alternative 3: A one line addition between Buses 2 and 6, and a one line addition  
                       between Buses 3 and 9 
Alternative 4: A one line addition between Buses 14 and 16, and a one line addition  
                       between Buses 11 and 14 
Alternative 5: Combining Alternatives 3 and 4 (four lines in total) 
 
Each of these five alternatives will create parallel path(s) with existing 
transmission circuit(s). The loss of one parallel line will, therefore, not interrupt all the 
power flow between the corresponding buses. The overall system reliability indices for 
the modified IEEE-RTS with the five system reinforcement alternatives and the base 
case values are shown in Table 9.10. 
 194
Table 9.10: Overall system reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS with the five 
                     different system reinforcement alternatives. 
System Indices Base case Alter. 1 Alter. 2 Alter. 3 Alter. 4 Alter. 5 
Prob{H} (/yr) 0.69183 0.96491 0.70561 0.96755 0.70562 0.98036
Prob{M} (/yr) 0.30656 0.03352 0.29296 0.03123 0.29304 0.01868
Prob{R} (/yr) 0.00161 0.00158 0.00143 0.00122 0.00134 0.00096
Freq{H} (occ/yr) 335.15 80.57 321.80 75.05 324.12 38.60
Freq{M} (occ/yr) 341.15 82.29 327.43 76.40 329.27 39.28
Freq{R} (occ/yr) 4.03 4.13 3.50 3.58 3.47 2.65
DPUI (sys.mins) 51.90 47.35 38.50 30.48 30.06 20.74
ECOST (M$/yr) 10.903 9.913 8.073 6.267 6.343 4.341
 
 
The results shown in Table 9.10 indicate that Alternative 1 (adding a line 
between Bus 2 and Bus 6) effectively relieves the N-1 security problem and improves 
the overall system security, as Prob{H} increases from 0.69183 to 0.96491. This 
reinforcement option is, however, not very effective in improving the system adequacy 
as DPUI only reduces to 47.35 sys.mins compared to 51.90 sys.mins in the base case. 
Alternative 2 does not effectively improve the system security as Prob{H} only slightly 
increases from 0.69183 to 0.70561. This alternative, however, considerably improves the 
system adequacy as DPUI reduces to 38.50 sys.mins. Alternative 1 was selected based 
on the high value of Freq{H} which is a security based indicator and Alternative 2 was 
selected based on the highest average overload hour on Line # 23, which is an adequacy 
based indicator. As expected, Alternative 1, therefore, improves the system security 
while Alternative 2 improves the system adequacy. 
 
Alternative 3 is intended to improve both system security and system adequacy. 
As noted earlier, Line # 6 encounters an average overload of 3 hrs/yr. This alternative, 
which is an extension of Alternative 1, improves both the system security and the system 
adequacy. The Prob{H} is slightly better than that of Alternative 1 and the DPUI 
reduces from 47.35 sys.mins to 30.48 sys.mins. This results in an ECOST reduction of 
almost 3.5 M$/yr.   
 
Alternative 4 is considered in order to further reduce DPUI from that obtained 
with Alternative 2, by adding one more line between Bus 11 and Bus 14. The reason for 
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adding this line is that the addition of a second line between Bus 14 and Bus 16 will 
increase the power flow through this path creating an average overload on Line # 19 of 
1.0 hr/yr. The line addition between Bus 11 and Bus 14 in Alternative 4 decreases the 
potential of an overload on this path. Table 9.10 shows that Alternative 4 results in a 
reduction of the DPUI from 38.50 sys.mins in Alternative 2 to 30.48 sys.mins. The 
Prob{H} for these two alternatives are basically the same and indicate that the line 
addition between Bus 11 and Bus 14 does not improve system security.    
     
Alternative 5 is a combination of Alternatives 3 and 4, and involves a total of 
four additional lines. Alternative 5 should provide considerable improvement in both the 
system security and system adequacy. As shown in Table 9.10, the overall reliability 
indices are considerably better than those for Alternatives 3 and 4, and are a 
considerable improvement over those of the base case. This alternative provides the best 
reliability benefit of the selected transmission reinforcement schemes, but involves 
significant investment. The economic analyses conducted on the five transmission 
reinforcement options are briefly illustrated in the following. 
 
The construction costs of 138 kV and 230 kV lines are assumed to be 0.40 
M$/km and 0.48 M$/km respectively. The useful lifetime of a new transmission line is 
40 years, and the discount rate is 8% per year. The line maintenance cost is 5% of the 
project expenses. The annual capital payments (ACP) for all the reinforcement 
alternatives are shown in Table 9.11. 
 
Table 9.11: Annual capital payments (ACP) for the different reinforcement alternatives  
                     in the modified IEEE-RTS. 
Reinforcement 
Options 
Investment cost  
(M$) 
Maintenance
Cost (M$) CRF 
ACP 
(M$/yr)
Alternative 1 0.40×80 = 32.000 1.600 0.08386 2.818 
Alternative 2 0.48×43 = 20.640 1.032 0.08386 1.817 
Alternative 3 0.40×80 + 0.40×50 = 52.000 2.600 0.08386 4.579 
Alternative 4 0.48×43 + 0.48×46 = 42.720 2.136 0.08386 3.762 
Alternative 5 52.000 + 42.720 4.736 0.08386 8.340 
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Table 9.12 shows the reliability cost/reliability worth components associated 
with the five different reinforcement alternatives. 
 
Table 9.12: Reliability cost/reliability worth components associated with the five 
                          different reinforcement alternatives in the modified IEEE-RTS.  
Reliability cost/worth 
components 
Base  
Case 
Alter. 
1 
Alter. 
2 
Alter. 
3 
Alter. 
4 
Alter. 
5 
ECOST (M$/yr) 10.903 9.913 8.073 6.267 6.343 4.341 
EPIC (M$/yr) 3.342 0.333 2.365 0.196 1.859 0.081 
EORC (M$/yr) 14.245 10.246 10.438 6.463 8.202 4.422 
ACP (M$/yr) 0.000 2.818 1.817 4.579 3.762 8.340 
TOC (M$/yr) 14.245 13.064 12.255 11.042 11.964 12.762 
 
 
Table 9.12 indicates that Alternative 3 (adding a new line between Bus 2 and Bus 
6, and another line between Bus 3 and Bus 9) results in the lowest total cost (TOC) of 
the five alternatives, followed by Alternatives 4, 2, 5 and 1 respectively. It is interesting 
to note that adding four new transmission lines in Alternative 5 results in a lower total 
cost than by adding one new line in Alternative 1. It is important to note that the results 
shown in Table 9.12 are on a one year basis from which Alternative 3 is the optimum 
choice. Alternative 5, which offers significant adequacy and security improvements, 
could prove to be the most attractive when considering the future load growth. Long 
term planning analysis can be conducted as illustrated in the previous section to examine 
the potential of each alternative.   
 
 In conclusion, the overall reliability framework proposed in this thesis 
incorporates the deterministic N-1 criterion in a probabilistic framework, and results in 
the joint inclusion of both adequacy and security considerations in system planning. 
Recent discussions [113] indicate that there is a need to re-design and apply 
deterministic techniques that include probabilistic considerations in order to assess 
increased system stress due to the restructured electricity environment. The desired 
technique should be capable of maintaining an acceptable balance between system 
utilization and the required system reliability. The overall reliability framework 
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considering both adequacy and security concerns described in this chapter can fulfill the 
tasks noted in [113].  
 
9.6  Conclusions 
 
An overall reliability analysis framework considering both adequacy and security 
perspectives is demonstrated in this chapter using system well-being analysis and 
traditional adequacy assessment. System well-being (security) analysis is used to 
quantify the degree of N-1 security (healthy) and the N-1 insecurity (marginal) in terms 
of probabilities and frequencies. Traditional adequacy assessment is incorporated to 
quantify the magnitude of the severity and the consequences associated with system 
failure. Selected adequacy-based and security-based indices are used to create a 
combined reliability framework. Various case studies are illustrated in this chapter based 
on different system conditions involving generation and transmission deficient 
situations. The results based on overall reliability analysis indicate that adequacy indices 
are adversely affected by a generation deficient environment and security indices are 
adversely affected by a transmission deficient environment. A system planning process 
using combined adequacy and security considerations offers an additional reliability-
based dimension. The combined adequacy and security framework presented in this 
chapter can assist system planners to appreciate the overall benefits of possible 
reinforcement options, and prove useful in the decision making process. Various 
possible reinforcement alternatives have been examined in this chapter using reliability 
cost/reliability worth considerations. The concept of a combined reliability framework 
should prove useful in the present electric utility environment where system stress is 
becoming increasingly important.  
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CHAPTER 10   
WIND POWER INTEGRATION IN BULK ELECTRIC 
SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS  
 
 
10.1  Introduction 
 
There has been considerably interest in utilizing wind for electric power 
generation in many systems throughout the world during the last two decades. Wind 
power is considered to be an encouraging and promising alternative for power 
generation because of its tremendous environmental, social and economic benefits, 
together with public support and government incentives. As reported by the Canadian 
Electricity Association (CEA), Canada has committed itself to a specific target of 10,000 
megawatts of installed wind power capacity by 2010 [114]. There is currently 590 
megawatts of wind capacity across Canada (retrieved on August 24, 2005 from the 
Canadian Wind Energy Association [115]). This target will therefore require an annual 
wind power growth rate of approximately 60%. Wind power is, however, an intermittent 
energy source that behaves far differently than conventional energy sources. The 
reliability impact of such a highly variable energy source is an important aspect that 
must be assessed when the wind power penetration is significant.  
 
Relatively little work has been done on bulk electric system reliability analysis 
associated with wind energy due to the complexity associated with including detailed 
modeling of both the generation and transmission facilities in addition to the wind 
characteristics. An advantage of utilizing sequential Monte Carlo simulation in bulk 
electric system reliability evaluation is that the framework already exists to incorporate 
the chronological characteristics of wind (diurnal and season wind speeds), load profiles 
and the chronological transition states of all the components within a system. Sequential 
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simulation can, therefore, provide realistic and more accurate results than other 
traditional methods when considering wind power. Research work on the impact of wind 
power generation in bulk electric system reliability is investigated and illustrated in this 
chapter. The studies conducted in this chapter are focused on the adequacy of bulk 
electric systems containing wind power. The concept of incorporating security 
considerations described in Chapters 8 and 9 is not considered in this chapter. 
 
10.2  Wind Energy Conversion System 
 
The wind energy conversion system (WECS) model is basically composed of 
two main parts designated as the wind speed model and the wind turbine generator 
(WTG) model. These two segments are briefly described as follows: 
 
10.2.1  Wind Speed Modeling 
 
An essential prerequisite in incorporating WECS in power system reliability 
analysis using sequential Monte Carlo simulation is to realistically simulate the hourly 
wind speed. Wind speed varies with time and location and at a specific hour is related to 
the wind speeds of the immediate previous hours. Wind speed models, therefore, have 
unique characteristics that are dependent on their geographies. The two wind regimes 
utilized in this paper were modeled using auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) time 
series models [116]. The general expression of the ARMA(n,m) model is as follows: 
 
ty   =  ∑∑ = −= − −+
m
j
jtjt
n
i
iti y
11
αθαφ       (10.1) 
 
where: yt is the time series value at time t, iφ  (i=1,2,…,n) and θj (j=1,2,…,m) are the 
auto-regressive and moving average parameters respectively, {αt} is a normal white 
noise process with zero mean and variance of σa2, i.e. )σNID(0,α 2at ∈ , where NID 
denotes Normally Independent Distributed.  
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The hourly simulated wind speed SWt at time t is obtained from the mean speed 
µt , its standard deviation σt and the time series yt as shown in Equation (10.2). 
 
tttt ySW σµ +=         (10.2) 
 
Using Equation (10.1), new values of yt can be calculated from current random 
white noise αt and previous values of yt-i. Equation (10.2) is used to generate the hourly 
wind speeds incorporating the wind speed time series. 
 
The studies presented in this chapter utilize wind speed models and data from 
two different sites located in the province of Saskatchewan. This information is 
designated as Regina and Swift Current data. Table 10.1 shows the hourly mean wind 
speed and the standard deviation at the two different sites. The ARMA models for the 
two sites are given in Equations (10.3) and (10.4). The Regina wind model shown in 
Equation (10.3) was developed and published in [116]. The Swift Current wind model 
shown in Equation (10.4) was developed using the ARMASA Toolbox [117, 118] 
associated with the System Identification Toolbox [119] in the MATLAB Program. 
Hourly wind speed time data from 1996-2003 (8 year series) obtained from Environment 
Canada were used in the ARMA model development, and hourly wind speed data from 
1984-2003 (20 years) at the Swift Current site were used to calculate the hourly mean 
wind speed and standard deviation. Wind speed data for the two locations used in the 
study are shown in Table 10.1. 
 
Table 10.1: Wind speed data at the two different sites. 
 
Sites Regina Swift Current 
Mean wind speed (km/h), µ 19.52 19.46 
Standard deviation (km/h), σ 10.99 9.70 
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Swift Current: ARMA (4,3): 
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10.2.2  Wind Turbine Generator Modeling 
 
The power output characteristics of a wind turbine generator (WTG) are quite 
different from those of conventional generating units. The wind speed has a major effect 
on the power output. There is a non-linear relationship between the power output of the 
WTG and the wind speed. The relation can be described using the operational 
parameters of the WTG. The three commonly used parameters are the cut-in, rated and 
cut-out wind speeds. The hourly power output can be obtained from the simulated 
hourly wind speed using Equation (10.5). 
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Where Pr , Vci , Vr and Vco are the rated power output, the cut-in wind speed, the rated 
wind speed and the cut-out wind speed of the WTG respectively. The constants A, B and 
C are determined by Vci , Vr and Vco as expressed in Equation (10.6) [120], and the wind 
turbine generator power curve is shown in Figure 10.1. All the WTG units used in this 
study are assumed to have a rated capacity of 2 MW, and cut-in, rated and cut-out speeds 
of 14.4, 36 and 80 km/h respectively. The failure rates and repair times of all the WTG 
are 2 failures/year and 44 hours respectively. 
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 Figure 10.1 shows the relationship between the power output of the WTG and 
the wind speed. The relationship is commonly known as the “Power Curve”. At a 
specific time, the output power of a WTG can be obtained from the hourly simulated 
wind speeds by applying the power curve. 
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Figure 10.1: Wind turbine generator power curve. 
 
Figure 10.2 shows the hourly simulated wind speeds for two consecutive 
simulation years based on the Regina model, and the resulting power output of 40 MW 
of WECS during a selected period in the two simulation years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2: Hourly simulated wind speeds and resulting power output of 40 MW of 
                        WECS during the first week of January in two simulation years. 
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The simulated results shown in Figure 10.2 are for illustration purposes in order 
to demonstrate how simulated wind characteristics and the resulting power outputs of 
the WECS can vary from year to year even during the same period of the year. In a large 
number of simulation years, some years may have good wind and some years may have 
poor wind for power generation.  
 
 The chronological power output of the WECS shown in Figure 10.2 can be 
represented as the chronological transition process of a system generation component, 
and directly incorporated into Step 3 of the sequential simulation process for bulk 
electric system reliability analysis described in Section 3.5. 
 
10.3  Generation Adequacy Assessment Associated with WECS 
 
 Although this thesis is focused on composite generation and transmission system 
reliability evaluation, it is important to investigate and appreciate some of the relevant 
features of wind power that impact generation adequacy and subsequently affect the 
reliability of composite power systems. Two important factors associated with wind 
power in generation adequacy assessment are considered in the following sections. 
These are the effect of wind speed correlations between wind farms, and the effect of 
wind power on load carrying capability.  
 
10.3.1  Effect of Wind Speed Correlations between WECS 
 
 The utilization of multiple wind farms (WECS) is more advantageous than that 
of a single WECS from a reliability perspective. Quantitative results are illustrated in 
[121] assuming that the wind regimes at the various locations are totally independent 
(uncorrelated). This is a reasonable assumption when the distances between the various 
wind farms are very large. The assumption of site wind independence can be extremely 
optimistic if the sites are in reasonably close proximity. This section extends the concept 
of utilizing multiple wind sites illustrated in [121] by considering different degrees of 
wind speed correlation and examining these impacts on the overall system reliability. A 
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technique to correlate wind speed time series in wind speed simulation models is shown 
in the following. This technique is used later in this chapter to study this effect in bulk 
electric systems.    
 
The wind speed correlation between two wind sites can be calculated using 
cross-correlation. The cross-correlation index (Rxy) is a measure of how well two time 
series follow each other [122, 123]. The value of Rxy is near the maximum value of 1.0 if 
the up and down movements of the two time series occur in the same direction 
(positively correlated). The value is close to zero if the two time series are basically 
uncorrelated, i.e. the two time series do not follow each other. The cross-correlation 
equation is shown in Equation (10.7). 
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where: Rxy is the cross-correlation coefficient, xi and yi are elements of the 1st and 2nd 
time series respectively, µx and  µy are the mean values of the1st and 2nd time series, σx 
and σy are the standard deviations of the 1st and 2nd  time series, n is the number of points 
in the time series. 
 
As previously noted, auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) time series 
models are used for wind speed simulation in this research. An ARMA model is 
composed of two sub-components, which are the auto-regressive (AR) model involving 
lagged terms on the time series itself (wind speeds from previous hours), and the moving 
average (MA) model involving lagged terms on the noise or residuals, which are random 
(non-autocorrelated and normally distributed). It is, therefore, possible to adjust the wind 
speed correlation between two or more different wind locations by selecting or 
determining the random number seeds (initial numbers) for the random number 
generator process used in the MA model. If the simulated wind speed time series for two 
different locations are generated at the same time using a single random number seed for 
the random number generator process, the time series of the wind speeds for these two 
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locations will, therefore, be highly correlated (Rxy ≥ 0.94, for example). On the other 
hand, if a random number seed is assigned for each wind location and is used in its own 
random number generator process, the simulated wind speed time series obtained will 
become fully independent (uncorrelated, i.e. Rxy ≤ 0.05).  
 
This procedure can be used to generate the two extreme scenarios of highly 
dependent wind speeds and highly independent wind speeds at different locations. Based 
on the approach presented, the level of correlation between two or more wind speed time 
series can be adjusted by selecting appropriate random number seeds. For example, 
consider the wind regimes at Regina and Swift Current and assume that the cross-
correlation coefficient between the two locations is 0.48. Further assume that Regina is 
used as the base location and that the assigned random number seed for this location is 
“X”. The task is to determine a seed for the Swift Current data which will result in a 
correlation coefficient of 0.48 with respect to the wind regime at Regina. Assume that 
this seed is a proportional value of “X”, for example “mX”, where “m” is real number. 
The next step is to pick some value (m) and test it in the wind speed simulation process 
to determine the best “m” that results in a correlation of 0.48. This step is a trial and 
error process but is relatively straightforward. 
 
The concept described above is illustrated using wind speed simulations based on 
the Regina and Swift Current ARMA time series models. Figure 10.3 shows the 
simulated wind speed time series during a selected period for Regina and Swift Current 
with cross-correlation coefficients of 0.94, 0.48 and 0.05. Figure 10.3 shows that when 
Rxy is equal to 0.94, the wind speed time series between the two sites are highly 
correlated. An Rxy of 0.48 illustrates that the two wind regimes are partially correlated. 
In the final case, an Rxy of 0.05 illustrates that the two wind speed time series are fully 
independent. 
 
Figure 10.4 shows the probability distributions of the annual power outputs from 
the combined 40 MW installed capacity from two wind farms (20 MW Regina and 20 
MW Swift Current) at different correlation levels between the two sites. 
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Figure 10.3: Different simulated wind speed correlations between Regina and 
                              Swift Current. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.4: Probability distributions of the annual power output at different correlation 
                      levels for the Regina and Swift Current wind regimes. 
 
Figure 10.4 clearly shows that when the cross-correlation coefficient between the 
two wind regimes decreases, the probability of having zero power output (P(0)), the 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 13 25 37 49 61 73 85 97 109 121 133 145 157 169 181 193
Time (hour)
W
in
d 
Sp
ee
d 
(k
m
/h
) Regina
Swift Current
cross-correlation = 0.94
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 13 25 37 49 61 73 85 97 109 121 133 145 157 169 181 193
Time (hour)
W
in
d 
Sp
ee
d 
(k
m
/h
) Regina
Swift Current
cross-correlation = 0.48
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 13 25 37 49 61 73 85 97 109 121 133 145 157 169 181 193
Time (hour)
W
in
d 
Sp
ee
d 
(k
m
/h
) Regina
Swift Current
cross-correlation = 0.05
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
Rxy = 0.05
Rxy = 0.25
Rxy = 0.48
Rxy = 0.75
Rxy = 0.94
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Power Output (MW)
Mean= 9.44 MW
Median= 6.52 MW
S.D.= 9.41 MW
Mean= 9.59 MW
Median= 4.58 MW
S.D.= 11.68 MW
Mean= 9.75 MW
Median= 5.36 MW
S.D.= 11.23 MW
Mean= 9.53 MW
Median= 6.00 MW
S.D.= 10.15 MW
Mean= 9.58 MW
Median= 7.25 MW
S.D.= 8.75 MW
P(0)= 0.25 
P(0)= 0.14 
P(0)= 0.12 
P(0)= 0.10 
P(0)= 0.19 
 207
probability of having maximum power output (P(40)) and the standard deviation (S.D.) 
decrease while the median value increases. This figure illustrates the impact of 
correlation on the expected annual power output from two wind farms. 
 
The generation adequacy assessment results shown in this section were obtained 
using a composite generation and transmission system reliability program (RapHL-II). 
The focus of this study is on generation adequacy. Transmission elements are assigned 
zero failure rates and therefore their contingencies are not considered. It should however 
be appreciated that in this case, transmission constraints such as line capacity limits and 
transmission power loss are still included in the analysis framework. The most common 
reliability indices used in HL-I analysis are the loss of load expectation (LOLE), the loss 
of load frequency (LOLF) and the loss of energy expectation (LOEE). These three 
reliability indices respectively are comparable to the expected duration of load 
curtailment (EDLC), the expected frequency of load curtailment (EFLC) and the 
expected energy not supplied (EENS) used in HL-II analysis. 
 
Table 10.2 shows the impact on the RBTS reliability indices of wind speed 
correlation at the two wind farms (Regina and Swift Current data). The results shown in 
Table 10.2 are based on two WECS penetration levels; 40MW in total (20MW at each 
site) and 80MW in total (40MW at each site). The LOLF and LOLE shown in Table 
10.2 are graphically portrayed in Figure 10.5. Figure 10.5 shows the positive impact on 
system reliability when the wind regimes at the two locations are less correlated (more 
independent). The reliability indices based on the 2×40MW WECS case tend to decline 
slightly faster than those based on the 2×20MW WECS case when the cross-correlation 
decreases. The reliability indices, which tend to saturate at a higher penetration due to a 
single wind farm, i.e. 80MW, if a single wind farm is used, can be further improved 
when multiple wind farms with lower wind speed correlations are installed instead of a 
single wind farm with the same total installed capacity. Another interesting point is that 
the system reliability based on the 2×20MW WECS case with fully independent wind 
regimes (Rxy = 0.05) is similar to that for the 2×40MW WECS case with fully dependent 
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wind regimes (Rxy = 0.94) even though the total installed capacities differ by a factor of 
two. 
 
Table 10.2: Reliability indices of the RBTS including the two wind farms (Regina and 
                      Swift Current data) with different wind speed correlations. 
WECS 
Capacity 
Correlation 
(Rxy) 
LOLF 
(occ/yr)
LOLE 
(hrs/yr)
LOEE 
(MWh/yr) 
Rxy = 0.94 0.60 1.92 17.05 
Rxy = 0.75 0.59 1.85 16.10 
Rxy = 0.48 0.57 1.76 15.14 
Rxy = 0.25 0.53 1.61 13.82 
40 MW 
Rxy = 0.05 0.51 1.57 13.49 
Rxy = 0.94 0.53 1.51 13.54 
Rxy = 0.75 0.51 1.37 11.99 
Rxy = 0.48 0.47 1.23 10.59 
Rxy = 0.25 0.41 1.04 8.97 
80 MW 
Rxy = 0.05 0.39 0.98 8.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.5: RBTS reliability indices including two wind farms (Regina and Swift 
                          Current regimes) with different wind speed correlations. 
 
The correlation levels between two wind regimes are related to the distance 
between the two wind farms. A lower correlation in the two wind regimes implies that 
they are physically far from each other. There is a higher system reliability improvement 
when the two wind farms are further apart as the wind power at the two sites can support 
or assist each other and variations in the total wind power are, therefore, smoothed out. 
The maximum correlation of the two wind regimes used in this chapter is not equal to 
1.0 due to the uniqueness of the ARMA time series model for each wind regime. 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0.94 0.75 0.48 0.25 0.05
Cross-correlation (Rxy)
LO
LE
 (h
rs
./y
r.
)
2×20MW
2×40MW
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.6
0.8
0.94 0.75 0.48 0.25 0.05
Cross-correlation (Rxy)
LO
LF
 (o
cc
./y
r.
)
2×20MW
2×40MW
 209
The concept of selecting initial seeds that relate to a particular cross-correlation 
coefficient between different wind locations is also applicable to a single wind farm, for 
example, a large-scale wind farm covering a widespread area. Wind regimes within this 
large-scale wind farm could be relatively variable, geographically dependent, and highly 
correlated. In order to obtain more accuracy in wind speed simulation associated with 
WECS, this single (large-scale) wind farm can be modeled with several ARMA time 
series sets in which each ARMA model represents an individual sub-location within the 
large-scale wind farm area. The concept of selecting seeds based on the cross-correlation 
coefficient can be applied when the correlation level between these sub-locations are 
known.  
 
10.3.2  Effects of WECS on Load Carrying Capability 
 
 The capacity benefit associated with a generating capacity addition can be 
evaluated by determining the increase in the system load carrying capability due to the 
addition of the generating facility. A WECS has a capacity value and can contribute to 
long-term reserve when it can replace conventional generation while maintaining the 
same level of system reliability. One reliability-based technique used to measure the 
benefit associated with a capacity addition is to determine the effective load carrying 
capability (ELCC) [2, 124 – 126]. The basic concept in this approach is to gradually 
increase the system peak load until the level of system reliability associated with a 
facility addition is the same as that of the base case (the original system without WECS).  
 
Studies of a system containing WECS indicates that the generating capacity 
adequacy index LOLF is affected quite differently than the LOLE and LOEE indices due 
to the inherent variability of the wind. It is, therefore, of interest to investigate how the 
selected LOLF and LOLE criterion responds to perceived system load carrying 
capability. The most commonly used reliability index in the ELCC approach is the 
LOLE which indicates how many hours in a given period (normally a year) a generating 
system cannot satisfy the overall system demand. The LOLF index of a system including 
WECS is quite unique and is affected quite differently than the LOLE indices due to the 
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hour-to-hour variations in wind speed. The unique aspect of LOLF is examined in this 
section by utilizing this index to calculate the ELCC for a system including WECS. The 
ELCC obtained using the LOLE and LOLF based indices are designated as ELCC(LOLE) 
and ELCC(LOLF) respectively and are illustrated in Figure 10.6.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.6: ELCC obtained using LOLE and LOLF indices (ELCC(LOLE) and 
      ELCC(LOLF)). 
 
Figure 10.6 shows the load carrying capabilities obtained using LOLE and LOLF 
based indices for three study scenarios on the RBTS. Two scenarios demonstrate the 
peak load carrying capability based on 40 MW of WECS installed capacity using Regina 
and Swift Current data. The third scenario used for comparison purposes is based on the 
load carrying capability obtained from a 7.1 MW combustion turbine unit (CTU) that 
provides a comparative reliability level (LOLE) under the original peak load condition 
to that obtained with 40 MW of WECS installed capacity with Regina data. The base 
case indicates the original system reliability when there is no other generation added to 
the system. The results illustrated in Figure 10.6 show that load carrying capabilities 
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obtained using the LOLE index for the three cases have relatively similar profiles 
whereas those obtained using the LOLF index are distinctly different for the WECS 
cases and the CTU case. The load carrying capabilities obtained using the LOLE and 
LOLF for the 7.1 MW CTU case are very similar (8.85 MW and 8.70 MW respectively) 
while the ELCC(LOLE) and ELCC(LOLF) for the 40 MW WECS installed capacity with 
Regina data are significantly different (9.40 MW and 4.28 MW respectively). The 
utilization of a LOEE index in load carrying capability assessment has also been 
examined and it appears that the utilization of LOEE provides similar results to those 
obtained using the LOLE based index. The focus, therefore, in the following is on 
comparisons of LOLE and LOLF in load carrying capability analysis. 
 
The utilization of a LOLF index when dealing with wind power provides an 
appreciation of the intrinsic behavior of this highly variable source in regard to the 
overall system reliability. It is obvious in this example that additional generation in the 
form of WECS provides a system reliability benefit that is quite different from that of a 
conventional generator. This is shown in Figure 10.6 where the ELCC(LOLE) and 
ELCC(LOLF) for WECS are quite different, while they are very similar for the 
conventional generating unit. The capacity value obtained using the ELCC(LOLF) includes 
the frequency of supply interruptions due to wind power variability, and therefore has 
both adequacy and security connotations. Figure 10.6 shows that the ELCC determined 
using the LOLF and the LOLE are different for the two wind sites. The wind farm with 
Swift Current data has a lower ELCC(LOLF) than that obtained using Regina data due to 
the higher hourly wind speed variations, which can be investigated using the auto-
correlation test. Figure 10.7 shows the ELCC(LOLE) and ELCC(LOLF) obtained using 
Regina and Swift Current data at different wind power penetration levels. Wind 
penetration level percentages are calculated using the total WECS installed capacity 
divided by the total system generation capacity which includes both conventional 
generating units and WECS. 
 
Figure 10.7 shows that the ELCC(LOLE) and ELCC(LOLF) percentages decline 
when the WECS installed capacity increases. The differences in ELCC(LOLE) and 
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ELCC(LOLF) at very low wind power penetrations are not significant, but the difference 
increases sharply and then gradually declines. Although the ELCC(LOLE) obtained using 
the Regina and Swift Current data are quite similar, the ELCC(LOLF) obtained using these 
two sites are relatively different. The ELCC(LOLF) based on Swift Current data is 
considerably lower than that based on Regina data. The difference between the two 
ELCC profiles indicates the potential difference in capacity benefits based on adequacy 
and security considerations. The difference for the Swift Current data is considerably 
larger than that for the Regina data. This implies that even though the long-term 
planning capacity values for both locations are quite competitive, the operational 
benefits at Swift Current are potentially lower than those for Regina due to Swift 
Current’s higher hourly wind variation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.7: ELCC(LOLE) and ELCC(LOLF) for the RBTS at different penetration levels. 
 
Some studies suggest that the capacity benefit of a WECS obtained using the 
LOLE is relatively close to the WECS capacity factor. This depends on wind conditions 
and wind power penetration. Power utilities who utilize frequency-related reliability 
criteria could suffer from overestimating the potential of WECS capacity benefits in 
their systems based on LOLE. The ELCC is a function of the system capability 
composition, the equipment parameters, desired system reliability, the system size, and 
the wind conditions at the site. The profile differences shown in Figure 10.7 could be 
different for other systems even though the same wind regimes are utilized. This is 
further illustrated as shown in Figure 10.8 using the IEEE-RTS. A similar conclusion to 
that drawn for Figure 10.7 can be applied to Figure 10.8. The differences between the 
ELCC(LOLE) and ELCC(LOLF) profiles shown in Figure 10.7 for the smaller system 
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(RBTS) case are more significant than those shown in Figure 10.8 for the larger system 
(IEEE-RTS). The utilization of both LOLE and LOLF indices provides a more 
comprehensive assessment of the risk of system interruptions for a power system with 
significant wind energy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8: ELCC(LOLE) and ELCC(LOLF) for the IEEE-RTS at different penetration levels. 
 
10.4  Transmission Constraints and Reinforcements Associated with WECS 
 
 The previous section is focused on generating adequacy (HL-I) analysis in which 
transmission contingencies are not incorporated. In this section, both generation and 
transmission contingencies (HL-II analysis) are considered. Connecting the WECS to 
different locations in a bulk system can have different impacts on the overall system 
reliability depending on the system topology and conditions. Connecting a large-scale 
WECS to an area which has weak transmission could create system operating constraints 
and provide less system benefit than connecting it to an area with stronger transmission. 
This section investigates bulk electric system transmission constraints associated with a 
large-scale wind farm. Transmission reinforcement in a weak transmission area in order 
to absorb more wind power in a system is also illustrated in this section.     
 
10.4.1  Effect of Connecting a Large-Scale WECS at Different Locations 
 
 This section investigates the reliability impact of connecting a WECS at different 
locations in a bulk electric system. Two study scenarios are used in this section. The first 
scenario is based on the original IEEE-RTS described in Section 3.6.2. This system has a 
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strong transmission network (high transfer capability margin), but is generation 
deficient. The second scenario is based on the modified IEEE-RTS described in Section 
9.4.2. There is significant transmission utilization in this system as the bulk of the 
generating capacity is located in the northern area. Considerable power is therefore 
transferred from the northern to the southern portion. This creates transmission 
congestion in the northern part (230 kV). The southern area (138 kV) can be considered 
to have both generation and transmission deficiencies.  
 
Selected reliability indices obtained using the original and modified IEEE-RTS 
without WECS additions are shown in Table 10.3. These results are designated as the 
base case values and are compared with the results obtained in a series of studies 
involving different WECS connections. The load shedding philosophy used in this 
analysis is the pass-1 policy, and the number of simulation years is 6,000 years.  
 
Table 10.3: Base case system reliability indices of the original and modified IEEE-RTS  
                    (No WECS addition). 
Overall System 
Reliability Indices
Original 
IEEE-RTS
Modified 
IEEE-RTS 
EFLC (occ/yr) 9.02 3.78 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 35.26 13.55 
ECOST (M$/yr) 18.962 10.094 
DPUI (sys.mins) 97.81 47.65 
 
 
Buses 1, 8, 13 and 18 were selected for connection to a WECS in order to 
examine the reliability impact associated with system location. Two different WECS 
installations with 120 MW and 480 MW of installed capacity were considered. In the 
120 MW WECS case, a single transmission line with a line rating of 308 MVA is used 
to connect the WECS to the bulk system. In the 480 MW WECS case, two transmission 
lines with individual line ratings of 308 MVA are used to connect the WECS to the bulk 
system. The failure rate and average repair time of the transmission lines are 1 
failure/year and 10 hours respectively. All the wind turbine generators (WTG) are 
assumed to be identical with the reliability parameters and power curve characteristics 
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described in Section 10.2.2. The Regina wind regime is utilized in this study and it is 
assumed that wind power is dispatched whenever it is available.  
 
 Tables 10.4 and 10.5 respectively show the system reliability indices for the 
original IEEE-RTS with the 120 MW and 480 MW WECS connected at the selected 
locations in the system.  
 
Table 10.4: System reliability indices for the original IEEE-RTS when 120 MW of  
                        WECS is connected at the four different locations using a single line. 
Location to Connect the WECS Overall System 
Reliability Indices at Bus 1 at Bus 8 at Bus 13 at Bus 18 
EFLC (occ/yr) 7.95 7.80 8.18 7.85 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 29.00 28.83 32.02 28.98 
ECOST (M$/yr) 15.172 15.179 15.882 15.254 
DPUI (sys.mins) 78.49 78.54 82.05 78.92 
 
 
Table 10.5: System reliability indices for the original IEEE-RTS when 480 MW of 
                        WECS is connected at the four different locations using two lines. 
Location to Connect the WECS Overall System 
Reliability Indices at Bus 1 at Bus 8 at Bus 13 at Bus 18 
EFLC (occ/yr) 8.22 8.97 6.37 6.47 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 24.59 24.53 19.86 20.25 
ECOST (M$/yr) 11.057 10.955 10.391 10.589 
DPUI (sys.mins) 57.09 56.70 53.78 54.78 
 
 
All the reliability indices shown in Tables 10.4 and 10.5 can be used for 
comparison purposes. The frequency-related index EFLC and the severity index DPUI 
are focused on due to their relationships with the variability of wind power and with the 
size of the WECS installed capacity. Table 10.4 shows that the system reliability indices 
when connecting the 120 MW WECS at the four different locations are relatively 
similar. There are reasonable improvements in system reliability compared to the 
original IEEE-RTS base case shown in Table 10.3. Connecting the 120 MW WECS to 
Bus 13 provides the lowest reliability improvement for the four locations. This is not the 
case in the 480 MW WECS study as shown in Table 10.5. The results in this study show 
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that connecting the 480 MW WECS at Bus 13 results in the highest reliability 
improvement for the four buses. The reason for this is that there is a considerable change 
in the network power flows when significant wind power is injected at Bus 13. Bus 13 is 
in a central location and supports both the central and southern areas. Power flow in the 
western side will subsequently reduce. Table 10.5 also indicates that connecting the 480 
MW WECS to Bus 1 or Bus 8 leads to lower reliability improvements than when 
connecting the WECS to Bus 13 or Bus 18. The reason for this is that the 480 MW 
WECS results in transmission congestion (overload on Line # 1 when connecting the 
WECS to Bus 1, and overloads on Lines # 12 and 13 when connecting the WECS to Bus 
8). This is due to the fact that most of the transmission line ratings in the southern part 
(138 kV) of the IEEE-RTS are limited to 208 MVA. A significant amount of wind 
power will cause system congestion if all the available wind power is dispatched prior to 
conventional generation and there is no wind power curtailment policy. Connecting a 
480 MW WECS to Bus 13 or Bus 18 is more advantageous as the transmission network 
in the north (230 kV) is much stronger than that in the south. The differences in 
reliability improvement shown in Table 10.5 when connecting the 480 MW WECS at 
the four different locations are, however, not very significant for the original IEEE-RTS.     
 
The second scenario is based on the modified IEEE-RTS. This system is 
considered to be under stress due to the considerable utilization of the transmission 
network. A significant amount of power flows from the north to the south due to the 
abundance of generation in the north and the southern area has both generation and 
transmission constraint problems. Similar studies to those conducted on the original 
IEEE-RTS were conducted on the modified IEEE-RTS. Tables 10.6 and 10.7 
respectively show the system reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS when 120 
MW and 480 MW of WECS capacities are added to the system. 
 
Tables 10.6 and 10.7 indicate that connecting the 120 MW or 480 MW WECS to 
the southern part of the modified IEEE-RTS (Bus 1 or Bus 8) significantly improves the 
overall system reliability. The improvement is more than that obtained by connecting the 
WECS in the northern area (Bus 13 or Bus 18). The severity indices are considerably 
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different for the cases when the WECS are connecting in the northern and southern 
areas. The DPUI for the Bus 1 and Bus 8 cases (southern) are very similar, and the DPUI 
for the Bus 13 and Bus 18 cases (northern) are similar. This is basically due to the fact 
that the heavy power flows from the north to the south are reduced when the WECS are 
installed in the southern region which increases the available transfer capability margins 
of the northern transmission facilities. 
 
Table 10.6: System reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS when 120 MW of 
                       WECS is connected at the four different locations using a single line. 
Location to Connect the WECS Overall System 
Reliability Indices at Bus 1 at Bus 8 at Bus 13 at Bus 18 
EFLC (occ/yr) 3.66 3.56 3.71 3.77 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 11.54 11.80 13.25 13.13 
ECOST (M$/yr) 8.154 8.186 9.977 9.732 
DPUI (sys.mins) 38.34 38.35 46.34 45.66 
 
 
Table 10.7: System reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS when 480 MW of 
                       WECS is connected at the four different locations using two lines. 
Location to Connect the WECS Overall System 
Reliability Indices at Bus 1 at Bus 8 at Bus 13 at Bus 18 
EFLC (occ/yr) 4.84 3.11 3.13 5.06 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 11.53 9.02 10.07 15.11 
ECOST (M$/yr) 5.701 6.068 8.917 9.638 
DPUI (sys.mins) 26.21 28.23 42.84 45.35 
 
 
As shown in Table 10.6 for the 120 MW WECS scenario, all the EFLC for the 
four cases decrease compared with the base case values shown in Table 10.3. This is not 
the case for the 480 MW WECS study shown in Table 10.7 where the EFLC is higher 
than that of the base case shown in Table 10.3 when the WECS is connected to Bus 1 or 
to Bus 18. The EFLC when the WECS is connected to Bus 8 or to Bus 13 decreases 
compared to that for the base case. Connecting the 480 MW WECS to Bus 1 creates 
considerable transmission congestion (overload) on Line # 1 (underground cable 
between Bus 1 and Bus 2). Similarly, Line # 23 (between Bus 14 and Bus 16) is heavily 
congested when the 480 MW WECS is connected to Bus 18 due to heavier power flow 
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from the north to the south. It is interesting to note that the DPUI as shown in Table 10.7 
for the cases when the 480 MW WECS is connected to Bus 13 or Bus 18 only slightly 
decrease compared to the DPUI when the 120 MW WECS is connected to Bus 13 or 
Bus 18 as shown in Table 10.6. This implies that adding additional wind power at these 
buses is not very effectively in improving the system reliability. The reliability 
improvement percentages in the DPUI due to the WECS over the base case DPUI 
presented in Table 10.3 are shown in Figure 10.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.9: DPUI improvement over the base case by adding 120 MW and 480 MW of 
                     WECS capacity to the original and the modified IEEE-RTS. 
 
In conclusion, the impact of wind power on system reliability is not only 
dependent on the wind regime, but is also related to the connection point in the bulk 
system. This impact is also dependent on the overall system topology and the operating 
conditions particularly those associated with transmission limitations. For example, the 
locations used to connect the WECS in the modified IEEE-RTS play more important 
roles in reliability improvement than those used when connecting the WECS to the 
original IEEE-RTS. This is due to the fact that there is significant transmission 
utilization in the modified IEEE-RTS, and therefore more transmission constraints 
compared to the original IEEE-RTS. Transmission capacities play an important role in 
restricting the maximum amount of wind power that a system can absorb without 
creating deterioration in the overall system reliability. The following section investigates 
the maximum amount of wind power that a system can absorb without deteriorating the 
overall system reliability when connecting the WECS at specific locations. 
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10.4.2  Transmission Capacity Limitations Associated with WECS 
 
 A bulk electric system can encounter transmission capacity limitation problems 
when a large-scale WECS is connected to a weak transmission area. The maximum 
amount of wind power that a system can absorb without violating the system constraints 
is dependent on the connection point in the system. This section examines the reliability 
impacts when various amounts of wind power are injected into a bulk electric system at 
specified locations. The modified IEEE-RTS is used in this study. Buses 1 and 8 were 
selected as the specific connection points. WECS installed capacities of 120, 240, 360 
and 480 MW are used. Two transmission lines with individual line ratings of 308 MVA, 
similar to those described in the previous section, are used in this study to connect the 
WECS to the system for all the WECS installed capacities. Case studies based on the 
utilization of single and multiple wind farms are also considered in this section.  
 
A.  Single Wind Farm 
 
 The Regina wind regime is used to model the WECS in this section. Tables 10.8 
and 10.9 respectively show the system reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS 
when the WECS is connected to Bus 1 and Bus 8. Table 10.8 indicates that the EFLC 
decreases when the WECS capacity increases from 120 MW to 240 MW. The EFLC for 
the case of 360 MW capacity, however, increases compared to the 240 MW value. A 
higher EFLC can be expected when the WECS capacity increases beyond 360 MW due 
to the fact that there is an average overload duration of 2 hrs/yr on Line # 1 (between 
Buses 1 and 2) when 360 MW of WECS is added at Bus 1. An average overload 
duration of 16 hrs/yr on Line # 1 occurs when the 480 MW of WECS is added at Bus 1. 
It should be noted that in these studies, there is no wind power curtailment policy 
applied and all the available wind power is used prior to dispatching conventional 
generation. It is also important to note that even though the EFLC increases when the 
WECS addition at Bus 1 exceeds 240 MW, the DPUI gradually decreases when larger 
WECS are utilized. These studies indicate that based on the EFLC, the maximum WECS 
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capacity that should be connected at Bus 1 is around 240 MW. Additional studies using 
different WECS capacities should be conducted to determine the specific value. 
 
Table 10.8: System reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS when different WECS 
                    capacities are connected at Bus 1.  
WECS Installed Capacity Overall System 
Reliability Indices 120 MW 240 MW 360 MW 480 MW 
EFLC (occ/yr) 3.36 3.19 3.28 4.84 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 11.20 10.02 9.51 11.53 
ECOST (M$/yr) 7.822 6.816 6.118 5.701 
DPUI (sys.mins) 36.52 31.70 28.23 26.21 
 
 
Table 10.9: System reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS when different WECS 
                    capacities are connected at Bus 8.  
WECS Installed Capacity Overall System 
Reliability Indices 120 MW 240 MW 360 MW 480 MW 
EFLC (occ/yr) 3.32 3.02 2.88 3.11 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 11.23 10.00 9.26 9.02 
ECOST (M$/yr) 8.237 7.246 6.550 6.068 
DPUI (sys.mins) 38.54 33.74 30.38 28.23 
 
    
In a similar manner, Table 10.9 indicates that the maximum WECS capacity that 
should be connected at Bus 8 is around 360 MW. This is due to the average overload 
durations on Lines # 12 and 13 respectively of 0.5 and 1 hr/yr. Tables 10.8 and 10.9 
show that the WECS capacities that the bulk system can absorb at the two different 
connection points  are considerably different. In practice, the location of a large-scale 
wind farm is dependent on the existence of a suitable wind regime. The studies shown in 
this section can be used to investigate the reliability benefit of all the potential BES 
connection points in close proximity to the wind power development area. The studies 
can also be used to assist in system reinforcement planning to assess the system 
capability to absorb more wind power at specified locations.       
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B.  Multiple Wind Farms 
 
 A single wind farm is used in the previous section to examine the maximum 
WECS capacity that a system can absorb, without violating the system constraints. In the 
case of a single wind farm, the maximum wind power at a specific point of time could 
be very close or equal to the total WECS installed capacity as all the WTG are subject to 
the same wind regime. This is not the case for multiple large-scale wind farms where the 
WTG at different locations may not be subjected to the same wind speed. Consequently, 
the total maximum wind power produced will not often be equal to the sum of the 
individual wind farm capacities. The transmission network may in fact be able to absorb 
more WECS capacity when multiple wind farms are used. This section examines the 
impact of multiple wind farms on system reliability improvement. Two wind regimes 
designated as Regina and Swift Current are used in this study. The wind speeds for the 
two wind farms are assumed to have a cross-correlation factor (Rxy) of 0.75. The 
installed capacity of each wind farm is assumed to be equal, and therefore the total 
installed capacity is twice the individual wind farm capacity. The two wind farms are 
assumed to be in reasonably close proximity and connected to the modified IEEE-RTS 
at Bus 1 through two transmission lines as illustrated in Figure 10.10. A similar 
arrangement is used to add WECS capacity at Bus 8 in the following analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.10: Multiple wind farms connected to Bus 1 of the modified IEEE-RTS. 
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Tables 10.10 and 10.11 respectively show the system reliability indices when 
two identical capacity WECS and different total installed capacities are connected at Bus 
1 and Bus 8. 
 
Table 10.10: System reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS when two identical 
                       capacity WECS and different total capacities are connected at Bus 1.  
WECS Installed Capacity Overall System 
Reliability Indices 120 MW 240 MW 360 MW 480 MW 
EFLC (occ/yr) 3.38 3.16 3.19 4.43 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 11.26 10.00 9.37 10.69 
ECOST (M$/yr) 7.918 6.777 6.101 5.670 
DPUI (sys.mins) 37.07 31.55 28.28 26.13 
 
 
Table 10.11: System reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS when two identical 
                       capacity WECS and different total capacities are connected at Bus 8. 
WECS Installed Capacity Overall System 
Reliability Indices 120 MW 240 MW 360 MW 480 MW 
EFLC (occ/yr) 3.32 3.00 2.86 2.92 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 11.24 10.02 9.22 8.74 
ECOST (M$/yr) 8.281 7.324 6.602 5.974 
DPUI (sys.mins) 38.81 34.28 30.70 27.71 
 
    
 The results shown in Tables 10.10 and 10.11 for the multiple WECS cases can be 
compared with those shown in Tables 10.8 and 10.9 for the single WECS cases. In 
general, there is more reliability benefit when two wind farms, which are reasonably 
close to each other (Rxy = 0.75) are utilized rather than using a single wind farm. The 
frequency and duration related indices (EFLC and EDLC) basically improve by using 
two wind farms. The severity index DPUI for each WECS addition is basically similar to 
that obtained using a single wind farm.    
 
 Table 10.10 indicates that the EFLC for the 360 MW WECS case is very close to 
the 240 MW case when connecting two WECS to Bus 1. This implies that the maximum 
WECS capacity that the system can absorb, can be increased compared to the single 
wind farm case. The average overload duration on Line # 1 in the 360 MW two wind 
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farm case is reduced to 1 hr/yr from 2 hrs/yr for the single wind farm. The EFLC 
increases due to transmission congestion on Line # 1 for the 480 MW two wind farm 
case. The average overload duration on Line # 1 for the 480 MW two wind farm case 
reduces to 12 hrs/yr compared to the 16 hrs/yr for the 480 MW single wind farm. This 
suggests that transmission reinforcement is required in order to add more WECS 
capacity at Bus 1.  
 
Table 10.11 shows the results when the two wind farms are connected at Bus 8. 
The results indicate that the EFLC for the 480 MW WECS case is very close to the 360 
MW value when the two WECS are connected at Bus 8. The maximum WECS capacity 
that the system can absorb through Bus 8, can be increased to 480 MW compared to 360 
MW under a single farm situation. This indicates that the bulk system can absorb the 
total 480 MW installed capacity from two wind farms through Bus 8 without requiring 
major system reinforcement. 
 
 The results show that Bus 8 can absorb up to 480 MW of WECS and that Bus 1 
cannot absorb 480 MW of WECS without severely violating the transmission 
constraints. Transmission system reinforcement is considered in the following section 
for the case in which 480 MW of WECS in two wind farms is added at Bus 1 in the 
modified IEEE-RTS.  
 
10.4.3  Transmission Reinforcement Planning Associated with WECS 
  
Two wind farms with a total of 480 MW installed capacity are assumed to be 
located in the south-western region of the modified IEEE-RTS shown in Figure 10.10. 
The shortest path to connect the wind farm to the bulk system is through Bus 1 and is 80 
km in length. The distances from the wind farms to Bus 3 and Bus 4 are approximately 
100 km in each case. As noted earlier, there is a transmission limitation when connecting 
480 MW of WECS to Bus 1. This section examines possible transmission reinforcement 
alternatives in order to absorb this amount of wind capacity without severely violating 
the transmission constraints. This section describes three studies. The first study 
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considers the case where the wind farm owner pays for the connection path to the bulk 
system. The wind farm owner will attempt to minimize the overall connection costs by 
building two transmission lines to the closest bus. In the second study, the system 
planner negotiates with the wind farm owner to reroute the connection path to benefit 
the overall system reliability. In this case, the system planner should subsidize some part 
of the connection cost incurred by the wind farm owner. Reliability cost/reliability worth 
analyses are conducted on the selected transmission reinforcement alternatives to 
determine the optimum planning option in the third study. 
 
A.  Wind Farm Owner Pays the Overall Connection Costs 
 
 In this section, it is assumed that the wind farm owner chooses to build two 
parallel lines to Bus 1. This is the shortest path to the bulk system (80 km in length). 
This would be the economically preferable option from a wind farm owner’s perspective 
and does not consider any possible bulk system constraints that might arise from 
injecting a significant amount of wind power at this location. The bulk system planner is 
considered to be responsible for any system reinforcements required in order to absorb 
the 480 MW of WECS into the system. Five selected reinforcement alternatives are 
shown in Figure 10.11. These alternatives are designated as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.11: Transmission reinforcement alternatives (Alternatives 1 – 5) for the 
                            modified IEEE-RTS with the 480 MW WECS addition. 
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Alternative 1: Constructing Line A 
Alternative 2: Constructing Line B.1 
Alternative 3: Constructing Line C.1 
Alternative 4: Constructing Lines B.1 and B.2 
Alternative 5: Constructing Lines C.1 and C.2 
 
The system reliability indices for the five transmission reinforcement cases 
(Alternatives 1 – 5) for the modified IEEE-RTS with the 480 MW WECS addition are 
shown in Table 10.12. 
 
Table 10.12: System reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS with the five  
                            transmission reinforcement alternatives when the 480 MW WECS 
                            addition is connected to Bus 1. 
Transmission Reinforcement Alternative Overall System 
Reliability Indices Alter. 1 Alter. 2 Alter. 3 Alter. 4 Alter. 5 
EFLC (occ/yr) 2.77 4.01 3.05 3.53 2.88 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 8.18 9.45 8.45 8.47 7.75 
ECOST (M$/yr) 5.123 4.729 5.740 4.339 4.609 
DPUI (sys.mins) 24.27 21.59 26.50 19.86 21.19 
 
 
Table 10.12 shows that Alternative 1 (constructing line A) provides the lowest 
EFLC and a low EDLC. This is due to the fact that transmission congestion on Line # 1 
is alleviated by constructing a parallel path. Alternative 2 (constructing line B.1) 
provides the least reliability improvement. The reason for this is that constructing line 
B.1 does not effectively alleviate the overload on Line # 1. The average overload 
duration on Line # 1 in this case decreases slightly from 12 hrs/yr, before reinforcement 
to 10 hrs/yr. Alternative 3 (constructing line C.1) reduces the average overload duration 
on Line # 1 to 2 hrs/yr. The average overload duration on Line # 1 decreases slightly to 9 
hrs/yr by constructing lines B.1 and B.2 (Alternative 4). The severity index DPUI in this 
case is the lowest of the five alternatives. Alternative 4 strengthens the transmission 
around Bus 3 which results in a considerable reduction in the unserved energy at this 
bus. Alternative 5 (constructing lines C.1 and C.2) results in the lowest EDLC and the 
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second lowest EFLC. An overload on Line # 1, however, still exists for an average of 2 
hrs/yr. Reliability cost/worth analyses of these five reinforcement alternatives are 
addressed later in this chapter.  
 
B.  Wind Farm Connection Costs Partially Subsidized by the System Planner 
 
In the previous section, the wind farm owner is assumed to construct the required 
connection at the minimum cost. This involves the shortest path with parallel circuits on 
the same structure. This process does not involve transmission network limitation 
considerations, and any positive or negative impacts on the overall system reliability. In 
this study, the system planner is assumed to be involved in deciding which connection 
path should be utilized. Negotiations between the system planner and the wind farm 
owner to consider alternative connection paths and the resulting additional connection 
costs incurred are required in this case. The system planner should pay for any increase 
in the connection costs incurred due to rerouting the connection paths to benefit the 
overall system reliability. Six selected transmission reinforcement alternatives are 
considered in this section, and are designated as Alternatives 6 – 11. These alternatives 
are shown in Figures 10.12 – 10.14 and are described as follows: 
 
Alternative 6: Constructing Line D 
Alternative 7: Constructing Lines D and B.2 
Alternative 8: Constructing Line E 
Alternative 9: Constructing Lines E and C.2 
Alternative 10: Constructing Lines D and E 
Alternative 11: Constructing Lines D, E and C.2 
 
The system reliability indices for Alternatives 6 – 11 for the modified IEEE-RTS 
with the 480 MW WECS addition are shown in Table 10.13. 
 
 
 
 227
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.12: Transmission reinforcement alternatives (Alternatives 6 and 7) for the 
                          modified IEEE-RTS with the 480 MW WECS addition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.13: Transmission reinforcement alternatives (Alternatives 8 and 9) for the 
                          modified IEEE-RTS with the 480 MW WECS addition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.14: Transmission reinforcement alternatives (Alternatives 10 and 11) for the 
                         modified IEEE-RTS with the 480 MW WECS addition. 
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Table 10.13: System reliability indices for the modified IEEE-RTS with the six 
                             transmission reinforcement alternatives when 480 MW of WECS  
                             is connected to the system. 
Transmission Reinforcement Alternative Overall System 
Reliability Indices Alter. 6 Alter. 7 Alter. 8 Alter. 9 Alter. 10 Alter. 11
EFLC (occ/yr) 2.71 2.49 2.63 2.39 2.53 2.31 
EDLC (hrs/yr) 7.26 6.85 7.51 6.80 6.49 6.10 
ECOST (M$/yr) 4.174 3.664 4.883 4.216 3.394 3.146 
DPUI (sys.mins) 19.33 17.13 22.83 19.81 16.13 14.99 
 
 
Table 10.13 indicates that Alternative 11 provides the highest overall system 
reliability improvement followed by Alternative 10. Overload on Line # 1 is eliminated 
in the case of Alternatives 8 – 11 due to rerouting the connection paths. An average 
overload duration of 1 hr/yr on Line # 1 still exists in Alternatives 6 and 7. The severity 
index DPUI for Alternatives 6 and 7 are, however, lower than those for Alternatives 8 
and 9. As noted earlier, transmission reinforcement at Bus 3 results in a significant 
decrease in unserved energy at this bus.     
 
An economic analysis of the eleven transmission reinforcement alternatives are 
examined using reliability cost/reliability worth considerations in the next section. An 
optimum solution may not come from the alternative that provides the highest reliability, 
and the alternative with the lowest investment cost may not be utilized if it does not 
provide suitable reliability improvement.  
 
C.  Transmission Reinforcement Selection Using Reliability Cost/Worth Analysis  
 
The concept and application of reliability cost/reliability worth analysis are 
illustrated in Chapter 9 considering both adequacy and security perspectives. A similar 
cost/worth analysis process is applied in this chapter. The studies conducted in this 
chapter are, however, focused on adequacy assessment and security-related costs are not 
considered in this analysis. The customer interruption cost (ECOST) is used together 
with the investment cost incurred in order to determine the minimum cost option.   
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In this economic study, the focus is on the utility costs that are incurred due to 
transmission reinforcements. If the system planner negotiates with the wind farm owner 
to reroute the connection path in order to improve the overall system reliability, part of 
the connection costs should be paid by the system planner. This additional cost is taken 
into account in the following economic analysis. Reliability cost/worth analyses for all 
the eleven transmission reinforcement alternatives described earlier were conducted 
using the following assumptions. 
 
Investment cost of a 138 kV overhead transmission line = 0.4 M$/km 
Investment cost of a 138 kV underground transmission line = 2.4 M$/km  
Transmission line length: Line A = 5 km (underground cable) 
         Line B.1 = 88 km,  Line B.2 = 50 km 
         Line C.1 = 36 km,  Line C.2 = 44 km 
         Line D = 100 km,  Line E = 100 km 
Useful lifetime considered = 40 years 
Line maintenance cost (during a useful lifetime) = 5% of the project cost 
Discount rate (present worth rate) = 8% per year 
Therefore, CRF  =  
10.08)(1
0.08)0.08(1
40
40
−+
+  = 0.08386 
 
The wind farm owner pays the transmission connection costs for Alternatives 1 
to 5.  
 
For Alternative 1: Constructing Line A (underground cable) 
Project cost (P1)  = investment cost + maintenance cost 
      = 2.4×5 (M$) + 0.05×2.4×5 (M$)  = 12.60 (M$) 
The annual capital payment (ACP1) = P1×CRF = 12.60×0.08386 = 1.057 M$/yr. 
 
For Alternative 2: Constructing Line B.1 
Project cost (P2)  = 1.05×(0.4×88)  = 36.96 (M$)          
The annual capital payment (ACP2) = P2×CRF = 36.96×0.08386 = 3.099 M$/yr. 
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For Alternative 3: Constructing Line C.1 
Project cost (P3)  = 1.05×(0.4×36)  = 15.12 (M$)          
The annual capital payment (ACP3) = P3×CRF = 15.12×0.08386 = 1.268 M$/yr. 
 
For Alternative 4: Constructing Lines B.1 and B.2 
Project cost (P4)  = 1.05×(0.4×88 + 0.4×50)  = 57.96 (M$)         
The annual capital payment (ACP4) = P4×CRF = 57.96×0.08386 = 4.861 M$/yr. 
 
For Alternative 5: Constructing Lines C.1 and C.2 
Project cost (P5)  = 1.05×(0.4×36 + 0.4×44)  = 33.60 (M$)         
The annual capital payment (ACP5) = P5×CRF = 33.60×0.08386 = 2.818 M$/yr. 
 
In Alternatives 6 – 11, the system planner negotiates with the wind farm owner 
to reroute the connection points to provide an overall system reliability benefit. This 
introduces a possible additional investment cost to the wind farm owner as this requires 
the construction of longer lines rather than utilizing the shortest path to the bulk system. 
The investment cost associated with constructing two different paths will be higher than 
that required to build parallel circuits on the same structure. In this case, the system 
planner will have to provide funding in order to convince the wind farm owner to reroute 
the required transmission. In this study, the additional investment and maintenance costs 
of any rerouted transmission path is paid by the system planner. 
 
The length of the original shortest parallel path from the wind farms to Bus 1 is 
80 km. The investment cost of a second line is assumed to be 50% of the cost of the first 
line when a double circuit structure is used. The wind farm owner’s connection cost is as 
follows: 
 
Project cost (P)  = investment cost + maintenance cost 
     = (0.4×80  + 
2
1 ×0.4×80)   +   0.05×(0.4×80  + 
2
1 ×0.4×80) 
     = 50.40 (M$) 
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The original connection cost for the wind farm owner is M$ 50.40. Any 
additional investment costs due to a rerouted path that exceeds the original connection 
cost of M$ 50.40 is subsidized by the system planner.  
 
Annual capital payments due to transmission reinforcement planning conducted 
by the system planner for Alternatives 6 to 11 are as follows: 
 
For Alternative 6: Alternative 6: Constructing Line D (rerouted) 
P6  = (cost of line D + cost of a line to Bus 1) – original connection cost 
      = 1.05×(0.4×100 + 0.4×80) – 50.40  = 25.20 (M$)   (rerouted cost) 
The annual capital payment (ACP6) = P6×CRF = 25.20×0.08386 = 2.113 M$/yr. 
 
For Alternative 7: Constructing Lines D (rerouted) and B.2 
P7  =  25.20  +  1.05×(0.4×50)  =  46.20 (M$)         
The annual capital payment (ACP7) = P7×CRF = 46.20×0.08386 = 3.874 M$/yr. 
 
For Alternative 8: Constructing Line E (rerouted) 
P8  = (cost of line E + cost of a line to Bus 1) – original connection cost 
      = 1.05×(0.4×100 + 0.4×80) – 50.40  = 25.20 (M$)   (rerouted cost) 
The annual capital payment (ACP8) = P8×CRF = 25.20×0.08386 = 2.113 M$/yr. 
 
For Alternative 9: Constructing Lines E (rerouted) and C.2 
P9  = 25.20  +  1.05×(0.4×44) = 43.68 (M$)         
The annual capital payment (ACP9) = P9×CRF = 43.68×0.08386 = 3.663 M$/yr. 
 
For Alternative 10: Constructing Lines D (rerouted) and E (rerouted) 
P10  = 1.05×(0.4×100 + 0.4×100)  – 50.40  = 33.60 (M$)                   
The annual capital payment (ACP10) = P10×CRF = 33.60×0.08386 = 2.818 M$/yr. 
 
For Alternative 11: Constructing Lines D (rerouted), E (rerouted) and C.2 
P11  = 33.60  +  1.05×(0.4×44)  = 52.08 (M$)                   
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The annual capital payment (ACP11) = P11×CRF = 52.08×0.08386 = 4.367 M$/yr. 
 
 The total cost (TOC) of each reinforcement alternative is obtained by summing 
the expected customer interruption cost (ECOST) and the annual capital payment 
(ACP). The total costs for all the alternatives are on a one year basis and are shown in 
Table 10.14. The lowest TOC indicates the optimum alternative based on reliability cost 
and reliability worth.  
 
Table 10.14: Reliability cost/worth components for the transmission reinforcement   
                          alternatives in the modified IEEE-RTS with a 480 MW WECS addition.    
Reinforcement
Alternative 
ACP 
(M$/yr)
ECOST
(M$/yr)
TOC 
(M$/yr) 
Alternative 1 1.057 5.123 6.180 
Alternative 2 3.099 4.729 7.828 
Alternative 3 1.268 5.740 7.008 
Alternative 4 4.861 4.339 9.200 
Alternative 5 2.818 4.609 7.427 
Alternative 6 2.113 4.174 6.287 
Alternative 7 3.874 3.664 7.538 
Alternative 8 2.113 4.883 6.996 
Alternative 9 3.663 4.216 7.879 
Alternative 10 2.818 3.394 6.212 
Alternative 11 4.367 3.146 7.513 
 
 
Table 10.14 indicates that Alternative 1 provides the lowest TOC of 6.180 M$/yr 
following by Alternatives 10 (6.212 M$/yr) and 6 (6.287 M$/yr). Alternative 1 involves 
only a short length of underground cable. Alternative 10 is very competitive with 
Alternative 1 as the TOC of Alternative 10 is only 0.032 M$/yr higher than that of 
Alternative 1. When considering the components in the total cost, the ECOST due to 
Alternative 10 is 1.729 M$/yr lower than that of Alternative 1. As shown in Tables 
10.12 and 10.13, Alternative 10 provides the second best reliability improvement while 
Alternative 1 is second last in reliability improvement for the eleven reinforcement 
alternatives. Alternative 1 with the lowest investment cost does not provide a 
comparable reliability improvement to that of Alternative 10. The system planner is not 
involved in the selection of the system connection point for Alternative 1. Alternative 10 
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involves agreement between the system planner and the wind farm owner to reroute the 
system connections to provide overall system reliability benefits. Alternative 10 is more 
advantageous than Alternative 1 and is the best option of the proposed transmission 
reinforcement planning schemes. This option will facilitate the addition of 480 MW of 
WECS to the bulk system and provide overall system reliability improvement. 
Alternative 10 should also prove to be the most attractive when considering future load 
growth. Long term planning analysis should be conducted as illustrated in Chapter 9 to 
examine the potential of each alternative.    
 
10.5  Conclusions 
 
Wind power integration in bulk electric system reliability evaluation is presented 
in this chapter. One advantage of utilizing sequential Monte Carlo simulation in bulk 
electric system reliability evaluation is that the framework already exists to incorporate 
the chronological characteristics of wind (diurnal and season wind speeds). Sequential 
simulation is therefore ideally suited to the analysis of intermittent generating resources 
such as wind energy conversion systems (WECS). The WECS models involving wind 
turbine generator power curve characteristics and hourly simulated wind speed using the 
auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) time series model are illustrated in this 
chapter. A wind speed simulation model and a correlation adjustment technique to 
incorporate multiple wind regimes are also presented in this chapter. The correlation 
adjustment technique provides realistic wind speed simulations for wind regimes that are 
related to each other. Analyses at both HL-I and HL-II to investigate the reliability 
impacts associated with wind power are presented. The impact of different degrees of 
wind speed correlation on the overall system reliability is examined using HL-I analysis. 
The results show that there is a higher system reliability improvement when wind speeds 
between wind farms are less correlated, as the wind power at the two sites can support or 
assist each other and variations in the total wind power are smoothed out. The capacity 
value of WECS based on the effective load carrying capability (ELCC) technique is 
investigated using the LOLE and LOLF as the criterion reliability indices. The results 
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show that the ELCC(LOLE) and ELCC(LOLF) are similar for a conventional generating unit, 
but can be considerably different for WECS.  
 
The effect of connecting a large-scale WECS at different locations in a bulk 
electric system is investigated. The results show that the impact on the system reliability 
of a WECS addition is dependent on the location used to connect the WECS to the bulk 
system. This is related to the system topology and conditions, particularly when there are 
transmission system limitations. This chapter also investigates the maximum amount of 
wind power that can be absorbed by a system without severely violating the system 
constraints. The maximum amount can vary when connecting the WECS at different 
locations. The analyses presented in this chapter can be used to determine the maximum 
WECS installed capacity that can be injected at specified locations in a bulk electric 
system, and assist system planners to create potential transmission reinforcement 
schemes to facilitate large-scale WECS additions to the bulk system. Transmission 
reinforcement planning associated with large-scale WECS, and the utilization of 
reliability cost/worth analysis in the examination of reinforcement alternatives are also 
illustrated in this chapter.   
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CHAPTER 11   
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
 Electric power utilities are facing increasing uncertainty regarding the political, 
economic, societal and environmental constraints under which they have to operate 
existing systems and plan future systems, and methods capable of analyzing the 
reliability of bulk electricity systems much larger than in those the past are needed. 
Modern developments in high speed computation facilities now permit the realistic 
utilization of sequential Monte Carlo simulation in practical bulk electric system 
reliability assessment resulting in a more complete understanding of bulk electric system 
risks and associated uncertainties. This research work is focused on composite 
generation and transmission system reliability evaluation using sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation. Sequential simulation can be used to reasonably represent most 
contingencies and the complex operating characteristics inherent in a bulk electric 
system and also provide a comprehensive range of reliability indices in both adequacy 
and steady-state security analyses. Two significant advantages when utilizing sequential 
simulation are the ability to obtain accurate frequency and duration indices, and the 
opportunity to synthesize the reliability index probability distributions associated with 
the mean values.  
      
Non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation techniques are briefly introduced in 
Chapter 2 together with the basic concepts and methodology of the sequential Monte 
Carlo simulation approach. The advantages and disadvantages of utilizing the sequential 
Monte Carlo simulation technique are also discussed in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the basic elements in bulk electric system reliability analysis 
using sequential Monte Carlo simulation. A general review of the basic delivery point 
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and system indices is presented. Network solution techniques and corrective action 
methods involving system operating constraints violations are described. Approximate 
methods for split network and ill-conditioned network solutions are also addressed. The 
concept of applying different load curtailment philosophies and their implementation in 
a linear programming technique is discussed in this chapter. The overall sequential 
simulation procedure for bulk electric system reliability analysis is demonstrated. A 
computer software using AC based load flow has been developed in this research work 
and is designated as RapHL-II (Reliability analysis program for HL-II). The two test 
systems known as the RBTS and IEEE-RTS used throughout the research work are 
briefly illustrated. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the utilization of sequential and non-sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation to calculate the interruption frequency indices of a bulk electric power 
system. Available DC based load flow software known as SECOREL and MECORE 
respectively are used to investigate the inherent differences in the calculated interruption 
frequency index by using sequential and non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation. Two 
factors that influence the frequency index calculation are the system failure state 
transitions and the demand chronology. These factors are examined and illustrated in 
this chapter. The results show that the impact of chronology is highly significant, and 
can exceed the impact of failure state transitions [127]. The sequential simulation 
approach is the most comprehensive technique available and can be used to provide 
frequency index estimates that can serve as benchmarks against which other 
approximate techniques such as the non-sequential method can be compared. 
 
 Reliability worth assessment methodologies for bulk electric systems are 
presented in Chapter 5. The event-based customer interruption cost evaluation (EBCost) 
technique described in References [68, 69] was implemented in the simulation software 
(RapHL-II) to provide realistic and accurate incorporation of the temporal variations in 
customer outage costs in reliability worth analysis. The results obtained using this 
method therefore can also serve as benchmarks in the development of more approximate 
methods required due to the absence of detailed information in many real life situations. 
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Three approximate methods designated as the average demand interrupted, the average 
delivery point restoration duration and the average system restoration duration 
approaches are developed and compared in this chapter. These approximate methods can 
be practically applied in the absence of detailed system information. 
 
 Chapter 6 presents the development of delivery point and system reliability index 
probability distributions in bulk electric systems using the sequential simulation 
approach. The results show that the reliability index probability distributions for the 
individual delivery points have unique characteristics. These unique aspects are due to 
system topology, operating policies and conditions [128]. System operating strategies, 
particularly those related to load curtailment policies, have important impacts on the 
individual delivery point characteristics. The load curtailment policies, however, have 
relatively little impact on the overall system reliability indices other than those related to 
reliability worth [102]. The concept of predicting bulk electric system reliability 
performance indices and their probability distributions [129, 130] is demonstrated in this 
chapter and sensitivity analyses are conducted to investigate the impacts of repair time 
distribution modeling. The results show that component repair time distribution 
characteristics have a considerable effect on the probability distributions of duration-
related indices such as the SAIDI and SARI of a single circuit delivery point. The 
impact is, however, less significant on the probability distributions of SAIDI and SARI 
for multi-circuit delivery points.  
 
 The utilization of bulk electric system reliability performance index probability 
distributions in a performance based regulation (PBR) mechanism is introduced in 
Chapter 7. The SAIFI and SAIDI for bulk electric systems are utilized in separate 
reward/penalty PBR frameworks. Actual historical data and simulated bulk electric 
system reliability performance indices are applied to hypothetical PBR frameworks in 
this chapter. A discussion of the potential utilization of the PBR protocol for overall bulk 
electric systems is presented. This discussion is extended to include the utilization of 
reliability performance index probability distributions in a PBR mechanism applied to a 
transmission company. 
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 Bulk electric system well-being analysis using sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation is presented in Chapter 8. The system well-being concept provides a 
probabilistic framework that incorporates a practical simplification of the traditional 
operating states associated with the accepted deterministic N-1 security criterion, and 
therefore steady-state security considerations are recognized in system well-being 
analysis. The results indicate that different system conditions that result in a similar 
degree of system risk may not necessarily result in the same degree of system stress  
[131]. The reverse is also true. The utilization of sequential simulation in bulk electric 
system well-being analysis provides accurate frequency and duration assessments and 
the associated well-being index probability distributions.  
 
Chapter 9 introduces a combined reliability analysis framework for bulk electric 
systems that includes both security and adequacy perspectives. The combined 
framework is achieved using system well-being analysis and traditional adequacy 
assessment. System well-being analysis is used to quantify the degree of N-1 security 
and N-1 insecurity in terms of probabilities and frequencies. Traditional adequacy 
assessment is incorporated to quantify the magnitude of the severity and consequences 
associated with system failure. Selected adequacy-based and security-based indices are 
used to create a comprehensive combined reliability framework. The results based on the 
combined reliability framework indicate that system adequacy is adversely affected by a 
generation deficient environment and system security is adversely affected by a 
transmission deficient environment. A system planning process using combined 
adequacy and security considerations offers an additional reliability-based dimension. 
The proposed process is illustrated by considering a series of possible reinforcement 
alternatives in the two test systems using reliability cost/reliability worth considerations.  
 
Wind power integration in bulk electric system reliability evaluation is presented 
in Chapter 10. Reliability analyses at both HL-I and HL-II involving WECS are 
illustrated in this chapter. The impact of different degrees of wind speed correlation on 
the overall system reliability is examined using HL-I analysis. The capacity value of 
WECS using the effective load carrying capability (ELCC) technique is investigated 
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using the LOLE and LOLF as criterion reliability indices. The results show that the 
ELCC(LOLE) and ELCC(LOLF) are similar for a conventional generating unit, but can be 
quite different for WECS. The effect of connecting a large-scale WECS at different 
locations in a bulk electric system is investigated. The results show that the impact of 
wind power on system reliability is affected by the connection location particularly 
when there are transmission system limitations. The maximum amount of wind power 
that can be absorbed by a system at specific locations without creating severe system 
constraints is also investigated. Transmission reinforcement planning associated with 
large-scale WECS, and reliability cost/worth analysis associated with reinforcement 
alternatives are also illustrated in this chapter. 
 
A comprehensive technique utilizing sequential simulation for composite system 
reliability evaluation has been implemented in a developed software designated as 
RapHL-II and used in this thesis. The computer software utilizes an AC-based power 
flow technique which provides an opportunity to incorporate reactive power and voltage 
considerations in the reliability simulation framework. Reactive power and voltage 
constraints are becoming serious concerns due to increased utilization of transmission 
networks created by the current transmission open access paradigm. The RapHL-II 
software can be used to obtain predictive reliability indices for individual delivery points 
and for the overall system together with their probability distributions. Reliability worth 
considerations are playing an increasing role in power system planning and operation. A 
comprehensive technique for reliability worth assessment is therefore essential, and 
implemented in the RapHL-II software.  
 
Non-sequential simulation requires considerably less computation time than 
sequential simulation, particularly in large bulk system reliability studies. The sequential 
technique can, however, provide more accurate reliability indices, particularly in regard 
to the frequency of load point and system failures, but also requires considerable 
additional data in the form of individual bus chronological load profiles. Both techniques 
therefore have advantages and disadvantages in the reliability evaluation of large 
practical bulk electric power systems. Both techniques can, however, be used to provide 
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reasonable estimates of system adequacy given that the underlying differences and 
approximations are understood. 
 
The concept of applying reliability index probability distributions to manage 
bulk electricity system risk is introduced in this thesis. Synthesizing bulk electric system 
reliability performance index probability distributions provides a multi-dimensional risk 
assessment tool that can complement the single risk dimension provided by an expected 
or average value. Reliability index probability distribution analysis can be used as a 
supplementary tool to manage and control future potential risks arising within a bulk 
electric system. This risk assessment tool can provide power engineers and risk 
managers with a more profound knowledge of their bulk electric system. It offers 
additional information insight for planning engineers on when system improvements and 
reinforcements should be conducted to reduce future potential risk and uncertainty. 
 
Most electric power utilities use deterministic techniques such as the traditional 
N-1 security criterion to assess system reliability in transmission system planning. These 
deterministic approaches are not consistent and do not provide an accurate basis for 
comparing alternate equipment configurations and performing economic analyses as 
they do not incorporate the probabilistic or stochastic nature of the system behavior and 
component failures. There is therefore growing interest in combining deterministic 
considerations with probabilistic assessment in order to evaluate the “system well-
being” of a composite generation and transmission system and to evaluate the likelihood, 
not only of entering a complete failure state, but also the likelihood of being very close 
to trouble. The system well-being concept presented in this thesis provides system 
engineers and risk managers with a comprehensive appreciation of specific system 
conditions, and additional information on the degree of system vulnerability under a 
particular system condition using a quantitative interpretation of the degree of system 
security and insecurity. 
 
The combined bulk electric system reliability framework created in this thesis 
can provide system planners with an appreciation of the degrees of system adequacy and 
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security under particular system conditions. The developed combined adequacy and 
security framework can assist system planners to realize the overall benefits associated 
with a system reinforcement option based on the degree of adequacy and security, and 
therefore facilitate the decision making process. The combined reliability framework 
should prove particularly useful in restructured electricity environments where system 
stress is becoming increasingly important. 
 
Wind power is an intermittent energy source that behaves quite differently than 
conventional energy sources. The reliability impact of this highly variable energy source 
is an important aspect that must be assessed as wind power penetration increases. 
Sequential simulation is ideally suited to the analysis of such an intermittent generating 
source. Bulk electric system reliability analysis associated with wind power as 
demonstrated in this thesis provides an opportunity to investigate the reliability benefits 
when wind power is injected at specified locations in a bulk electric system, and can 
facilitate system reinforcement planning. 
 
The required computation effort is a major challenge when utilizing sequential 
Monte Carlo simulation in bulk electric system reliability analysis. This is particularly 
true when conducting system well-being analysis. An actual bulk electric system may 
contain over one thousand buses. Using a normal personal computer (a single processor) 
may be computational expensive or infeasible. The utilization of multi-processors such 
as parallel and distributed processing environments for sequential simulation is proposed 
in Reference [132] by application to the Brazilian 1,389 bus system. The resulting 
computational time is reasonable for system planning applications. This is one possible 
effective solution to the computation effort dilemma. Alternatively, in order to obtain 
realistic delivery point reliability indices in large-scale bulk electric systems, the overall 
system can be divided into subsystems and reliability analyses conducted separately in 
each subsystem. Attention can be focused on the area in which the reinforcement is 
applied rather than on the entire bulk electric system. This is an exciting area for future 
research. 
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APPENDIX A: RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION 
 
Random numbers are a key ingredient in a Monte Carlo simulation process. A 
random number generated by a mathematical model is theoretically not truly random, 
and it is, therefore, designated as a pseudo-random number. Pseudo-random numbers 
used in the simulation process should, however, closely approximate the ideal properties 
of uniformity and independence in order to assure the randomness. There are many 
methods available for generating random numbers. The technique used in this thesis is 
designated as a multiplicative congruential pseudo-random generator. The general form 
of congruential methods based on a fundamental congruence relationship can be 
expressed as follows [13, 103]:  
 
xi+1   =   (axi + c)(mod m)     (A.1) 
 
where a is the multiplier, c is the increment and m is the modulus; a, c and m are 
nonnegative integers. Equation (A.1) can be more specifically called a mixed 
congruential pseudo-random generator. As noted earlier, the pseudo-random generation 
method used in this research is the multiplicative congruential pseudo-random generator 
which is a particular case of the mixed congruential generator described in Equation 
(A.1) with c = 0. The multiplicative congruential pseudo-random generator can, 
therefore, be expressed as: 
 
xi+1   =   axi(mod m)      (A.2) 
 
The module notation (mod m) for the multiplicative congruential generator means that 
 
   xi+1   =   axi - mki      (A.3) 
 
where ki  =  (axi/m) denotes the largest positive integer in axi/m. 
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 Given an initial starting value, x0, that is called a seed, Equation (A.1) generates 
a random number sequence which lies between [0, m]. A random number sequence 
uniformly distributed is the interval [0, 1] can be obtained by  
 
   
m
x
      U ii =        (A.3) 
 
Clearly, such a sequence will repeat itself in at most m steps, and will therefore be 
periodic. If the repeat period equals m, it is called a full period. Different choices of the 
parameters a and m produce large impacts on the statistical features of random numbers. 
Based on many statistical tests, the following parameters provide satisfactory statistical 
features in generated random numbers: 
 
m   =   231 – 1, 
a    =   16807 or 630360016 
The initial starting value (a seed), x0, can be any odd number. 
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APPENDIX B: LINEAR PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES 
 
B.1  Simplex Methods for Linear Programming [13, 36, 103] 
 
 The linear programming problem is to minimize or maximize a linear objective 
function while satisfying a set of linear equality and inequality constraints. It has the 
following standard form: 
 
   minimize cTx 
   subject to Ax  =  b     (B.1) 
     0  ≤  x  ≤  h 
 
where: c, h and x are the n-dimensional column vectors, b is an m-dimensional column 
vector, and A is m×n dimensional matrix. This is a generalized simplex form to include 
both lower and upper bounds constraints of variable x.  
 
B.1.1  Primal Simplex Method 
 
 The primal simplex method for a linear programming problem includes the 
following steps: 
 
Step 1: Determine an initial basic feasible solution using the artificial variable 
technique and create an initial simplex tableau: 
In tableau, yij and yi0 are the coefficients corresponding to matrix A and 
vector b, respectively, following each Gaussian elimination step; rj = cj - zj (j = 
m+1,..., n), where cj are the coefficients in the objective function of the original 
problem, which are known as direct cost coefficients; zj = ∑cjyij are known as 
composite cost coefficients and rj are know as relative cost coefficients; z0 = 
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∑ciyi0 is the value of the objective function at the present step; ej = + or – (j = 
1,..., n), which is called the sign row. For the initial basic feasible solution, 
 
 
variable nonbasic a is x if      0
variable basic a is x ify
             x
i
ii0
i =    (B.2) 
 
and all the ej take + signs. 
 
x x1 .  . . .  xm xm+1  . . .  xn b 
 c1   . . .  cm cm+1  . . .  cn  
x1 1 0  . . .  0 y1,m+1  . . .  y1n y10 
x2 0 1  . . .  0 y2,m+1  . . .  y2n y20 
. . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . 
. . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . 
. . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . 
xi 0 0   1   0 yi,m+1  . . .  yin yi0 
. . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . 
. . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . 
. . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . 
xm 0 0  . 0 .  1 ym,m+1  . . .  ymn ym0 
 0 0  . 0 .  0 rm+1  . . .  rn -z0 
 e1 e2  . 0 .  em em+1  . . .  en  
 
 
Step 2: Select rk = min{rj < 0, (j = m+1,..., n)}. The kth column is called the pivotal 
column. If there is no negative rj, the present solution is already an optimal and 
feasible solution and the simplex process ends. The values of the variables are 
determined according to the signs of ej. If ej = +, xj = xj and if ej = –, xj = hj - xj. 
If there still exists negative rj, go to Step 3. 
 
Step 3: Calculate the following three values for the elements in the selected pivotal 
column: 
• hk 
• θ1 = min{yi0/yik} for all yik > 0 (if there is no positive yik, θ1 = ∞) 
• θ2 = min{(yi0 - hi)/yik} for all yik < 0 (if there is no negative yik, θ2 = ∞) 
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Step 4: Modify the simplex table according to the magnitude of the three values in 
Step 3: 
• If hk is the minimum, the last column is subtracted by the column that is the 
product of the kth column and hk and then the kth column is multiplied by -1 
(including the change of the sign for ek). The base remains unchanged. 
• If θ1 is the minimum and θ1 appears in the qth row, then yqk is selected as 
the pivot. 
• If θ2 is the minimum and θ2 appears in the qth row, then yq0(new) = yq0(old) – 
hq, yqq is multiplied by -1 and the sign of eq is changed; yqk is selected as the 
pivot. 
 
Step 5: With the selected pivot element yqk, conduct the Gaussian elimination in the 
simplex table so that the pivot becomes 1 and the other elements in the pivotal 
column become 0. The updated simplex table is obtained; go to Step 2. 
 
B.1.2  Dual Simplex Method 
 
 In the previous section, the primal simplex method starts from an initial feasible 
solution and then an optimal solution is gradually obtained while retaining feasibility in 
its algorithm. On the other hand, the dual simplex method starts with an initial basic 
solution satisfying optimality of the objective function but not satisfying feasibility. 
Feasibility is gradually obtained under the condition that optimality is retained. Which 
method is utilized depends upon the features of the problems to be solved. If an initial 
feasible solution can be easily obtained, the primal simplex algorithm is used. If an 
initial optimal but nonfeasible solution can be obtained, the dual simplex algorithm is 
used. The basic steps of the dual simplex method can be summarized as follows: 
 
Step 1: Create the initial simplex tableau of the primal problem corresponding to a dual 
basic feasible solution xB, that is rj ≥ 0 for j = m+1,..., n, in the simplex 
tableau. 
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Step 2: If xB ≥ 0, that is, there is no negative element in the column b of the simplex 
tableau, then an optimal and feasible solution is already reached. If there are 
any negative elements in the column of b, go to Step 3. 
 
Step 3: Select the smallest value in the negative elements of xB: 
  min{(xB)i|(xB)i < 0}  =  xq     (B.3) 
The xq is leaving base variable. This means that the qth row is the pivotal row.   
 
Step 4: Check all elements of the pivotal row yqj (j = 1,..., n). If all the elements yqj ≥ 0, 
there is no feasible solution. If there are negative elements in the pivotal row, 
then 
θ  =  min{(zj – cj)/yqj|yqj < 0}  =  (zk – ck)/yqk   (B.4)  
where cj, zj and yqj are the same as defined in the primal simplex method, and xk 
is the entering base variable, which means that the kth column is the pivotal 
column. 
 
Step 5: With the pivot element yqk, conduct the Gaussian elimination to update the 
simplex tableau. An updated optimal base B in obtained and then a new dual 
basic feasible solution is calculated: xB = B-1b. Go to Step 2. 
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APPENDIX C: BASIC SYSTEM DATA FOR THE RBTS 
AND IEEE-RTS 
 
Tables C.1 – C.3 and C.4 – C.6 shown the bus data, line data and generator data 
from the RBTS and for the IEEE-RTS respectively. (Base MVA = 100) 
 
Table C.1: Bus data for the RBTS. 
Load (p.u.) Bus 
No. Active Reactive Pg Qmin Qmax V0 Vmin Vmax 
1 0.00 0 1.0 0.50 -0.4 1.05 0.97 1.05 
2 0.20 0.07 1.2 0.75 -0.4 1.05 0.97 1.05 
3 0.85 0.28 0.0 0.00 0.0 1.00 0.97 1.05 
4 0.40 0.13 0.0 0.00 0.0 1.00 0.97 1.05 
5 0.20 0.07 0.0 0.00 0.0 1.00 0.97 1.05 
6 0.20 0.07 0.0 0.00 0.0 1.00 0.97 1.05 
 
 
Table C.2: Line data for the RBTS. 
Bus Line 
No. I J R X B/2 Tap 
Current 
Rating 
(p.u.) 
Failure 
rate 
(occ/yr) 
Repair
rate 
(hrs) 
1 1 3 0.0342 0.1800 0.0106 1.00 0.85 1.50 10.00 
2 2 4 0.1140 0.6000 0.0352 1.00 0.71 5.00 10.00 
3 1 2 0.0912 0.4800 0.0282 1.00 0.71 4.00 10.00 
4 3 4 0.0228 0.1200 0.0071 1.00 0.71 1.00 10.00 
5 3 5 0.0228 0.1200 0.0071 1.00 0.71 1.00 10.00 
6 1 3 0.0342 0.1800 0.0106 1.00 0.85 1.50 10.00 
7 2 4 0.1140 0.6000 0.0352 1.00 0.71 5.00 10.00 
8 4 5 0.0228 0.1200 0.0071 1.00 0.71 1.00 10.00 
9 5 6 0.0228 0.1200 0.0071 1.00 0.71 1.00 10.00 
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Table C.3: Generator data for the RBTS. 
Unit No. Bus No. Rating
(MW) 
Failure rate
(occ/yr) 
Repair rate 
(hrs) 
1 1 40.0 6.0 45.0 
2 1 40.0 6.0 45.0 
3 1 10.0 4.0 45.0 
4 1 20.0 5.0 45.0 
5 2 5.0 2.0 45.0 
6 2 5.0 2.0 45.0 
7 2 40.0 3.0 60.0 
8 2 20.0 2.4 55.0 
9 2 20.0 2.4 55.0 
10 2 20.0 2.4 55.0 
11 2 20.0 2.4 55.0 
 
 
Table C.4: Bus data for the IEEE-RTS. 
Load (p.u.) Bus 
No. Active Reactive Pg Qmin Qmax V0 Vmin Vmax 
1 1.08 0.22 1.92 1.20 -0.75 1.00 0.95 1.05 
2 0.97 0.20 1.92 1.20 -0.75 1.00 0.95 1.05 
3 1.80 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
4 0.74 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
5 0.71 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
6 1.36 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
7 1.25 0.25 3.00 2.70 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
8 1.71 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
9 1.75 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
10 1.95 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
13 2.65 0.54 5.91 3.60 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
14 1.94 0.39 0.00 3.00 -0.75 1.00 0.95 1.05 
15 3.17 0.64 2.15 1.65 -0.75 1.00 0.95 1.05 
16 1.00 0.20 1.55 1.20 -0.75 1.00 0.95 1.05 
17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
18 3.33 0.68 4.00 3.00 -0.75 1.00 0.95 1.05 
19 1.81 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
20 1.28 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
21 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.00 -0.75 1.00 0.95 1.05 
22 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.45 -0.90 1.00 0.95 1.05 
23 0.00 0.00 6.60 4.50 -0.75 1.00 0.95 1.05 
24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 
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Table C.5: Line data for the IEEE-RTS. 
Bus Line 
No. I J R X B/2 Tap 
Current 
Rating 
(p.u.) 
Failure 
rate 
(occ/yr) 
Repair 
rate 
(hrs) 
1 1 2 0.0260 0.0139 0.2306 1.00 1.93 0.24 16.00 
2 1 3 0.0546 0.2112 0.0286 1.00 2.08 0.51 10.00 
3 1 5 0.0218 0.0845 0.0115 1.00 2.08 0.33 10.00 
4 2 4 0.0328 0.1267 0.0172 1.00 2.08 0.39 10.00 
5 2 6 0.0497 0.1920 0.0260 1.00 2.08 0.39 10.00 
6 3 9 0.0308 0.1190 0.0161 1.00 2.08 0.48 10.00 
7 3 24 0.0023 0.0839 0.0000 1.00 5.10 0.02 768.00
8 4 9 0.0268 0.1037 0.0141 1.00 2.08 0.36 10.00 
9 5 10 0.0228 0.0883 0.0120 1.00 2.08 0.34 10.00 
10 6 10 0.0139 0.0605 1.2295 1.00 1.93 0.33 35.00 
11 7 8 0.0159 0.0614 0.0166 1.00 2.08 0.30 10.00 
12 8 9 0.0427 0.1651 0.0224 1.00 2.08 0.44 10.00 
13 8 10 0.0427 0.1651 0.0224 1.00 2.08 0.44 10.00 
14 9 11 0.0023 0.0839 0.0000 1.00 6.00 0.02 768.00
15 9 12 0.0023 0.0839 0.0000 1.00 6.00 0.02 768.00
16 10 11 0.0023 0.0839 0.0000 1.00 6.00 0.02 768.00
17 10 12 0.0023 0.0839 0.0000 1.00 6.00 0.02 768.00
18 11 13 0.0061 0.0476 0.0500 1.00 6.00 0.02 768.00
19 11 14 0.0054 0.0418 0.0440 1.00 6.00 0.39 11.00 
20 12 13 0.0061 0.0476 0.0500 1.00 6.00 0.40 11.00 
21 12 23 0.0124 0.0966 0.1015 1.00 6.00 0.52 11.00 
22 13 23 0.0111 0.0865 0.0909 1.00 6.00 0.49 11.00 
23 14 16 0.0050 0.0389 0.0409 1.00 6.00 0.38 11.00 
24 15 16 0.0022 0.0173 0.0364 1.00 6.00 0.33 11.00 
25 15 21 0.0063 0.0490 0.0515 1.00 6.00 0.41 11.00 
26 15 21 0.0063 0.0490 0.0515 1.00 6.00 0.41 11.00 
27 15 24 0.0067 0.0519 0.0546 1.00 6.00 0.41 11.00 
28 16 17 0.0033 0.0259 0.0273 1.00 6.00 0.35 11.00 
29 16 19 0.0030 0.0231 0.0243 1.00 6.00 0.34 11.00 
30 17 18 0.0018 0.0144 0.0152 1.00 6.00 0.32 11.00 
31 17 22 0.0135 0.1053 0.1106 1.00 6.00 0.54 11.00 
32 18 21 0.0033 0.0259 0.0273 1.00 6.00 0.35 11.00 
33 18 21 0.0033 0.0259 0.0273 1.00 6.00 0.35 11.00 
34 19 20 0.0051 0.0396 0.0417 1.00 6.00 0.38 11.00 
35 19 20 0.0051 0.0396 0.0417 1.00 6.00 0.38 11.00 
36 20 23 0.0028 0.0216 0.0228 1.00 6.00 0.34 11.00 
37 20 23 0.0028 0.0216 0.0228 1.00 6.00 0.34 11.00 
38 21 22 0.0087 0.0678 0.0712 1.00 6.00 0.45 11.00 
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Table C.6: Generator data for the IEEE-RTS. 
Unit No. Bus No. Rating
(MW) 
Failure rate
(occ/yr) 
Repair rate 
(hrs) 
1 22 50.0 4.42 20.00 
2 22 50.0 4.42 20.00 
3 22 50.0 4.42 20.00 
4 22 50.0 4.42 20.00 
5 22 50.0 4.42 20.00 
6 22 50.0 4.42 20.00 
7 15 12.0 2.98 60.00 
8 15 12.0 2.98 60.00 
9 15 12.0 2.98 60.00 
10 15 12.0 2.98 60.00 
11 15 12.0 2.98 60.00 
12 15 155.0 9.13 40.00 
13 7 100.0 7.30 50.00 
14 7 100.0 7.30 50.00 
15 7 100.0 7.30 50.00 
16 13 197.0 9.22 50.00 
17 13 197.0 9.22 50.00 
18 13 197.0 9.22 50.00 
19 1 20.0 19.47 50.00 
20 1 20.0 19.47 50.00 
21 1 76.0 4.47 40.00 
22 1 76.0 4.47 40.00 
23 2 20.0 9.13 50.00 
24 2 20.0 9.13 50.00 
25 2 76.0 4.47 40.00 
26 2 76.0 4.47 40.00 
27 23 155.0 9.13 40.00 
28 23 155.0 9.13 40.00 
29 23 350.0 7.62 100.00 
30 18 400.0 7.96 150.00 
31 21 400.0 7.96 150.00 
32 16 155.0 9.13 40.00 
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APPENDIX D:  CHRONOLOGICAL LOAD DATA 
 
D.1  Time Variation of Load 
 
Table D.1 gives the percentage allocation of the sector peak for all the 52 weeks 
(1-52) of the residential sector. 
 
Table D.1:  Weekly residential sector allocation. 
Week 
No: 
Percentage 
Allocation 
Week 
No: 
Percentage 
Allocation 
1 0.922 27 0.815 
2 0.960 28 0.876 
3 0.938 29 0.861 
4 0.894 30 0.940 
5 0.940 31 0.782 
6 0.901 32 0.836 
7 0.892 33 0.860 
8 0.866 34 0.789 
9 0.800 35 0.786 
10 0.797 36 0.765 
11 0.775 37 0.840 
12 0.787 38 0.755 
13 0.764 39 0.784 
14 0.810 40 0.784 
15 0.781 41 0.803 
16 0.860 42 0.804 
17 0.814 43 0.860 
18 0.897 44 0.941 
19 0.930 45 0.945 
20 0.940 46 0.969 
21 0.916 47 1.000 
22 0.871 48 0.950 
23 0.960 49 0.975 
24 0.947 50 0.970 
25 0.956 51 0.980 
26 0.921 52 0.990 
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Table D.2:  Hourly percentage of the sector peak load for all sectors. 
Hour No: Res. 
Average 
Day 
Res. 
Peak 
Winter 
Res. 
Peak 
Summer 
Average 
Com. 
Peak 
Com. 
Industrial 
1 0.550 0.600 0.700 0.010 0.010 0.337 
2 0.500 0.550 0.650 0.010 0.010 0.337 
3 0.430 0.455 0.600 0.010 0.010 0.337 
4 0.370 0.400 0.550 0.010 0.010 0.337 
5 0.360 0.400 0.550 0.010 0.010 0.337 
6 0.380 0.395 0.510 0.030 0.030 0.337 
7 0.385 0.400 0.500 0.040 0.040 1.000 
8 0.425 0.450 0.540 0.250 0.350 1.000 
9 0.450 0.550 0.600 0.850 0.850 1.000 
10 0.550 0.650 0.650 0.900 0.900 1.000 
11 0.600 0.700 0.700 0.910 0.900 1.000 
12 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.920 1.000 1.000 
13 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.985 0.985 1.000 
14 0.750 0.850 0.850 0.975 0.975 1.000 
15 0.750 0.850 0.850 0.880 0.850 1.000 
16 0.750 0.850 0.850 0.865 0.865 1.000 
17 0.800 0.900 0.900 0.890 0.850 1.000 
18 0.850 0.950 0.950 0.900 1.000 1.000 
19 0.850 0.950 0.950 0.900 1.000 1.000 
20 0.860 1.000 1.000 0.640 0.950 1.000 
21 0.860 1.000 1.000 0.600 0.850 1.000 
22 0.800 0.900 0.900 0.420 0.750 1.000 
23 0.750 0.850 0.850 0.400 0.300 1.000 
24 0.650 0.750 0.750 0.025 0.020 1.000 
 
 
Res. Average Day = Average (Fall/Spring season) day for the residential sector 
 
Res. Peak Winter  = Peak Winter day for the residential sector 
 
Res. Peak Summer= Peak Summer day for the residential sector 
 
Average Com.       = Average (Fall/Spring) day for the residential sector 
 
Peak Com.             = Peak (Summer/Winter) day for the commercial sector 
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Table D.2:  Hourly percentage of the sector peak load for all sectors (continued). 
Hour No: Govt. & 
Inst. 
Peak 
Office & 
Building 
Average 
Office & 
Building 
Large 
Users 
Peak 
Agri. 
Average 
Agri. 
1 0.400 0.590 0.270 0.1037 0.010 0.001 
2 0.400 0.590 0.410 0.1037 0.010 0.001 
3 0.400 0.450 0.350 0.1037 0.010 0.001 
4 0.400 0.420 0.400 0.1037 0.010 0.001 
5 0.400 0.390 0.400 0.1037 0.010 0.001 
6 0.600 0.410 0.300 0.1037 0.010 0.001 
7 0.700 0.750 0.550 0.1037 0.100 0.020 
8 0.750 0.770 0.650 1.0000 0.200 0.100 
9 0.800 0.850 0.850 1.0000 0.600 0.400 
10 0.850 0.840 0.800 1.0000 0.700 0.600 
11 0.900 1.000 1.000 1.0000 0.750 0.650 
12 0.920 1.000 1.000 1.0000 0.800 0.670 
13 0.930 1.000 0.985 1.0000 0.770 0.650 
14 0.960 1.000 0.975 1.0000 0.850 0.680 
15 0.970 0.985 0.850 1.0000 1.000 0.690 
16 0.970 0.975 0.865 1.0000 0.970 0.760 
17 1.000 0.970 0.850 1.0000 0.950 0.810 
18 0.980 0.965 0.900 1.0000 0.920 0.700 
19 0.800 0.950 0.900 1.0000 0.900 0.500 
20 0.750 0.950 0.680 0.5000 0.750 0.350 
21 0.650 0.940 0.640 0.5000 0.550 0.300 
22 0.500 0.920 0.420 0.5000 0.100 0.005 
23 0.430 0.720 0.400 0.5000 0.020 0.004 
24 0.120 0.520 0.025 0.5000 0.010 0.003 
 
 
Govt. & Inst.                        = Government & Institutions for all seasons 
 
Peak Office & Building       = Peak (Summer/Winter) day for the Office Building sector  
 
Average Office & Building = Peak (Fall/Spring) day for the Office Building sector  
 
Peak Agri.                            = Peak (Fall/Spring) day for the Agricultural sector 
 
Average Agri.                      = Average (Summer/Winter) day for the Agricultural sector 
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Table D.3:  Daily percentage of the sector peak load. 
Day Res. Com. Ind. Govt. 
& Inst. 
Office & 
Building 
Large 
Users 
Agri. 
Monday 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Tuesday 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Wednesday 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Thursday 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Friday 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Saturday 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.50 1.00 1.00 
Sunday 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.30 0.40 1.00 1.00 
 
 
 
D.2  Calculation of Sector Load Factors 
 
Sector load factor  =  
24364
)d()w()x(
3
1k
24
1i
n
1i
7
1i
iii
×
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ××∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = =     (D.1) 
 
where:   k  =  Season type (k=1 refers to fall/spring, k=2 refers to winter  
                      and k=3 refers to summer), 
  n  =  a number of weeks in k, 
      ∑
=
24
1i
ix   =  summation of hourly per unit values from Tables D.2, 
            wi  =  weekly allocation from Table D.1 for residential sector, 
             di  =  daily allocation from Table D.3. 
 
1. Residential sector load factor = 
{ }
24364
)51.683.1118()51.6033.1617()51.6636.1707.15(
×
××+××+××  =  0.5598 
 
2. Commercial sector load factor =  
{ }
24364
)713515.13()717515.13()72243.12(
×
××+××+××  =  0.5440 
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3. Large Users sector load factor =  
{ }
24364
)713259.15()7172259.15()7222259.15(
×
××+××+××  = 0.6344 
 
4. Government & Institution sector load factor = 
{ }
24364
)7.51358.16()7.51758.16()7.52258.16(
×
××+××+××  = 0.5625 
 
5. Office & Building sector load factor = 
{ }
24364
)9.513955.18()9.517955.18()9.52247.15(
×
××+××+××  = 0.6140 
 
6. Agricultural sector load factor = 
{ }
24364
)713898.7()717898.7()72211(
×
××+××+××  = 0.3838 
 
7. Industrial sector load factor = 
{ }
24364
)713022.20()717022.20()722022.20(
×
××+××+××  = 0.8340 
 
 
 
 
D.3  Customer Sector Allocations  
 
 
Tables D.4 and D.5 show customer sector allocations at different load buses for 
the RBTS and IEEE-RTS respectively. 
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Table D.4: Customer sector allocations at different load buses for the RBTS. 
Load Percentage of Customer Sector (%) Bus 
No. Agri. Lrg U. Resid. Govern. Indus. Comm. Offic. 
2 0.00 0.00 36.25 27.50 17.50 18.75 0.00 
3 0.00 65.29 23.41 0.00 4.68 5.53 1.09 
4 0.00 0.00 47.50 0.00 40.75 11.75 0.00 
5 0.00 0.00 44.50 27.75 0.00 18.50 9.25 
6 37.00 0.00 39.25 0.00 15.25 8.50 0.00 
 
 
Table D.5: Customer sector allocations at different load buses for the IEEE-RTS. 
Load Percentage of Customer Sector (%) Bus 
No. Agri. Lrg U. Resid. Govern. Indus. Comm. Offic. 
1 0.00 0.00 34.03 15.83 36.94 13.20 0.00 
2 0.00 0.00 50.05 35.26 0.00 14.69 0.00 
3 6.33 0.00 52.50 0.00 33.25 7.92 0.00 
4 0.00 0.00 34.52 46.22 0.00 19.26 0.00 
5 0.00 0.00 51.38 0.00 28.10 20.07 0.00 
6 8.38 0.00 49.70 0.00 29.34 10.48 2.10 
7 18.24 0.00 38.44 0.00 31.92 11.40 0.00 
8 0.00 0.00 55.00 15.00 11.67 16.66 1.67 
9 19.54 48.86 23.46 0.00 0.00 40.87 3.27 
10 8.77 21.92 41.54 0.00 20.46 7.31 0.00 
13 6.45 16.13 30.09 9.69 22.59 10.75 4.30 
14 0.00 44.07 32.42 0.00 20.57 2.94 0.00 
15 0.00 67.43 17.29 0.00 0.00 10.78 4.50 
16 0.00 42.75 25.90 17.10 0.00 14.25 0.00 
18 0.00 56.49 18.69 0.00 11.98 6.85 5.99 
19 0.00 61.41 30.72 0.00 0.00 7.87 0.00 
20 0.00 33.40 42.11 13.36 0.00 11.13 0.00 
 
where: Agri. = Agricultural, Lrg U. = Large Users, Resid. = Residential,  
            Gover. = Government and Institution, Indus. = Industrial,  
            Comm. = Commercial, Offic. = Office and Building. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
